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This thesis is concerned with economics of the labour market. Because of the distinct
character of the labour market (mainly due to the particular type of commodity traded,
ie. human resources), labour economics has evolved  into  a very broad  area of research
(as is illustrated by the Handbook of Labor Economics, which now consists of 3 volumes
and 53 chapters). Many important issues are dealt with, ranging from unemployment  and
social security to optimal employment contracts and the effect of education on earnings.
Moreover, labour economics is one of the few fields in economics where theory and
empirical research go hand in hand. An example is job search theory, where data on
unemployment durations and subsequent wages are used to identify structural parameters
of search models (see Devine and Kiefer (1991) for an overview). The results can then be
used to address policy issues such as long-term unemployment and the effects of minimum
wages. Another example is the econometrics of sample selectivity, arising for instance in
models of labour supply (a literature that goes back to the early '7Os) and which is now
applied in the measurement of training program effectiveness.
Both features of labour economics, the combination of empirical and theoretical re-
search and the broadness of the field, are reflected in this dissertation. Two empirical
chapters, one theoretical chapter and one mixed chapter deal with models of search,
matching and bargaining. The models are used to analyse unemployment dynamics,
part-time employment and the process of wage formation.  As each chapter starts with an
extensive introduction, the chapters can be read independently of each other. Moreover,
the chapters do not have a general theme. Therefore, there will be no concluding chapter.
However, below a brief overview and the main conclusions of each chapter will be given.
Chapters 2 and 3 use hazard rate models to analyse transition rates into and out of
unemployment of French unemployed. The empirical hazard rate models stem from the
theoretical wage posting models (see Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) for a recent overview
of job search theory). In these models firms post wages in order to attract workers  and
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unemployed workers search for the best offer. Together, the wage offet· clist.iii,1 it.i„,1, Llic
offer arrival rate and the optimal decision rule of the unemployed worker cleteritiille tlie
chance of getting a job at a given moment, the so called hazard rate. Originating from
this structural approach, a more flexible procedure is the reduced form duration analysis,
which directly models the hazard  rate (see amongst others Lancaster  (1990)).
In Chapter 2, which is based on Van den Berg, Van Lomwel and Van Ours (1998),
we analyse the transition rates into and out of unemployment of French unemployed.
The data used in this analysis are French aggregate data that on the one hand cover
a long enough time period to estimate business cycle effects and on the other hand are
detailed enough to analyse individual unemployment durations. Employing a method by
Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1994), we decompose the unemployment dynamics
of the unemployed into the effects of genuine duration dependence, business cycles and
unobserved characteristics. The focus of this chapter is on how these dynamics differ
between youths, adults and elderly.
The empirical results suggest that there is no strong long-run trend in the inflow or
outflow rates for youths. Adults on the other hand experience increasing inflow rates
and decreasing outflow rates. However, at least part of the explanation of the better
performance of youths over the past decades lies in the existence of special youth training
and workfare programs. These programs not necessarily improve the long-run labour
market prospects of youths.
We find that in general the inflow rate into unemployment is counter-cyclical, whereas
the outflow rate is pro-cyclical. Yet there are pronounced differences between gender-
types and age groups. For instance, female inflow rates are hardly cyclical. This may be
explained by discouraged worker effects and lower incentives to register as unemployed
(remember  that  we use administrative  data). The strong cyclicality  of male inflow rates
on the other hand can be explained by the strong representation of men in sectors that
are sensitive to economic shocks. Comparing age groups, the results show that the cycle
in the inflow rate of male youths is larger than that of adult males. Moreover, the cycle
in the outflow rate is smaller for both male and female youths, compared to their adult
counterparts. The volatility of the youth unemployment rate can thus be attributed
to volatility in the youth infiow rate. These differences can be explained by the above
mentioned training and workfare programs for youths and the prevalence of short-term
contracts for young workers. 'Itaining programs lead to high outflow rates, whereas short-
term contracts lead to high and volatile inflow rates in combination with less volatile
outflow rates.
Apart from the business cycle effects, we find evidence on the importance of seasonal
effects on youth unemployment. These effects mainly concern the inflow into unemploy-
ment. In particular, school-leavers cause the incidence to be higher in the second half
of the year. Moreover, we find that training programs absorb many of these new labour
market entrants.
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Finally, interaction of duration dependence with the business cycle has some policy
implications. Youth unemployment durations are negatively duration dependent. More-
over, youths have the biggest chance of becoming long-term unemployed during a recession
(high infiow rates and low outfiow rates). We also find that youth exit probabilities are
negatively duration dependent. Not some bad (unobserved) characteristics but the mere
fact of having been unemployed for a long time causes the exit probability to fall. There-
fore, policy to prevent long-term youth unemployment should aim at these long-term
unemployed youths.
In the analysis of Chapter 2 no distinction is made between different labour market
states.  Due to data limitations, transitions from unemployment to out of the labour
force cannot be distinguished from transitions to employment. Yet, from other empirical
studies (see Devine and Kiefer (1991) for an overview) it appears that there are differ-
ences in duration dependence of exit rates out of unemployment, depending on whether
the destination is employment or out of the labour force. Moreover, studies show that
characteristics like age, gender and education affect these transition rates differently (see
e.g.    Visser  (1990)). In Chapter  3 we investigate these differences for France. Estimat-
ing a competing risks model, we analyse the differences in unemployment dynamics with
respect to the destinations employment and out of the labour force.  As an interesting
byproduct, we deduce the conditions for identifiability of a dependent competing risks
model in a nonparametric setting.
Our results show that a competing risks model is superior to a single risk model only
considering the exit out of unemployment regardless of the destination. In particular, we
find that the duration dependence patterns differ between both destinations. Second, the
unobserved heterogeneity terms affect the exit to both destinations differently, but we
find no evidence that these terms are correlated. It should be noted that the empirical
analysis suffers from identification problems. We deduce the condition for identifiability,
which turns out to be barely met in our data.
Chapter 4 focusses on part-time employment. OECD statistics show that over the
past decades part-time employment has become an important labour market phenomenon.
Although there are differences in levels between OECD countries, in all countries part-time
employment is an important component of employment growth. Usually, increased female
participation rates are said to have induced increased levels of part-time employment.
However, changes in labour demand can also explain this phenomenon.
We construct an equilibrium matching model to address these issues. Matching models
(Pissarides (1990)), like wage posting models, fit into the literature on job search theory.
In matching models firms do not post wages, but open vacancies. The search friction now
consists of the fact that it takes time for unemployed workers and vacancies to find each
other. As soon as an unemployed worker and a vacancy have met, the wage is determined
by a bargaining procedure.
We extend the standard matching model to incorporate part-time employment and
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endogenous participation. The general equilibrium approach then allows 11+ t.1, 41.Sh(•Sh ,|1('
effect of changes in both labour demand and supply on the level of part-tillie LillI,loyiticlit
in the economy. In particular, we calibrate our model to reflect the Dutch labour market.
The comparative statics of the model reveal that changes in labour demand are much
more likely to explain the increase in part-time employment in the Dutch labour market
over the past two decades than changes in labour supply. Where the former induces
extra supply, the effect of the latter is limited by the production structure. Although the
extra supply makes it easier to hire part-time workers, the production structure limits the
number of new workers that can be productive.
That indeed changes in labour demand caused the increase in part-time employment
as experienced in The Netherlands might have to do with the policy of working time
reductions, started in the early '8Os. During the recession in this period the working time
reductions were accompanied by reduction of operating hours in order to get rid of excess
capacity. However, during the second half of the '8Os the economy recovered. In response
firms uncoupled operating hours and working time. Together with increasing fluctuations
in the workload, this added to the firms' need for flexible working time arrangements
in order to optimally schedule employees. Part-time employment could provide the firms
with this flexibility. The analysis in the second part of Chapter 4, using data from a Dutch
firm panel, provides empirical evidence for this claim. In particular we find that the more
working time and operating hours differ, the higher the level of part-time employment in
a firm. We also find evidence for the assertion that workload fluctuations are positively
associated with part-time employment.
In the model of Chapter 4, wages are determined by a bargaining procedure between
the firm and the applicant. Chapter 5 takes a closer look at wage bargaining. In particular,
it contributes to the noncooperative bargaining literature on wage negotiations between
a union and a firm. In these models, building on Rubinstein's (1982) alternating offer
model, the union and the firm bargain sequentially, alternately proposing a wage contract.
Previous literature (for instance Fernandez and Glazer (1997)) focussed on the occurrence
of strikes and holdouts in equilibrium. This chapter, taken from Houba and Van Lomwel
(2000),   extends the alternating offer framework to allow for finite contract length   and
productivity growth, analysing the effects on the equilibrium outcomes of the model. In
particular, these extensions put the credibility of going on strike and the effects of a
holdout into a dynamic context, so that more interesting wage dynamics result.
We find that the maximum utility the union can attain does not depend on the length
of the contract. However, the way this utility is reached differs. It turns out that there
are two classes of parameters, each implying a particular kind of dynamics.  In the one
case, there is monotonic convergence to a steady state. In the other, there is no steady
state and cyclical behaviour results. Moreover, there is a subclass of parameters for which
a voluntary wage decrease can occur, even if strike is currently credible.
In the limit, as the time between bargaining rounds vanishes, the credibility issue
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disappears. Strike is always credible, and there is convergence to a unique steady state
wage share. In this limit, a wage decrease can still occur. Moreover, our limit results
suggest that a large class of extended models can be analysed using the Nash bargaining
solution with the appropriate disagreement points.
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Chapter 2
Unemployment Dynamics and Age
2.1 Introduction
There is hardly any study on youth unemployment that does not start by stating that
governments are deeply concerned by high rates of youth unemployment. In France, the
country we focus on in this chapter, youth unemployment rates are double digit and much
larger than those of adults. Moreover, Flench unemployment rates are higher than the
OECD average. In 1994, the unemployment rate in France was 9.7 (13.1) percent for
men (women) aged 25-54, and 24.2 (31.6) percent for men (women) aged 15-24 (OECD
(1996)).
There are several economic explanations for the relatively great concern for youth
unemployment compared to unemployment in general. First, an early spell of unemploy-
ment may increase the incidence and duration of future unemployment, because youths
are not yet firmly rooted into the labour market and may be stigmatised by an early spell
of unemployment. Second, this early spell of unemployment hampers the accumulation of
human capital. Not only will human capital not increase due to the absence of on-the-job
training, the human capital acquired at school is depreciated as well. Finally, commitment
to society as a whole may reduce, the devil finding work for idle hands (OECD (1984a)).
This concern has led the French government to enact special youth programs and poli-
cies. In 1981 the "Future for youth plan" (Plan avenir jeunes) was brought into effect.
The main objective of this plan was to stimulate the employment of young people by
various economic premiums and exemptions for employers and by various training and
workfare programs. The number of participants to such programs increased substantially
after the 1986 "Emergency plan for youth employment" (Plan d'urgence pour l'emploi
des jeunes), which introduced stronger incentives to participate and facilitated the devel-
opment of new programs (see OECD (1984b), CSERC (1996) and Bonnal, Foug&re and
S6randon  ( 1997) for details on various programs  and the numbers of individuals enrolled
in them).
In this chapter we study unemployment dynamics among different age groups in a
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systematic way, focusing on business-cycle and calendar-time effects on the inflow and
outflow rates of unemployment. These in turn determine the movement of the unemploy-
ment rate over time.  Most of the previous studies on labour market dynamics have taken
a micro approach (see Devine and Kiefer (1991) for an overview). This approach focuses
on personal characteristics that affect individual re-employment probabilities. Macroeco-
nomic conditions are at most included as an additional regressor (see for example Dynarski
and Sheffrin (1990)). Recently, Sider (1985), Baker (1992), and Butler and MacDonald
(1986), amongst others, have stressed the effect  of the business cycle on aggregate flows of
individuals over a long period of time, using aggregate data. A few empirical studies on
unemployment dynamics focus  on the youth labour market. Clark and Summers  (1982),
by examining US data from the Current Population Survey of 1976, find that the high rate
of joblessness among youths is a problem of job availability. Their data convey a picture
of a dynamic labour market, where youth employment is very responsive to aggregate de-
mand. The participation rate shows a large increase in the summer months, mainly due
to summer-only workers. Lynch (1985) examines duration data for a sample of London
youths taken from a longitudinal survey of young workers in the greater London area who
left school at age 16 in the summer of 1979. The determinants of re-employment prob-
abilities are estimated using a Weibull proportional hazard model. The main conclusion
concerns the evidence of negative duration dependence. Lynch (1989) uses a US data set
of young workers (both male and female) in the National Longitudinal Survey to estimate
the determinants of re-employment probabilities. She finds strong negative duration de-
pendence, and differences between men and women. Moreover she finds that local demand
conditions play an important role. Chapter VI of the OECD 1983 Employment Outlook
(OECD (1983)) also explores differences between youth and adult unemployment. Youths
face a much higher risk of becoming unemployed, and most of the separations are involun-
tary. Moreover, youths have a higher propensity to terminate spells of unemployment by
way of withdrawing from the labour force. The teenage labour force flows, in particular
in North America, show a strong seasonal pattern. Finally, Chapter IV of the OECD
1996 Employment Outlook (OECD (1996)) examines the youth labour market over the
1980s and 1990s. Youth employment and unemployment seems to be exceptionally sensi-
tive to the overall state of the labour market. From all these empirical studies we derive
the following stylised facts on youth unemployment. First, youth unemployment is much
more responsive to aggregate economic conditions than adult unemployment. Secondly,
youth unemployment has a strong seasonal component. Thirdly, youth unemployment is
heterogeneous with respect to gender.
In the present chapter we examine whether these results are confirmed in a formal
econometric analysis. For example, we examine to what extent youths are dispropor-
tionally affected by a recession. We estimate a model in which the business cycle affects
the inflow and outflow into and out of unemployment. Concerning the latter we adopt a
model in which the individual exit probability is duration dependent and also depends on
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the business cycle and on individual-specific characteristics. It is important to allow for
the latter type of characteristics when dealing with cyclical effects on the exit rate out of
unemployment. The weeding out of the individuals with the highest individual-specific
effects occurs faster in the top of the cycle than in a recession (see Van den Berg and Van
Ours (1996)).  As a result, individual heterogeneity causes the duration dependence of the
aggregate exit probability to be less negative in a recession than in the top of the cycle.  If
one does not take this into account then the business cycle effect in the recession will be
over-estimated; that is, the estimated effect on the individual exit probability will be less
severe than the real effect. In our analysis, we estimate different models for different age
groups and genders, and we allow for heterogeneity of unobserved individual character-
istics.  In sum, the estimates provide an econometrically more careful description of the
business cycle effects than can be obtained from simply eyeballing the graphs of raw data.
Note that previous studies on unemployment durations typically assume that duration
dependence is invariant across age groups (some studies, however, restrict attention to
data from just one age group, see e.g. the articles by Lynch mentioned above).  In the
empirical analysis we use French administrative data which distinguish unemployment by
elapsed duration and by gender. The data are quarterly and cover the period 1982.IV-
1994.IV. Our model and estimation method are based on Abbring, Van den Berg and Van
Ours (1994).
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2 we present the model and the
empirical implementation. Section 2.3 describes the data. In Section 2.4, the estimation
results are presented, and we decompose unemployment variation into the contributions
of its determinants, notably business cycle effects.  From a policy point of view, it is
important to know differences across age groups of the instantaneous effect of the business
cycle on inflow and outflow. For example, if exit probabilities of youths respond to
business cycles at a later stage than the exit probabilities of adults, then this may help
policy makers to anticipate cycles of youth unemployment. The results can also be used to
predict, for a given state of the business cycle, which types of employed and unemployed
workers suffer most from the cycle in terms of their chances on the labour market.  In
Section 2.5 we therefore discuss the policy implications of our results in some detail.
2.2 The model and the empirical implementation
In this section we describe the model for the exit probabilities out of unemployment.
Since this model is described in detail in Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1994),
the present exposition is brief.  In the first subsection we start with a sketch of the type of
data we use, and we discuss the role of measurement errors. The second subsection deals
with the unemployment duration model. The parameterisation of the model is discussed
in the third subsection.
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2.2.1   Observation of unemployment
We use two measures of time, each with a different origin. The variable t denotes the du-
ration of a spell of unemployment for a given individual. The variable T denotes calendar
time. We take t and T to have the same measurement scale, apart from the difference in
origin. Both t and T are discrete variables. For example, consider an individual who is
unemployed for t periods at calendar time ·r. If he fails to leave unemployment in period
t, he will be unemployed for t+1 periods at calendar time T +1.
Aggregate data give the total numbers of individuals in the labour market who are
unemployed for t periods of time  (t = 0,1,2,...) at calendar times T (T = To, To + 1, To +
2,...).  By comparing the number of individuals who are unemployed for t periods of time
at ·r to the number unemployed for t+1 periods at T t l,w e observe the fraction of the
former who leave unemployment at t. This fraction of course equals the exit probability
Out of unemployment 0(tIT) of an individual who is unemployed for t periods, when
calendar time equals T at the moment of potential exit:
0(t IT) = (2.1)
U(t|T) - U(t + 117 + 1)
UUM)
In reality we do not exactly observe the numbers U(tIT), due to e.g rounding-off errors
and administrative errors. In addition, the unemployment definition changes over time.
We capture this by way of stochastic errors.  From now on, a tilde denotes an observed
variable whereas the absence of a tilde denotes the true value of the corresponding model
variable. We assume that
0(tl·r) = U(tIT)€t,r (2.2)
with
log 43 - N(0, 02)
In the empirical analysis we allow for non-zero correlations between errors €t,r at one
single calendar moment.  Thus, we specify the correlation between log Et·,r·  and log €t••,r••
to be equal to rlt'-t··| if T* = T**, and 0 otherwise. Combining the equations (2.1) and
(2.2), we obtain
log(1 - 8(tIT)) = log(1 - 0(t IT)) + et,r (2.3)
where
et,T := log €t+1,1+1 - log Et,T
Equation (2.3) links the data to the true exit probabilities. In the next subsection we
present a model for 8(tiT)
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2.2.2 The model
The model expresses the true exit probabilities in terms of the (determinants of the) exit
probabilities at the individual level. The relation is established by way of aggregating
over individual unemployment duration distributions.
It is assumed that all variation in the individual exit probabilities out of unemployment
can be explained by the prevailing unemployment duration t and calendar time T, and
by observed and unobserved heterogeneity across individuals. The effect of t represents
genuine duration dependence, i.e. dependence of individual exit probabilities on the
elapsed unemployment duration. Calendar time is assumed to capture macro effects
(including business cycle and seasonal effects) on individual exit probabilities, as well
as structural changes influencing these probabilities. In the data we use, we have two
observed individual characteristics that can be used as an explanatory variable x, namely
the  gender  and age group (youth, adult, elderly). We estimate the model separately  for
both gender types and the three age groups, and in the sequel we suppress the conditioning
on the prevailing value of x.
We denote the probability that an individual leaves unemployment right after t periods
of unemployment, given that he is unemployed for t periods at calendar time 7, and
conditional on his unobserved characteristics v, by 8(tIT, v). By definition, this is the exit
probability out of unemployment (or hazard) at 1- conditional on t and v. We assume
proportionality of individual exit probabilities 8(tl·r, v): there are functions  01  and 102
such that
8(tl·r, v) = 01(t) · 1 2 7) · v (2.4)
with 41 and 102 Positive and uniformly bounded from above. The functions 41 and 92
represent the duration dependence and the calendar time dependence of the individual
exit probabilities out of unemployment. Furthermore, the distribution of v is such that,
for every t and 7-,
Pr(0 < 0(tl·r, u) < 1) = 1.
We now turn to the effect of calendar time at the inflow into unemployment on the
exit probabilities. We assume this to act by way of the composition of the inflow. This is
modelled by a calendar time dependent scale parameter of the distribution function Gr
of v,
G,(103(7-)v) = G(v)
with G(v) the distribution of the composition of the inflow at the calendar time base
T = O, and 93 Positive and uniformly bounded from above.  If 43(T) > 1 then the
individuals entering unemployment at T on average have lower values of their unobserved
characteristics (i.e. lower exit probabilities) than the individuals entering at the calendar
time base. For instance, this parameter could capture the effect of (relatively) highly
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qualified graduates, usually entering the labour market in the third quarter. To express
the exit probabilities 8(tl·r) appearing  in  the  r.h.s. of equation  (2.3) in terms  of 8(t T, V),
we have to integrate v out of the latter.  It can be shown that the following relation holds
(see Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1994)),
0(t17-) = 01(t)02(T)03(T - t)
v
(2.5)
E  [v Ht=i(1 - 01(t - i)02(7 - i)43(,  - t)v)1
Ev[11:=1(1 - 41(t - i)02(t - i)93(T - t)V)1
in which Ev(.) denotes the expectation with respect to the distribution G. Substitution of
equation (2.5) in equation (2.3) establishes the link between the observed exit probabilities
and the model determinants.
Our model is closed by the specification of an equation for the infiow size (the incidence
equation). We measure the size of the inflow by the number of people in the first duration
class U(OIT). This number is smaller than the true inflow, because people who enter and
leave within a quarter are excluded: We specify
U(OIT) = 04(T) (2.6)
with the function 44 positive and uniformly bounded from above. Substitution of (2.6)
into equation (2.2) links the observed 0(OIT) and the unknown function li'4(T)
In the model described above, the structural determinants  are the functions  141,   2,                             |
103, 04 and G. As shown by Van den Berg and Van Ours (1996), the assumptions above
ensure nonparametric identifiability of the model without effects of calendar time at the
moment of infiow. In particular, they ensure that duration dependence and unobserved
heterogeneity can be distinguished empirically without the need to specify parametric
functional forms on the shape of tbi or G. From equation (2.5) it is clear that the functions
01 (t)  and 02('r) are identified  from the multiplicative effect  on  0(tl·r) of respectively  t  and
T. By expanding the product terms in equation (2.5) it follows that 8(tIT) depends on
G(v) by way of the first t+1 moments of u, denoted by kii, and that these are identified
from interaction effects between  t  and  T (i.e., between  41 (t) and 92(T)) in 0(tIT). If the
calendar time effect on 03 is repetitive, as in case of seasonal effects, then 03 is identified,
see Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1994). In the sequel, we assume that 03 only
includes seasonal effects. The function 94 is trivially identified from the 0(01·r) data.
2.2.3 Parameterisation
We adopt the nonparametric estimation method by Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours
(1994). First,
l I the literature both this measure and the true infiow have been used (e.g. Layard, Nickell and
Jackman (1991)). From additional analysis it is clear that the dynamic features of both series are similar.
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<nt-1
01 (t) = exp 1 E 41,Ii.,(t)  
l i=o
in which Ii,t =l i f t=i and 0 otherwise, and nt is the number of duration classes consid-
ered. The unobserved heterogeneity distribution is estimated through  the
"
parameters"
representing its normalised moments  Bl, 72,73 i  · · · , 78
Mi
I11
We adopt products of flexible high-order polynomials (capturing business cycle effects)
and dummy variables (capturing seasonal effects) for the structural functions 42 and 44·
In notation to be explained below,
05(·r) = wj(·r) *:j,c(T),   j = 2,4,
whereas  ,3 (T) is specified to equal W3('r). The seasonal effects in 42, 03 and 94  are specified
as
(4
Wj(T) =exp 1 2-, w,jI,(T)           (2.7)
l s=1
where I, is an indicator function for season s, s = 1, ..., S. The cyclical and trend effects in
02 and 94 are represented by polynomials of indexed order that are mutually orthogonal
on the data interval for T.   Let the functions pl(T), P2(1-), I)3(T), denote these Chebyshev
polynomials. Then
k
V'j,c(T) = E a,jp,(T),   j = 2,4
i=0
Note that we can compare our estimates to the way in which conventional business cycle
indicators behave over time. We normalise the duration model by taking aO2 - 003 - 1,
W21 = W31 -   (so the first season is the base season), and 01(0) = 1 (so 1 '10 - O). We
normalise the incidence model by taking a04 = 1 and w41 = 0· Finally, we include a
multiplicative  term  exp(c)  in 1/,4, where  c  is a parameter  to be estimated.
Before finishing this section we point out a procedure to test the MPH assumption (see
Van den Berg and Van Ours (1996)). Consider the estimates of 72, ··,7.,·  If the model
is correct, .., 7,:, are mutually consistent as normalised moments  of a distributionthen  72,
with positive bounded support (from zero until the upper bound depending on the func-
tions  91  and  92)·   This  can be tested  for. For example,  if 72  <   1  or  73  <  722 then there  is
no distribution with positive support that is able to generate such moments (see Shohat
and Tamarkin (1970); for example 72 < 1 would imply Var(v) < 0). Similar constraints
must hold for the higher order moments. These tests are useful as specification tests, as
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they can be shown to be informative on the validity of the proportionality assumption
(equation (2.4); see Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1994)).
2.3  The data
We use French administrative data on numbers of unemployed individuals in three age
groups: youths (aged below 25), adults (aged 25-49) and elderly people (aged 50 and
over), for both genders. These were collected by the Ftench public employment of-
fices (A.N.RE.), and subsequently collected on a nation-wide scale by the Department
of Labour. They cover individuals who are actively looking for full-time permanent jobs,
and who are immediately available. The data are collected each quarter, and they allow
for calculation of exit probabilities out of the first five quarterly duration classes, over
the period 1982.IV-1994.IV. The latter time interval cannot be lengthened, because from
1995.I onwards the definitions of the administrative data changed substantially, causing
an irreparable break in the series. Each quarter, a number of individuals move from one
age group to another. We do not have data on these numbers, but their magnitude should
be very small in comparison to the size of the inflow and outflow.
Unemployed individuals need to register at a public employment office in order to be
eligible for unemployment benefits. However, since 1984, older unemployed individuals
are exempted from seeking employment and registering. During the past decade, the age
limit has been decreased from 57.5 to 55 years. As a result, we expect the data on elderly
unemployed to be less informative. It is important to note that individuals may not only
leave the unemployment statistics for employment. Participation in training schemes is
an additional reason for exit, according to the employment offices.
Figure 2.1 shows the development of unemployment levels of male and female youths.
The overall pattern is the same for both genders, male youth unemployment being
lower than female youth unemployment. After a sharp rise in the early 198Os, a sharp
decline sets in until 1990. The early 1990s show an increase again, but this increase is less
modest for young men. This cyclical pattern is almost absent in the unemployment figures
of adults (see Figure 2.2). There we see a strong linear upward trend for both men and
women. The levels of unemployment are more or less the same for adult men and women.
The level of unemployment of the elderly is nearly constant over time, unemployment
levels being higher for older men than for older women (see Figure 2.3).
The graphs in Figures 2.4,2.5 and 2.6, showing the inflow size as a function of time,
resemble those for the unemployment levels. The inflow size for youths shows a down-
ward trend, while the inflow size for adults is strongly upward trended. The inflow size
for elderly is more or less constant. The trend for youths is caused by the declining par-
ticipation rates for youths. This can be seen from Figures 2.7 - 2.9, where the inflow rate
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Figure 2.2: Unemployment in France, age group 25-49.
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Figure 2.5: Inflow into unemployment, age group 25-49.
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Figure 2.6: Inflow into unemployment, age group 50+.
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is graphed. The inflow rate is defined as the inflow size divided by the size2 of employ-
ment, for each age/gender group.3   From the figures it is clear that the inflow rate for
Figure 2.7: Inflow / number of employed, age group < 25.
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youths is not downward trended. The inf'low rate equals the probability of inflow into
unemployment for a randomly-chosen employed participant. Therefore, this variable is
more relevant for our purposes than the inflow size. In the next section we therefore focus
on the inflow rates. In particular, 04(T) is estimated from inflow rate data.
The upward trend in the inflow size for adult women is also due to a certain extent
to the increased participation rate of adult women (compare Figures 2.5 and 2.8, note
however from Figure 2.8 that the inflow rates for male and female adults have both
increased over time). The upward trended infow size of adults and the downward trended
inflow size of youths cause the share of youths in the inflow size to diminish over time.
2We use labour force survey data from Eurostat to quantify the number of employed. These are based
on a different definition of labour market states than the administrative data (Van den Berg and Van der
Klaauw (1998)), but unfortunately we do not have employment size data based on the latter definition.
The employment data are yearly, but as the number of employed is much larger than the infiow size,
seasonal fluctuations in the employment size should not have a substantial effect on the inflow rate.
3The declining participation rate for youths is a typical French phenomenon; it reflects the extension of
school attendance over this period (CSERC (1996)). The decline may be the result of a decision of youths
to stay out  of the labour market and enrol in further education because  of the  high  risk of unemployment.
It is not clear whether this is desirable or not.
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Figure 2.8: Inflow / number of employed, age group 25-49.
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Figure 2.9: Inflow / number of employed, age group 50+.
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Figure 2.10: Average quarterly exit probability, men.
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In 1983 the inflow size share of male (female) youths amounted to 52 (56) percent. By
1994, this share had shrunk to 29 (33) percent. The inflow size share of elderly during
this  period  was  more  or less constant  over time, being  7 (6) percent  for men (women).
In sum, the composition of the inflow size has changed in terms of age.  Note that if one
would ignore the change in composition, and merge the data of all age groups together
for a single empirical analysis, then the results would be biased.
Compared to other age groups, the inflow size for youths is high. For youths, 8(OIT)
constitutes on average about 40 percent of total unemployment at a date 7-, whereas this
is about 25 percent for adults and 15 percent for elderly workers. These numbers indicate
a dynamic youth labour market. This is also conveyed by the empirical exit probabilities
in the data. Figures 2.10 and 2.11 show the relationship between empirical exit proba-
bilities out of unemployment and unemployment duration, averaged over calendar time.
Obviously, youths have the highest exit probabilities. The fact that inflow and outflow
rates for youths are high is well documented (see the references in Section 2.1). High
youth inflow rates may be due to the fact that many young workers are still searching for
a good match. High youth outflow rates may be due to the fact that youths are flexible
and have on average lower benefits. In France, both may also be due to a specific type of
youth job contracts with little or no job protection. We return to this in the next section.
For youths and adults, the exit probability declines (non-monotonously) over the du-
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Figure 2.11: Average quarterly exit probability, women.
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ration, while for the elderly it is more or less constant. There are small differences in
the level of the exit probabilities for men and women in the first duration classes.  For
higher duration classes the exit probabilities are approximately the same across gender.
The decline of the unemployment exit probability over the duration of unemployment
can be due to unobserved heterogeneity, negative duration dependence, or a combination
of both. The non-monotonicity on the other hand may be caused by the unemployment
benefit system and a duration-dependent flow into public employment programs.
In 1986, the procedure according to which the data are collected was changed. As a
result, the time series on 0(tIT) exhibit ruptures at 1986.IV. Further, the policy towards
youth unemployment changed substantially in the mid-1980s as well, resulting in for
instance the 1986 Emergency Plan for Youth Employment, mentioned in the introduction.
For these reasons, we add to the model a dummy variable d(T) equalling one if T is after
1986.IV and zero otherwise. In particular, we multiply the expressions for U(OIT) and
d(T)0(OIT) in the corresponding model equations by (012'87)    , in which d2:'87 is a parameter
to be estimated. We do not impose this parameter to be the same in the equations for
U(017) and 8(OIT).
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2.4 Estimation results
2.4.1 Preliminary issues
Concerning the exit out of unemployment, we estimate a five-equation model for exit out
of the first five duration classes (see equation (2.5)), for each gender-type and age group
separately. The model expressions for 0(MT) become very complicated for higher duration
classes, and this complicates their use in the model estimation. However, below we show
that the estimation results can in turn be used to make certain inferences on unemploy-
ment  dynamics in higher duration classes. Estimation of incidence equation (2.6), using
incidence observations 8(Olt), completes the analysis of unemployment dynamics. The
model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood. The cyclical components in  ,2 and 04 are
modelled using fifth-degree polynomials.4
It turns out that for the elderly we encountered problems in estimating the duration
model, in particular the 'n parameters. As noted in Subsection 2.2.2, these parameters
are identified from the interactions (or cross effects) of t and T in 8(tIT). The number of
iterations required for the ML algorithm to converge was very large, as were the resulting
standard errors of the 7, estimates.  (This does not depend on the number of duration
classes (i.e.  on the number of equations used in the estimation.)  As a result, we could not
reject the null hypothesis that there is no unobserved heterogeneity among the elderly.
This may be explained by the way the data on elderly are collected. As noted in Section
2.3, unemployed individuals older than 55 (previously 57.5) do not have to register in
order to be eligible for unemployment benefits. Therefore, the administrative data only
contain information on a subset of people who do not want to retire and expect that they
will easier find a job by registering. We decided to estimate for the elderly a modified
version of the duration model described in Subsection 2.2.2, not allowing for unobserved
heterogeneity. Equation (2.4) then reduces to
8(t T, V) = '01(t) · 02(T)
where the functions 01 and 42 are parameterised as described in Subsection 2.2.3.
2.4.2 Business cycles and the age-specific incidence of unem-
ployment
Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 present the estimates of the equation for the inflow rate into
unemployment.
Figure 2.12 shows the combined trend and cycle in the estimated inflow rate 44(T)
of women and men.  (i.e., they show the estimated 04 (T) evaluated at the average value
4Accor(ling to statistical tests and graphical eyeball checks, the fit of the model is not improved by
including higher-order polynomial terms.
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Table 2.1: Parameter estimates incidence. Age group <25.
Men Wornen
constant
c  -2.487 (0.027) -2.486 (0.028)
cycle
a'14 0.033 (0.027) 0.003 (0.028)
a24 0.115 (0.012) 0.079 (0.013)
a34 0.092 (0.011) 0.053 (0.012)
a44 -0.049 (0.012) -0.020 (0.012)
(%54 -0.027 (0.010) 0.004 (0.010)
season
6,24 -0.112 (0.018) 0.058 (0.018)
 4)34 0.442 (0.018) 0.694 (0.018)
W44 0.364 (0.018) 0.339 (0.018)
measurement eTTOT
a  0.044 (0.004) 0.044 (0.004)
dz,87 1.124 (0.043) 1.176 (0.046)
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 2.2: Parameter estimates incidence. Age group 25-49.
Men Women
constant
c  -3.789 (0.024) -3.654 (0.021)
cycle
C214 0.159 (0.021) 0.249 (0.016)
(224 0.033 (0.010) -0.050 (0.008)
(134 0.005 (0.009) -0.043 (0.008)
044 -0.032 (0.009) 0.013 (0.008)
a54 -0.028 (0.008) 0.006 (0.006)
season
W24 -0.151 (0.015) -0.097 (0.012)
W34 0.008 (0.015) 0.119 (0.012)
244 0.127 (0.015) 0.064 (0.012)
measurement error
0 0.035 (0.004) 0.029 (0.003)
012,87 1.096 (0.034) 1.094 (0.028)
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.3: Parameter estimates incidence. Age group 50+.
Men Wornen
constant
c  -4.372 (0.034) -4.474 (0.025)
cycle
 14 0.081 (0.030) 0.124 (0.021)
C 24 -0.017 (0.014) -0.064 (0.011)
C234 -0.003 (0.013) -0.020 (0.010)
a'44 -0.066 (0.014) -0.017 (0.010)
a54 -0.033 (0.011) -0.001 (0.008)
season
(224 -0.144 (0.021) -0.105 (0.015)
U'34 -0.119 (0.021) -0.052 (0.015)
244 0.022 (0.021) 0.017 (0.015)
measurement erTOT
a 0.051 (0.005) 0.037 (0.004)
d2'87 1.184 (0.054) 1.098 (0.036)
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
of its seasonal component; the value   on the vertical   axis   can be interpreted   as   the   de-
sectionalised quarterly probability that a randomly chosen employed worker becomes un-
employed). The infiow  rate is upward trended for adults and elderly, whereas there  is
no strong trend for youths. To compare the cyclical fluctuations across age groups and
gender types, we filter out the trend, using a Hodrick-Prescott filter.5 We then calculate
the relative deviations from this trend. The results are shown in Figure 2.13.6
The capacity utilisation ratio and Real GDP growth are conventional business cycle
indicators. Figure 2.14 shows the development of these indicators for France over the
period 1984.I-1994.IV. By comparing the capacity utilisation ratio and Real GDP growth
to the cyclical fluctuations in the incidence for men, it follows that, for all age groups,
male incidence is counter-cyclical, while female incidence is hardly cyclical at all. The
latter can be explained by a discouraged worker effect. Women who are not entitled to
unemployment benefits may decide not to register at the ANPE during a recession, feeling
that it is useless. They may therefore tend to stay non-participant. The strong cyclicality
5This smoothing method selects the trend path that minimises the sum of the squared deviations,
subject to the constraint that the sum of the squared second differences not be too large. This constraint
determines the smoothness. We have set the smoothness parameter to the value 1600, as recommended
in the literature, see Prescott  (1996).
6The estimated relative fluctuations in the infiow size (not reported here) are virtually the same as in
the inflow rate, as should be expected.
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of male incidence can be explained by the fact that men are strongly represented in sectors
that are sensitive to cyclical shocks  (OECD  (1996)), like manufacturing.
The infiow is most volatile for male youths.  This, as well as the high level of the
inflow for youths, can be explained by institutional features of the French labour market
(see Cohen, Lefranc and Saint-Paul  (1997), who observe high separation rates for French
young workers in labour force survey  data). In particular,  one can distinguish between
two types of employment contracts: short-term contracts of one year, renewable once,
with inexpensive separation possibilities  (CDDs or "contrats & durde determin6e")  on the
one hand, and long-term contracts in which involuntary job termination is difficult (CDIs
or  "contrats A dur6e indetermin6e") on the other. The short-term contracts are often used
for young workers. Obviously, the workers with such contracts have a high inflow rate
into unemployment. This contributes to the high youth inflow rate. Cohen, Lefranc and
Saint-Paul (1997) argue that youths thus bear the full burden of the increased flexibility of
the French labour market. The option to be able to fire workers at low cost is particularly
attractive for firms in a recession, so one may expect the inflow rate into unemployment
for the corresponding workers to be particularly high during a recession. This is exactly
what we find. There is no systematic difference between the phases of the cycles for young
men and adult men. Since 1988, the cycle for male youths seems to lag one year behind
the cycle for adult men.
We finish this subsection with an examination of the estimated seasonal pattern in the
incidence of unemployment. For youths, this is characterised by notably higher incidence
in the second half of the year, probably caused by youths entering the labour market after
leaving school. To obtain a closer look at the seasonal pattern in the inf'low, we estimate
a more general version of equation (2.7);
( 4
W4(T) = exp 1 Z [W4, + A.d(T)] I. (7-)  
l s=1
where d(T) is a dummy variable equalling 1 if T is after 1986.IV and 0 otherwise.  We
normalise 041 = El - 0, taking the first season as the base season. This equation incor-
porates an interaction effect between the policy dummy and the season. It turns out that
the parameter estimates as reported in Table 2.1 hardly change. Furthermore, for women
1,3 and for men Ie and K3 are significant and negative. This suggests that the policy
towards youth unemployment has had a dampening effect on the inflow rate of school
leavers. For adults and elderly, the incidence of unemployment is not much affected by
the season.
2.4.3 Business cycles and the age-specific duration of unemploy-
ment
The estimation results for the duration model are shown in Tables 2.4,2.5, and 2.6.
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Table 2.4: Parameter estimates duration. Age group <25.
Men Wornen
unobserved heterogeneity
Fl   0.445 (0.009) 0.351 (0.009)
72   1.037 (0.029) 1.031 (0.054)
73   1.155 (0.136) 1.066 (0.279)
74   1.452 (0.514) 1.260 (1.282)
3   2.117 (1.778) 2.825 (5.554)
duration dependence
011  0.021 (0.030) 0.007 (0.037)
012  -0.061 (0.049) -0.034 (0.069)
013  -0.097 (0.058) 0.030 (0.083)
914  -0.053 (0.063) 0.066 (0.097)
cycle outjlow
a'12 -0.062 (0.009) -0.036 (0.010)
a'22 -0.051 (0.007) -0.044 (0.008)
a'32 -0.025 (0.007) -0.062 (0.009)
(142 0.063 (0.006) 0.041 (0.007)
(252 -0.001 (0.005) -0.006 (0.007)
season outbow
222 -0.132 (0.030) -0.035 (0.036)
W32 -0.085 (0.024) 0.010 (0.030)
242 0.041 (0.025) 0.147 (0.032)
season composition infow
66'23 -0.012 (0.005) 0.003 (0.006)
233 0.018 (0.007) 0.012 (0.010)
W43 0.034 (0.008) 0.035 (0.011)
measurement error
a   0.042 (0.003) 0.037 (0.003)
p   0.614 (0.055) 0.649 (0.059)
dk,87 1.123 (0.018) 1.112 (0.021)




7274 -74 - 74 -74 + 27273 0.103 0.172
7375 - 7& -  75-732+2727374 -0.228 -0.218
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.5: Parameter estimates duration. Age group 25-49.
Men Wonnen
unobserved heterogeneity
Ill   0.321 (0.007) 0.252 (0.007)
72   1.260 (0.059) 1.445 (0.069)
73   2.056 (0.296) 2.902 (0.374)
74   3.883 (1.252) 7.600 (1.754)
75   6.308 (5.311) 22.599 (8.064)
duration dependence
011  0.124 (0.033) 0.230 (0.032)
012  0·094 (0.052) 0.241 (0.055)
013  0·091 (0.062) 0.352 (0.068)
014  0·173 (0.068) 0.534 (0.077)
cycle outjiow
a12 -0.177 (0.012) -0.191 (0.016)
0722 -0.001 (0.007) -0.058 (0.012)
C 32 -0.040 (0.008) -0.126   (0.012)
042 0.077 (0.006) 0.052 (0.009)
052 0.033 (0.006) 0.035 (0.009)
season outjiow
W22 -0.070 (0.029) -0.055 (0.037)
CU32 -0.081 (0.025) 0.034 (0.030)
242 -0.261 (0.031) -0.279 (0.041)
season composition inflow
223 -0.014 (0.005) -0.006 (0.007)
233 0.019 (0.006) 0.030 (0.007)
U)43 0.054 (0.005) 0.050 (0.007)
measurement error
0   0.025 (0.002) 0.025 (0.002)
p   0.732 (0.051) 0.761 (0.048)
dk,87 1.137 (0.017) 1.179 (0.026)
Moment-inequatity statistics (Wald w.r t.  0)
Men Wornen
72 - 1 4.366 6.500
73-72 2.880 3.965
7274-7  -74-74 +27273 -0.703 2.276
7375 - 742-7575 -7&+ 2727374 -1.522 -0.119
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.6: Parameter estimates duration. Age group 50+.
Men Women
duration dependence
*Ill 0.240 (0.057) 0.467 (0.080)
V12 0.059 (0.060) 0.193 (0.088)
013 0·150 (0.057) 0.254 (0.083)
014 0·274 (0.056) 0.335 (0.082)
cycle outflow
a02 0.156 (0.011) 0.127 (0.013)
C 12 0.013 (0.004) 0.014 (0.004)
( 22 0.001 (0.003) 0.008 (0.003)
032 0.006 (0.003) 0.000 (0.003)
a42 0.016 (0.003) 0.008 (0.003)
(252 0.005 (0.003) 0.005 (0.003)
season outfow
W22 -0.249 (0.100) -0.359 (0.171)
CU32 -0.051 (0.059) -0.037 (0.070)
a,142 -0.467 (0.107) -0.829 (0.150)
measurement error
0  0.036 (0.003) 0.036 (0.004)
p  0.703 (0.062) 0.650 (0.102)
dz,87 1.379 (0.081) 1.631 (0.137)
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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In this subsection we focus on the estimates of the parameters of interest (i.e., those
concerning calendar-time effects). Figure 2.15 shows the combined trend and cycle in the
outflow.7 Exit probabilities are on average higher for men than for women. Youths have on
average the highest exit probabilities. (Note that the parameter Bl can be interpreted as
the average exit probability out of the first duration class. The estimate of this probability
is much larger for youths than for adults.) Young workers are attractive because of the
type of contract on which they can be hired. In addition, many young workers leave
unemployment to special youth training and workfare programs. It is not clear whether
the latter type of exits from unemployment are very attractive.  Some of the workfare
programs do not seem to provide much valuable work experience (Bonnal, Foug6re and
Sdran(lon (1997)). Also, some programs resemble regular employment, with the crucial
difference that wages are allowed to be below the mandatory minimum wage for adults
(Abowd et al.  (1997)). From a study of individual labour market histories, Abowd et al.
(1997) conclude that the individual probability of unemployment increases substantially at
the moment at which the individual crosses the maximum age for these programs (usually
25 years).  In sum, the youth outflow rate level by itself may suggest a rosier picture than
warranted by the positions taken after exit out of unemployment and long-run prospects
in general.
The outflow rates for adults seem to be rather strongly downward trended. Figure 2.16
show the relative deviations from the trend, for each age group. The pattern
described              Iby the deviations resembles the pattern described by the conventional business cycle
indicators (see Figure 2.14),  so the exit probabilities are pro-cyclically affected. A striking
result is that the exit probabilities of young workers are less affected by the cycle than
those of adult workers.  This is actually in agreement with the importance of youth job
contracts. In a recession, hiring young workers is relatively attractive in comparison to
hiring adult workers, for the reason that the former can be fired easily. In other words,
the main advantage of hiring youths in a recession is not that they can be hired so easily
but rather that they can be fired so easily.
The phase of the cycle differs between men and women. For men, the turning points
are about a half to one year earlier in time than they are for women.  This can be explained
by the fact that men are over-represented in sectors that are sensitive to cyclical shocks
from abroad, like manufacturing sectors, which are leading sectors in economic cycles.
Women predominantly work in service sectors.
The seasonal effect on the outflow works by way of a direct effect on the outflow
probabilities, and by way of an indirect effect on the composition of the inflow.  The
direct seasonal effect on the outflow probabilities of youths is small. Adults and elderly
experience a strong negative effect in the fourth quarter, relative to the first quarter.
TPrecisely,  they  show the estimated  02(T)  multiplied  by  Mi· This equals  the exit probability  out  of
the first duration class, evaluated at the average value of the seasonal effect on the exit probabilities, if
the season of inflow is the first season.
SECTION 2.4. ESTIMATION RESULTS                                           33





O   - adults





01'   0 - - --- % -/









¤ 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994
:







8 r-- -% \
MA                \ \-
0
e                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 -
3  .-
If




in                       Youths
  -       -  adults0
- - -    elderly
0
 ·
=1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994
34                                 CHAPTER 2. UNEMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS AND AGE
Figure 2.16: Relative deviation from trend, women (top) and men (bottom).
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The indirect seasonal effect on the composition of the inflow is similar for youths and
adults. (Remember we do not estimate this effect for elderly.) Individuals who become
unemployed in the second half of the year have more success in leaving unemployment
quickly.
2.4.4 The other parameter estimates
In this subsection we briefly discuss the estimates of the other model parameters, most
of which are included into the model in order to ensure that the calendar-time effect
parameters are correctly estimated.
The parameter 72 by definition equals 1 + Var(v)/E(v)2. Therefore, if the estimate
of  72  does not significantly differ  from 1, there  is no unobserved heterogeneity.    This  is
the case for youths. The moments of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution G(u) are
consistent with a degenerate distribution in v = Ft.   Note that this does not  mean that
all youths are the same; it merely means that they do not have significantly different
individual exit probabilities. It should be noted that this result may be sensitive to the
proportionality assumption (2.4) and to the assumption that the rupture in the data at
1986.IV is due to external factors. We return to this below.
For male adults, the moment-inequalities imply a discrete distribution with two pos-
itive points of support. The unobserved heterogeneity of female adults, on the other
hand, can be described by a discrete distribution with three positive points of support.8
Note that for both age groups we have found distributions that are consistent with the
estimated normalised moments. This supports the MPH specification.
The duration dependence parameter estimates for youths indicate a non-monotonous
but insignificant dependence. Testing  the null hypothesis 41,  -  0, (i  =  1,2,3,4),  the
Wald statistic is 6.0 for women and 8.1 for men. Therefore, for both male and female
youths the null hypothesis is not rejected at a 5 percent significance level. For adults and
elderly we find significant positive duration dependence during the first five quarters of
unemployment. This dependence is strongest for women. As a result, stigma effects do
not seem to play a dominant role during the first five quarters of unemployment.
Our empirical analysis so far has been based on the exit probabilities out of the first
five quarters of unemployment.  We now present a procedure to extend this analysis to
8This suggests that the variation across female adults is larger than across male adults, and this is
confirmed by the higher value of the estimate of 72 for female adults. It may be interesting to infer the
specification of the implied discrete unobserved heterogeneity distribution. For male adults it turns out
that 86% of the inflow into unemployment has a heterogeneity value equal to 0,80 times the mean Bl of the
distribution, and 14% has a heterogeneity value equal to 2.27 times this mean (so Pr(u = 0.80,61)  = 0.86
and Pr(u = 2.27,ti) = 0.14). For adult women, Pr(v = 0.22Fl) = 0.24, Pr(v = 1.09iul)  =  0.70,
Pr(v = 3.31Mt)    =    0.05. Thus, among female adults, there  is a small subgroup  with  a very large  exit
probability. Among adult men, the group with a very high exit probability is a somewhat larger. The
individuals in these groups disappear rapidly from unemployment, as the duration proceeds.
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higher duration classes. As argued above, unobserved heterogeneity can be characterised
by a discrete distribution. Assuming these implied distributions are the true distributions,
we can extend our empirical analysis to higher duration classes without much computa-
tional burden. Along this  line, we estimate the *i, parameters,  for i  =  5, . . , 17, using data
on exit probabilities for 19 (quarterly) duration classes, fixing the other parameters on
their estimated values in the 5-equation duration model. The results are shown in Figure
2.17.  All age groups show negative duration dependence after 4 quarters of unemploy-
ment. The duration dependence of youths and elderly is moderate. After 13 quarters
of unemployment the individual exit probabilities of both groups increase.  This may be
due to the expiration of benefits or by an artefact of the data collection procedure (the
small number of unemployed in these high duration classes causes the exit probability to
be inexactly measured). The latter explanation is supported  by  the  fact  that the effect
does not show up for adults, who constitute the largest group and as such are relatively
abundant in the higher duration classes.
The measurement errors all have a standard deviation close to 0.04, and they are pos-
itively correlated across duration classes at one calendar moment. From this we conclude
that the model fits the data well, and that misclassification of unemployed individuals into
adjacent duration classes is not a major source of errors in the observed unemployment
figures. The estimates of d2'87 indicate a significant positive effect for all gender types
and age groups. This effect varies between 5 and 15 percent for the incidence equation
and between 11 and 18 percent for the equation for 8(OIT) There is not much difference
across genders. Also, the effect is not larger for youths than for adults. This suggests
that the significant effect of the dummy variable is not caused by policy towards youth
employment, but rather by the changes in the data collection procedure.
2.5 Conclusions
In France, like in many other Western European countries, both the level and the turnover
of youth unemployment are high in comparison to adult unemployment.  In this chapter
we have examined the dynamics of age- and gender-specific unemployment, by estimating
the calendar-time behaviour of the unemployment inflow and outflow rates, taking account
of duration dependence, individual heterogeneity, and seasonality in the data. For youths,
there does not appear to be a strong long-run trend in the inflow or outflow rates. The
inflow size has decreased for youths and for adult women, but this is a consequence of the
declining participation rates for these groups. For adults, the inflow rates have increased,
and the outflow rates have decreased.  In this sense, youths fared better than adults during
the past decades. However, this is to a certain extent due to the special youth training
and workfare programs, and it is not always clear that these improve the long-run labour
market prospects of youths.
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Figure 2.17: Genuine duration dependence, women  (top)  and men (bottom).
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Concerning cyclical effects, it turns out that in general the inflow rate is counter-
cyclical whereas the outflow rate is pro-cyclical. For women, the cycles in the inflow rate
are not pronounced. This may be due to a discouraged worker effect during recessions,
and to a lower incentive to register as unemployed. The strong cyclicality of the male
inflow rate can be explained by the fact that men are strongly represented in sectors that
are sensitive to cyclical shocks. For men, the cycle in the inflow rate is somewhat larger
for youths than for adults. For both men and women, the cycle in the outflow is somewhat
smaller for youths. The volatility of the youth unemployment rate can thus be attributed
to the volatility of the youth inflow rate, whereas for adults the opposite is closer to the
truth.
Many differences in cyclical behaviour between (male) youths and (male) adults can
be explained by institutional features of the French labour market. Young workers are
often employed in jobs with short-term contracts or in training or workfare programs.
The former can be argued to contribute to the high youth inflow and outflow rates, the
volatility of the youth inflow rate, and the lack of volatility of the youth outflow rate.
The latter programs can be argued to contribute to the high youth outflow rates.
There is no systematic difference between the phases of the infiow cycles for young men
and adult men. Since 1988, the cycle for male youths seems to lag one year behind the
cycle for adult men, but before 1988 the ordering is reversed. From the other parameter
estimates, the most important result concerns the negative duration dependence of the
youth exit probability after a year of unemployment.
These results imply some policy suggestions. As explained in the introduction to this
chapter, long-term youth unemployment is very undesirable. A given young individual
in the inflow has the highest probability of becoming long-term unemployed if he enters
unemployment in a recession. Moreover, youth inflow is highest during a recession, and
youth exit probabilities are negatively duration dependent. Thus, policy against long-
term youth unemployment should focus on unemployed youths in a recession who have
been unemployed for more than a year. Another result with some relevance for policy
concerns the fact that it could not be unambiguously established that the adult inflow
rate is a leading indicator of the youth inflow rate.
Finally, our results highlight the importance of seasonal fluctuations.  Here we find
some major differences between youth and adult unemployment. These differences are
related to the inflow into unemployment. The large seasonal fluctuations in youth unem-
ployment are to a large extent driven by fluctuations in the inflow that are presumably
caused by the large number of school leavers entering the labour market in the third
quarter of the year.
Chapter 3
Unemployment Durations and the
Destination of Exit
3.1 Introduction
Nowadays, the econometric analysis of unemployment durations has become widespread.
Most studies are concerned with univariate unemployment durations, focusing on the
length of the spell between entering and leaving unemployment. An important issue is
whether the exit rate out of unemployment declines over the duration of the spell and if
so whether this is due to negative duration dependence of the individual exit rate or due
to unobserved heterogeneity causing the high exit rate individuals to leave unemployment
first.  From a policy point of view, duration dependence and unobserved heterogeneity
in the exit rates are important issues, because they have different policy implications.
Negative duration dependence means that emphasis should be put on the long-term un-
employed , while unobserved heterogeneity calls for screening of newly unemployed.
In many empirical duration studies no distinction is made between the states of unem-
ployment and out of the labour force. Yet, there may be differences that affect transitions
to and from the states.
Flinn and Heckman (1983), for example investigate whether there are differences be-
tween the two states with respect to the dynamics of the transition to unemployment.
They conclude that there are such differences. The transition from out of the labour force
to employment and from unemployment to employment are behaviourally different. From
other empirical research it appears that there are differences in duration dependence of
exit rates out of unemployment, depending on whether the destination is employment or
out of the labour force (Devine and Kiefer (1991)).  If one does not make a distinction
between the two exit states, allowing the duration dependence to differ, the model is
misspecified and the estimation results are biased. Moreover, a lot of studies show that
there are differences between the exit rates to employment and out of the labour force
with respect to the effect of characteristics like age, gender and education (see e.g. Visser
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(1990)).  If one does not account for these differences, then correlation between unob-
served heterogeneity in both exit rates is introduced. For instance, if age has a negative
effect on the exit to employment and a positive effect on the exit to nonparticipation, this
implies negatively correlated unobserved heterogeneity.  If one only estimates the transi-
tion from unemployment to employment, ignoring nonparticipation, the durations of the
unemployment spells are not independently right-censored. This will cause the estimates
to be biased (Van den Berg (1990)).
In our empirical analysis we investigate whether there are differences in the exit rate
from unemployment with respect to the destinations employment and out of the labour
force. In our model we allow for differences in duration dependence. Furthermore, we
allow for unobserved heterogeneity to affect the exit rates and we allow for correlations
between the unobserved heterogeneity terms of both processes.
We use rather unique French administrative data over the period 1988-1995 in our
empirical analysis. These macro data are quarterly and cover individuals who are looking
for full time permanent jobs. The data set includes information on elapsed duration of
unemployment and on the exit state, enabling us the estimate a competing risks model.
We extend a method for the nonparametric estimation of duration dependence and
unobserved heterogeneity that has been developed by Van den  Berg and Van  Ours  (1996).
This extension enables us to examine whether the exit probabilities to employment and
nonparticipation differ with respect to these determinants, and whether there is correla-
tion between the unobserved heterogeneity composition of both exit rates. We deduce the
conditions for identifiability of a dependent competing risks model in a nonparametric set-
ting. The identification depends on the relation between the effect of exogenous variables
on the one hazard and the observed exit rate for the other hazard. This is analogous to
Heckman and Honord (1989) for the continuous time model, and thus gives general insight
in the mechanisms concerning identification.
The outline of this chapter is as follows.  In the next section, the model and estimation
method are introduced. We describe our data in Section 3.3. Here, we also show how
the exit probabilities are constructed from the data. Estimation results are reported in
Section 3.4. Concluding remarks are made in Section 15.
3.2 The model and the estimation method
3.2.1 The model
We estimate a two state competing risks model. A spell of unemployment can end with
a transition into employment (E) or an exit into nonparticipation (N). At an aggregated
level we observe the total number of people that leave unemployment at calendar time
T, stratified by the time these people haven been unemployed and the exit state. hom
these numbers one can calculate the exit probability out of unemployment at calendar
SECTION 3.2. THE MODEL                                                       41
time T for duration t. We assume that both the exit probability to employment and
to nonparticipation can be described by a MPH model. In the data we use, we only
have two observed explanatory variables, the gender of the individual and calendar time.
We estimate the model separately for both gender types, and therefore suppress the
conditioning on the gender type. We assume that all variation in the exit probabilities can
be explained  by the prevailing unemployment duration t (duration dependence), calendar
time T, and by unobserved heterogeneity across individuals. Note that we take t and T to
have the same measurement scale, apart from the difference in origin. We can now express
the exit probability to destination i after t periods of unemployment, conditionally given
the explanatory variables ·r and vi, (i = E, N), as
BE(t T, VE) =  lE(t) 02%(T) VE (3.1)
BN(t ·r, uN) - '01N(t)  2N T) uN (3.2)
0 < BE(tl·r, VE) + BN(t 'r, VN) < 1 (3.3)
The functions Wli and *2, represent the effect of unemployment duration and calendar
time. The unobserved heterogeneity terms vE and vN are allowed to be correlated. Finally,
we assume that vi and T are independent, which implies that the distribution of (vE, UN)
does not change over time.
3.2.2 Empirical implementation
In this study, we are primarily interested in estimating the parameters of duration depen-
dence and unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, we extend the strategy by Van den Berg
and  Van  Ours  (1996), by examining ratios of observed exit probabilities.    Note  that  the
data only provide observations of exit probabilities unconditional on the unobserved het-
erogeneity  term  vi. Let 8,(t T) denote these exit probabilities. To express them in terms of
the exit probabilities 8, (tl T, vi),  we have to integrate vi  out  of the latter. Consider BE(t T)
for t = 0;
GE(07)   =  EvE  41£(0) 42.ECT) VE 
-   lE(0) *12£(T) BlE
where,
f kl
Bki =E[vi j   ,  i- E,N (3.4)
For t=l w e get
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Pr(t =l A EIT) =
=  avE•VN   1 - 01ECO)4#ECT - 1)ug - 01NCD)02NCT - 1)vN  . 11'lE(1)92ECT)VE 
-   41£(1)92.E(·r) · EvE.VN  VE - 91£(0)*2E('r - 1)vl - 41N(0)92N('r - 1)vEUN 
=      .¢'lE(1)02E(,r) .  plE -  'lE<  1 '2E T - 1)/12£ -  1N<   '2N(·r - 1)*1ElN     (3.5)
where,
FIEiN = E  EVN   = Cou(VE, VN) + BlE/liN (3.6)
GE(1|T) =
Pr(t =l A Eli-)
Pr(t 2 l IT)
BlE - BE(OIT - 1)<2f - ON(017 - 1)5%1
(3.7)= 018(1)42E(T)·
1 - GE(OIT - 1) - ON(OIT - 1)
Dividing equation (3.7) by BE(OIT), ref. (3.4), we get
BE(1 T) 1 - 72EGE(Oil- - 1) - billON(O|T - 1)
= 711£ · (3.8)
 E(017) 1 - GE(0|T - 1) - eN(017- - 1)
where,
'bi(1)      :=E,N (3.9)
711, = 01,(0)  '
1[12:





If vE  1 UN  then Cou(vE, UN)  = 0 and K11  =  1. The distribution of (vE,UN)  is then
equal to the product of the univariate distributions. Suppose now that DE 4 UN.  Then
*1ElN is not necessarily equal to FIEFiN, so that Kii is not necessarily equal to 1 and has
to be estimated.
If there is no unobserved heterogeneity then All = 72E = 1, and the ratio of ;j< li)
in equation (3.8) is constant over the calendar time. If this ratio fluctuates over calendar
time, then this indicates the presence of unobserved heterogeneity.  Van den Berg and
Van Ours (1997) have used this property to develop a simple check for the presence of
unobserved heterogeneity in the exit rates from unemployment.
The parameter K11 in equation (3.8) is identified from the effect of past calendar time
variation in the exit to N on GE(111-). This fails if 02£(T) E *2N(T), i.e. if there is no
independent variation in calendar time. In this case BECOIT - 1) (x ON(OIT - 1), so only
72£ + Constant ·All and 72N + constant ·E11 can be identified. By checking time series of
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GE(O|T) and ON(017-), it can be seen whether this is the case. These results are analogous to
the identifiability results derived by Heckman and Honord (1989) for the continuous time
competing risks model. For instance, one of the necessary assumptions for identification
they derive is that the functions of the covariates in both hazard functions can vary
independently.
In a similar way it follows that
ON (1|7-) 1 - 72NGN(01'r - 1) - KlleECOIT - 1)
 N<0 T) 1 - 8£(0|7- - 1) - ON(017- - 1)
= WN. (3.12)
Now consider the third duration class, t = 2.
Pr(t 2 21·r)   =    1 - Pr(t = 0|7- - 2)  · <1 - Pr(t = 1|T - 1, t 2 1) 
=    1 - GE<O|T - 2) - ON(OIT - 2)  · <1 - GE(1 T - 1) - ON(017- - 1) 
Pr(t =2 A EIT) =
= EvE,VN  (1 - 91.ECO)02.ECT - 2)vE - 01N(0)02NCT - 2)1;N,  0
 1 - 01£(1)42£(T - 1)vE - WIN(1)92NCT - 1)uN  ' *lE(2)*'2ECT)uE 
Similar reasoning as above, using the expression for GE(ll·r) in equation (3.7), leads to
OE(2|·r) c(·r)
GE(1 'r) 1 - BE(01'r - 1)72,E - ON(017- - 1)All
=  712E ·
 1 - (GE(117 - 1) + GE(017 - 2))72E + GE(017- - 2)8£(19 - 1)738
- (eN(liT - 1) + eNCO|T - 2)) Klt + eNCO|T - 2)eN(1|·r - 1),c12





1 - GE(017 - 1) - eN(OIT - 1)
(1 - BECOIT - 2) - eN(017- - 2)) (1 - GE(11·r - 1) - eN(11·r - 1) 
Thi = 011.21     i -E, N (3.15)01,(1) '
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The parameter K12 is identified from the effect of 02NCT - i) on GE(2|T). Again this
fails if there is no independent calendar time variation, i.e. <ME(T) E 02N(T)
Then BE(OIT - 2)0£(1|T - 1) oc ON(017- - 2)ON(lIT - 1), so only 73E + constant ·K12 is
identified. Moreover, in this case GE(OIT - 2)ON(117- - 1) + ON(017- - 2)0£(l IT - 1) oc
GE(017 - 2)8£(1|T - 1), so only 73£ + constant ·K21 is identified.
Note that in case vE 1 uN
E I.Evil  _ E I.El E I.i,1012 = - 72N (3.18)
111Ell;IN 111ElitN
A21 - 728 (3.19)
Finally, the second ratio equation for exit to N equals:
eN(2IT)                                 C
ON(1 7-)   =  712N '1- ON(01'r - 1)72N - GE<0|1- - 1)All
 1 - (eN(1|·r - 1) + eN(01.r - 2) 72.v + 8. (01.r - 2)8.,(1|·r - 1)73.v
-(GE(11·r - 1) + 8.E(01.r - 2) 1€11 + GE(01.r - 2)8.E (1|·r - 1),c21
+(eN(017 - 2)GE(1|·r - 1) + 8.E(017- - 2)0.A,(1|·r - 1))Kl2 
(3.20)
where c(T) is defined in equation (3.14).
The parameters are estimated as follows. We specify log 8,(t IT)/8,(t - 1 |T) to equal the
log of the corresponding model expression, i.e. equations (3.8), (3.12), (3.13) and (3.20)
plus an error term.  So we estimate a system of 4 equations. The error terms represent
specification errors,  that are assumed to be identically N(0, E) distributed over time
periods. We allow the errors in the four equations to be contemporaneously related. Note
that the parameters describing the heterogeneity distribution appear in all four equations,
and therefore are overidentified. We estimate the system by maximum likelihood.
3.3 The data
We use French administrative data on individuals looking for full time permanent jobs.
The data are aggregated by duration class. For the model to be applicable, the frequency
at which the data are collected has to equal one over the size of the unemployment duration
classes. In our empirical analysis, we use quarterly data on the exit probabilities out of
the first three quarterly duration classes, over the period 1988.3-1994.4.
To derive the observed exit probabilities from the data, we use two different data
sets. The first data set distinguishes unemployment by elapsed duration and gender type.
These stock data enable us to calculate exit probabilities, aggregated over all possible
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destinations. Let U(t T) denote the number of unemployed in duration class t at the end
of quarter T. Then the observed exit probability equals
8(LIT) = (3.21)
U(tlf) - U(t + lIT + 1)
UUM)
The second data set contains the number of unemployed that left unemployment in
a given quarter, stratified by destination, duration of the past spell of unemployment
and gender type. Five possible destinations are distinguished, viz. nonparticipation,
expulsion, training, employment and others. Because of the small number of people
in some of the categories, we have grouped the destinations: employment and training
denote destination employment, while the other three destinations are taken together in
the destination nonparticipation.
The observed exit probabilities are now derived in the following way. Denote the
percentage of the outflow to destination i during quarter ·r having been unemployed t
quarters by f,(tlT).1 Then
Bi(t T) = fi (t IT). (3.22)U(t|T - 1) - U(t + 1IT)
U(tjT - 1)
In order to circumvent modelling seasonal effects, we have corrected the raw data on
the exit probabilities for seasonal effects, using the Census X11 filter (Shiskin, Young and
Musgrave (1967)). In appendix 3.A we show that seasonal effects in the inflow are also
corrected for by this procedure.
As noted in the previous section, identification of the unobserved heterogeneity distri-
bution fails if GE and 8,v are proportional to each other over calendar time. We will now
check time series of GE and ON to see whether this is the case. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show
time series of both 8's for males. Clearly, there is independence in the movement of both
series over time. This is confirmed by the correlation coefficients. For males (females) the
correlation between BECOIT) and ON(01'r) is 0.92 (0.86) and 0.62 (0.82) between GE(l IT)and
GN(1 IT). However, these correlations are quite high.2 This is confirmed by the estimation
results below, which show that the estimates of the unobserved heterogeneity parameters
have large standard errors.3
' An alternative approach  is to divide the observed flows in the second  data set  by an appropriate  risk
set, based on the stocks in the first data set. The risk set for the flow from class t in quarter T is of the
form aU(tIT -1)+BU(t - 117 - 1),withatd=l. For reasonable values of a and 0, this gives similar
estimation results.
2The high correlations are not caused by the correction for seasonal effects. The unadjusted data also
show high correlations.
3The identification of 73E and 73N is troublesome in particular, as BE(0|7· - 2)#Ar(11'r - 1) + eN(017- -
2)OE(137' - 1) turns out to be almost proportional to GE(OIT - 2)0£(117 - 1).
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3.4 Estimation results
The estimation results are shown in Table  3.1.
Table 3.1: Parameter estimates unrestricted model.
Males Females
unobserved heterogeneity distribution
72E 1.372 (0.137) 1.324 (0.148)
73E 1.002 (0.079) 1.005 (0.167)
72N 1.254 (0.314) 1.215 (0.242)
73N 1.005 (0.189) 1.007 (0.335)
All 1.120 (0.192) 1.284 (0.167)
t 12 0.939 (0.572) 1.368 (0.702)
A21 2.372 (0.429) 2.423 (0.574)
duration dependence
BE 1.053 (0.037) 1.058 (0.032)
92E 0.929 (0.031) 0.938 (0.028)
77IN 0.907 (0.041) 0.985 (0.030)
923 0.991 (0.048) 1.024 (0.037)
log-likelihood
331.71 351.49
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
The exit rate to employment shows negative duration dependence during the second
quarter of unemployment for both males and females. Moreover, for males there is neg-
ative duration dependence in the exit rate to nonparticipation during the first quarter
of unemployment. The other duration dependence parameters do not differ significantly
from one.
The estimates of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution parameters are charac-
terised by large standard errors. This is probably caused by the somewhat high correlation
between  the exit rates  to  the two labour force states (ref. Section 3.3), complicating  the
identification of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution. The estimates of K11 indicate
that the unobserved heterogeneity distributions are uncorrelated for both gender types.
Uncorrelated heterogeneity distributions translate into the following restrictions:
K11 = 1,  h12 = 72N,    K21  = 72E (3.23)
Table 3.2 shows the estimation results of the model in which these restrictions are im-
posed. The likelihood ratio test statistic, comparing the estimation results of Tables 3.1
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Table 3.2: Parameter estimates restricted model.
Males Females
unobserved heterogeneity distribution
728 1.446 (0.070) 1.519 (0.098)
73E 2.030 (0.262) 2.170 (0.469)
72N 1.432 (0.129) 1.570 (0.127)
73N 1.430 (0.650) 1.793 (0.867)
duration dependence
WE 1.041 (0.028) 1.047 (0.032)
92E 0.928 (0.023) 0.932 (0.028)
711N 0.918 (0.037) 0.986 (0.030)
ThN 0.990 (0.038) 1.028 (0.037)
log-likelihood
331.22 351.20
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
and 3.2 equals 0.98 for males and 2.58 for females. As the 10%-critical value of the X2(3)
distribution is 6.25, we do not reject the no correlation assumption at any reasonable sig-
nificance level. The parameter estimates of the duration dependence parameters are close
to the estimates in the unrestricted model. Duration dependence in the exit rate to em-
ployment is similar for males and females, with significant negative duration dependence
during the second quarter of unemployment.
From the estimates of the unobserved heterogeneity parameters we can infer whether
unobserved heterogeneity is present. In particular, this follows from the 72, estimate. An
estimate significantly larger than 1 implies that var(v,) > 0, i.e. that the unobserved
heterogeneity distribution is non-degenerate. For both males and females, we find unob-
served heterogeneity in the exit rate to both employment and nonparticipation, which is
hardly surprising, given the high level of aggregation in the data. Further, 73, - 722i does
not differ significantly from zero, for each gender. As Shohat and Tamarkin (1970) show,
this implies that G(vi) can be accurately described by a discrete distribution with one
positive point of support and one point of support equal to zero.
We will now infer the specification of the implied discrete unobserved heterogeneity
distribution. For males in the first duration class, the mean exit rate to employment
equals 0.20.  Of the males flowing into unemployment, 71% has a heterogeneity value
equal to 0.27. This means that 29% never finds a job, while 71% has a chance of 27% to
find a job within 3 months. Because part of the unemployed males never finds a job, the
mean exit rate to employment decreases sharply. Because of the changing composition
of the  pool of unemployed (assuming no duration dependence),  the  mean  exit  rate  in  the
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second quarter of unemployment drops  to  0.14.   For the transition into nonparticipation,
almost all males have a heterogeneity value equal to the mean BlN of the distribution,
due to the fact that the estimate of 73 almost equals the estimate of 72· In this case the
heterogeneity distribution is almost degenerate. The mean exit rate to nonparticipation
in the first duration class equals  0.17. (This somewhat high level  may be explained  by
the  fact  that here nonparticipation also includes the destinations expulsion and other).
In this case the mean exit rate only decreases due to negative duration dependence.
For females, the mean exit rate to employment in the first duration class is equal to
0.18.  Of the unemployed females, 70% has a change of 25% to find a job within 3 months,
while 30% never finds a job.  In this case the mean exit rate to employment drops to
0.13 due to the changing composition of the pool of unemployed females. The mean exit
rate to nonparticipation  in the first duration class for females  is 0.14. About 12% never
becomes nonparticipant, while 88 percent has a chance of 16% to exit nonparticipation
within 3 months. Due to unobserved heterogeneity, the exit rate to nonparticipation goes
down to 0.12 in the second quarter of unemployment.
There is not much difference in the heterogeneity distributions for males and females.
About two third has a high probability of finding a job, while one third never finds job.
The chance of becoming nonparticipant is positive for almost all unemployed. This makes
sense, given the fact that one can personally decide to become nonparticipant.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we analyse the unemployment dynamics in the French labour market. In
particular, we investigate the outflow from unemployment distinguishing between exits
into employment and exits into nonparticipation. We estimate a two state competing
risks model with nonparametric specifications of duration dependence and unobserved
heterogeneity. We allow for correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity terms of
both exit rates.
By using a nonparametric approach, we deduce the condition for identifiability of a
dependent competing risks model. These results are in line with previous identification
results for competing risks models in continuous time: Identification depends on the
independent variation of exogenous variables in the hazard functions.
We find that the exit rates to employment and nonparticipation are uncorrelated, for
both males and females. Moreover, the duration dependence patterns and heterogeneity
distributions of the exit rate to employment and nonparticipation are different. The exit
to employment shows negative duration dependence after one quarter of unemployment,
while the exit to nonparticipation shows no duration dependence for females, and negative
duration dependence during the first quarter for males.
Our main conclusion is that in the outflow from unemployment it is important to
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distinguish between exits to employment and exits to out of the labour force.  It is clear
that there are differences in dynamics between the two transitions which researchers have
to account for.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
3.A Seasonal adjustment
In this appendix we show that adjusting the data for seasonal effects also eliminates
seasonal effects in the inflow. The way we proceed is as follows: We first derive the ratio
equations when we allow for seasonal effects in the inflow. We then estimate the modified
model, showing this extra term to be non significant.
We assume the seasonal effects in the inflow to act by extra term in the MPH specifica-
tion of the exit rates. This method is observationally equivalent to making the unobserved
heterogeneity distribution G dependent on 7- (See Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours
(1994)).   The exit probability to destination i after t periods of unemployment, condition-
ally given the explanatory variables ·r and vi, (i = E, N), then equals
 E(t ·r, VE  - *'lE(t) '02£<T) 03E('r -t) DE (3.24)
 N t T, UN  -  '1N(t) *'2N T) *,3N T- t) 1,N (3.25)
Applying the same method as in Subsection 3.2.2 gives the following ratio equation:
GE(liT) 03E(T -1)   1- 72EGE(O|T -1) - AlleN(Oil- -1)
(3.26)
BE(0|T) - 111E · 03,E T) 1 - GE(O|T - 1) - ON(OIT - 1)
ON(l IT) 03NCT - 1)   1 - 72NeNCo|T - 1) - KlleE(017- - 1)
(3.27)
BN 0 T) - 'liN ·   103N(T)          1- ON(01·r -1) - OE(OIT -1)
For estimation, the fraction is parameterised as follows:
'03i (IV) Wli03i (I )
03,(I) W2*93*(II)
03,(II) C+'3£43,(III)
#3iCIII)      1 W32(IV) (3.28)
Wli ' W2: ' W3:
We now estimate the extended model as described in Subsection 3.2.2. The extra
parameters to be estimated then are ln(wii),ln(W2,),ln(wai)· We only estimate the first
ratio equation because if the seasonal adjustment does not correct for seasonal effects in
the inflow, the first ratio equation suflices to show this. This has the advantage that we
do not have to estimate the poorly identified parameters. Without loss of generality we
assume the heterogeneity distributions  to be independent  (ie.    All  =  1).    The next table
shows the estimation results.
Testing for the hypothesis that adjusting for seasonal effects also corrects for seasonal
effects in the inflow is equivalent to testing the hypothesis
Vi : ln(wl,) = ln(w2,) = ln(w3,) = 0.
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Table 3.3: Parameter estimates extended model.
Males Females
Employment
918 1.053 (0.030) 1.053 (0.030) 1.076 (0.034) 1.078 (0.032)
72E 1.479 (0.073) 1.479 (0.073) 1.614 (0.098) 1.619 (0.092)
ln(wlE) 0.005 (0.012) 0.004 (0.009)
ln(u.,2E) -0.004 (0.012) 0.007 (0.009)
ln(w3E) 0.002 (0.012) 0.005 (0.009)
Nonparticipation
771N 0.905 (0.036) 0.905 (0.036) 0.990 (0.031) 0.989 (0.030)
72N 1.386 (0.130) 1.383 (0.130) 1.592 (0.128) 1.588 (0.125)
ln(wiN) -0.001 (0.012) -0.005 (0.008)
ln(w,N) 0.004 (0.012) 0.005 (0.008)
ln(W3N) 0.002 (0.012) 0.001 (0.008)
log-likelihood
170.22 170.48 185.35 187.47
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
From the estimation results it follows that we cannot reject this hypothesis at any rea-
sonable significance level, as the 10%-critical value of the X2(6)-distribution equals 10.64.
Chapter 4
Part-time Work in General
Equilibrium
4.1    Introduction
Part-time work is a labour market phenomenon of increasing importance across Europe.
Although there are differences in the level of part-time employment relative to full-time
employment across countries, in most OECD countries a considerable share of employment
growth over the last decade consisted of part-time employment.  This is illustrated in
Table 4.1. An increase in part-time employment relative to total employment can be
caused by changes in both labour supply and labour demand. From a labour demand-
Table 4.1: part-time employment and employment growth 1987-1997.
Part-time employmenta Average growth contribution
Country % total employment in 1997 total employment Part-time Full-time
Italy 11.3 -0.06 0.31 -0.37
UK 22.9 0.66 0.35 0.31
Netherlands 29.1 1.99 0.84 1.15
European Union 15.7 0.85 0.42 0.43
OECD 14.3 0.98 0.47 0.51
I Part-time employment refers to persons who usually work less than 30 hours.
source: OECD Employment Outlook 1999.
side perspective, part-time work can provide the firm with flexibility. Using part-time
jobs, it is easier for the firm to adjust its workforce so that it meets Huctuating demand,
the so called internal jiezibility (see amongst others Bosch et al.   (1989)). This point is
also made very clearly in the field of operations research, where there is a vast literature
on tour scheduling problems (see amongst others Brusco and Johns (1996), Mabert and
Showalter (1990) and Easton and Rossin (1997)).
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Moreover, there is an interaction between collective working time reduction and part-
time work. In times of a recession, collective working time reduction can be used by
firms to dispose of a labour surplus (This is what happened in the Netherlands during the
early '8Os). However, this working time reduction  can  lead to labour shortages in times
of economic recovery. One way to solve this is to uncouple working time and operating
hours. Flexible arrangements with individual employees (like part-time work) are needed
then to staff the firm during all operating hours. In general, the increased need for
flexibility by the firm together with preferences for shorter hours by employees cannot be
answered by collective agreements but lead to individual working time arrangements (for
an overview of the interaction between working time reduction and work organisation see
Bosch (1998), on working time in the Netherlands see Tijdens (1998)).
With respect to labour supply, an increased participation of people wanting to work
part-time makes it easier for firms to recruit these people. It turns out that the vast
majority of people wanting to work (and in fact working) part-time, are women.  (In
Europe the share of women in part-time employment is around 80%, OECD(1996)).  In
the Netherlands we have seen a huge increase in female labour force participation, due to
for instance increased levels of eduction and decreased fertility rates (See amongst others
Plantenga (1994)). Working part-time  then  is  a  way  for  men and women to share caring
and working responsibilities and to create equal opportunities.
To emphasise the need for a general equilibrium approach, note that the causality
between supply and demand factors is not clear beforehand. It might be the case that the
creation of part-time job opportunities induced (female) labour force participation (Renes
(1991) finds empirical evidence on an added-worker effect in case of female labour supply),
or that because of the increased participation of women part-time jobs were created. In
this paper we analyse how the factors above are related in a general equilibrium framework.
In doing so, we explicitly take into account the notion of search frictions by developing a
matching model (Pissarides (1990)).
The theoretical literature on working time until now has primarily focused on collective
working time reductions. These studies deal with the optimal employment decision of
competitive firms (for an overview see Kapteyn, Zaidi and Kalwij (2000)). Two studies
that use the matching framework for analyzing working time are Marimon and Zillibotti
(1999) and Vranceanu (1999). In both studies labour as a production factor is decomposed
into the number of workers and the number of hours they work. The optimal number of
hours (either determined by bargaining or set by the firm) and workers is compared to the
optimum in case maximum working time is restricted. As in the competitive framework
only small effects (if any) are found. Note however that the setup of these studies, that
is decomposing labour input into workers and hours is not rich enough to model part-
time labour. These models can only deal with collective working time reductions, ie. all
workers work the same number of hours. However, to model part-time work the model
should allow for different hours within the firm.
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One approach to model this is the competitive framework in which the firm is con-
fronted with a certain demand schedule, and decides how many employees of different
types to employ and how many hours each type should work. Objective is to minimise
the associated (labour)   cost  to  meet the demand constraint (Ehrenberg   (1971)).    Note
that this type of model exactly captures the idea of "fine tuning of working time" as a
demand side explanation of part-time work. However, apart from wage cost these models
do not take into account the cost of searching for a worker. The first study that does take
these frictions into account is Roger  and  Roux (1998), incorporating the idea of adjusting
the workforce to meet demand into a wage posting framework. By simulation they anal-
yse the effects of a change in full-time hours on the demand for full-time and part-time
workers.
In this paper we take a reduced form approach when modelling the firm's decision
problem. That is, we do not explicitly model the demand for the good that is produced,
nor do we model the scheduling of the workforce. Instead, we introduce heterogeneity
in the standard matching model (see for instance Albrecht and Vroman (1999),Sattinger
(1995),  Shimer and Smith  (2000)). In particular,  we  have  a firm  that  can open vacancies
for 2 types of jobs (to be interpreted as part-time and full-time). The firm's decision
problem then is to find the optimal composition of its workforce, given his production
structure and the situation on the labour market. The workers in the model are hetero-
geneous with respect to their cost of participating in the labour market. Given this cost
they decide whether or not to participate and for which job to search.
By analyzing the comparative statics properties of the model, we assess the impact
labour demand and supply on the composition of employment. It turns out that an
increase in the share of part-time employment is much more likely caused by changes in
labour demand. Although changes in labour supply do affect the level of employment,
they do not affect the composition of it.
We then proceed by confronting these results with data on Dutch firms. In particular
we estimate the effects of several firm characteristics on the level of part-time employment
in that firm. We find some evidence for the internal flexibility hypothesis; Fluctuating
demand is associated with demand for part-time workers. More importantly, we find that
increasing differences between operating hours and (full-time) working time positively
affect the level of part-time employment. This confirms the hypothesis that the uncoupling
of operating hours and working time in the Netherlands during the late '8Os and early
'9Os lead to increased levels of part-time employment.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the model. At the
end of this section the steady state equilibrium is derived, as are the properties of this
equilibrium. In Section 4.3 we numerically analyze the equilibrium effects of changes in
supply and demand. The empirical analysis is carried out in Section 4.4, using the 1991
and 1993 waves of a Dutch employer survey. Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 The model
We  extend the standard matching model (Pissarides  (1990)). In particular, we introduce
heterogeneous workers. This heterogeneity reflects the difference in cost of participating
and therefore determines the participation decision. Second, we have different types of
labour used by the firm, so that a worker can choose between different types of jobs.
4.2.1 Workers
A worker can participate either in the full-time or the part-time labour market. In the
next section, the selection mechanism into these markets is discussed. Here we derive
the value of being respectively an unemployed and employed worker in labour market
i, i=p (part-time), f (full-time). These values are described by the well known "asset
pricing" equations:
rUi = 4 + Ai(Gi)(Ei _ Ui)' (4.1)
rE, = Wi + 8,(Ui - Ei) (4.2)
Here bi denotes the unemployment benefits in labour market i,wi the wage rate in
this market and 4 the local job destruction rate. Participants in both markets discount
the future at the same rate ri = r. We make the standard assumption that matching
in market i can be described by a matching technology m,(v, u) which is increasing in
its arguments, concave and homogeneous of degree one.  Then the chance of meeting a
vacancy  can be expressed in terms  of the labour market tightness  in that market  8,  =  2,
v, being the number of vacancies, ui being unemployment in market i:
Xi (8,) = = mil -, 17 (4.3)
mi(vi, ui) / Vi     \
14                        k 'Iti
4.2.2 Labour force participation
We model endogenous participation by introducing worker heterogeneity with respect
to the cost of participating in the labour market. These cost could for instance reflect
opportunity cost or the cost of child-care arrangements. We assume that each member
of the population has a certain dis-utility of participating w E [w, w],  and  that  this  w  is
distributed according to f (w).
Now whether or not people participate depends on the value of looking for a job,
compared to the per period dis-utility derived from being in the labour force, w.1 We now
assume that there are two labour markets, one for full-time jobs and one for part-time
jobs, and that these two markets are fully separated. This means that people are only
looking for one type of job and do not consider offers of the other type. In other words,
iOr equivalently the utility associated with not participating.
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people not only decide whether to participate or not, they also decide what type of job
they are going to look for. The labour market conditions in each labour market, notably
the tightness as described above, determine the value of searching for either type of job.
Moreover, part-time and full-time vacancies do not cause congestion for each other.
The assumption that both labour markets are fully separated is equivalent to assuming
that job seekers can distinguish the type of vacancy before they apply. Given the fact
that employment advertisements usually state the number of weekly hours of the job, this
assumption seems reasonable. Moreover, assuming one labour market in which all types
of workers meet randomly with both types of vacancies, would (under certain conditions)
also lead to ex post segmentation. In particular people with a dis-utility below a certain
threshold then only accept full-time job offers and people with a dis-utility higher then
this threshold would only accept part-time job offers.  Note that by separating both
markets, the model does not allow for involuntary part-time employment (ie. people
working part-time that could  not find full-time employment). However, as pointed  out
by the Employment Outlook (1993), most (over 80%) part-time work is voluntary.
In the context of part-time and full-time jobs, we need a measure to compare the
values of unemployed search in each market. Assume that participating in the part-time
labour market gives utility Up + (1 - M) . When participating part-time, one can still
enjoy 1 - li percent of the out of the labour force utility (expressed in present discounted
value terms). This means  that  ki is the dis-utility of participating part-time as percentage
of participating full-time. One could interpret this as a part-time job being relatively
more or less time consuming.
The above enables us to divide the interval [W, wl into three subintervals, each contain-
ing the w's associated with a specific labour force state. For each state it should hold that
given your value w being in that state has more value than being in one of the two other
states. Equation (4.4) shows the subintervals and their associated labour force state.
w > max
{TU'. 5 } out of labour force
w E part-time
< FU,-rUp IMi'\ (4.4)
\  1-p  'B j
w < min {rut, rusp}  A'1'time
In the following we make the (normalising) assumption that w < min {ref,«Up}
and w > max
{TU'. 9 } This
assumption ensures that there will always be people
participating full-time and people that do not participate. In order to have a positive
number of people participating in the part-time labour market, we need that 'Uf--IUE <
ruE.   We can prove a useful result (all proofs are deferred  to the appendix);
Lemma 4.1.  rgE , rui -rup ** rt.'  I-pep < rUf < E z, VIL E (0,1)
P     1-B
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Lemma 4.1 states a necessary condition for participation  in the part-time labour mar-
ket to occur:
TU.
TUf < -Si. (4.5)
j'.
This condition can be interpreted as follows. Comparing participating part-time to par-
ticipating full-time, one gains (1 - p)w per period, but loses rUf - rUp.  Now if rUf >
there is no value w < rUf (w must be smaller than rUi, otherwise no one would par-
ticipate) such that the gains of participating part-time outweigh the losses attached to
it.
Moreover, lemma 4.1 states  that  if  51  >   ru - up, the interval  [w, wl is split  into  the
following three subintervals:
w    > d t Out of tabour force
V.
w € (»,9) part-,ime (4.6)
W < fult-timeTUf-TUp1-B
4.2.3  The firm
Following Pissarides  (1990),  we  have a representative2, profit maximising firm using both
full-time and part-time workers as inputs for production. Let Ni denote the number of
workers of type i and let F(Np, Nf) be the production technology.
The firms decision variables are the number of vacancies of each type to post. Given
the matching technology and the exogenous job destruction rate, the number of employees
evolves according to
N, = 11,(8,)14 - 6,Ni, (4.7)
where 9,(Oi) denotes the chance for a vacancy of type i to meet an unemployed worker.
mi(vi, 14) - mi(81,1) _ A,(8,)9,(#i) =           - - - (4.8)4    4   4.               1
Each vacancy of type i costs the firm 7, per unit of time, capturing recruitment cost
such as advertising. Moreover, when a vacancy of type i is filled, the firm incurs setup
cost  8, (like training  cost and benefit contributions). Together, these costs represent  the
so called quasi-fixed cost of labour (Oi (1962)).
The present discounted value of profit is given by
£00 C
< _74       + s,j   dt,     (4.9)II =     e-rt  F(Nf, Np) - E  wiN, + 9,(8,)'K \«00     / ))
2This can be interpreted as a continuum of firms, in equilibrium all taking the same decision.
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where wi is the wage for type i workers. The optimality (Euler) conditions for Ni, max-
imising II are
8-" (FN, (N.,N,)-wi- "(Iit-i + si)) -f( - e-'.(-7,   + 3,)) -0, (4.10)71(Bi)
where FNi denotes the partial derivative of F to Ni. In steady state (ie.  wi and 0,
constant) these equations reduce to
FN. (Np, Nf ) - wi - (r + 8:)  <--7'„ + si   = 0. (4.11)k,1(8,)  j
These are the in the matching literature well known job creation conditions. They state
that in the optimum the cost of an extra worker (consisting of the expected recruitment
cost and the setup cost) equal the present discounted value of the net gains of an extra
worker  (ie. the marginal product minus  the  wage).   Note  that  in  this  case the marginal
product of an extra worker depends on the composition of the workforce.
The production technology
Before we continue with the equilibrium analysis, we have to be more specific on the char-
acteristics of the production function FiNp, NA. We first make the standard assumption
that there are diminishing returns to both inputs, FN,N, (Np, Ni) < 0. More relevant for
our purposes is the sign of the cross-product FN,N,(Np, NA, As the abstract production
technology should reflect organisational dimensions of the firm such as shift work arrange-
ments, operating hours and scheduling flexibility. The cross-product can be interpreted
as the extent to which both types of labour are beneficial to one another. Moreover, the
cross-products are related to the elasticity of substitution between both inputs.
In the numerical analysis below we allow for non-negative cross-products. If we want
to allow for negative cross-products, the production function has to exhibit decreasing
returns to scale. Given the fact that our model does not include capital as production
factor, it would perhaps be more realistic to impose this property. However, decreasing
returns in production would make the numerical analysis much more cumbersome because
the outcomes of the model then depend on the scale. Second, this assumptions would not
add anything to the essential mechanisms in our model. Therefore, we assume that the
production function exhibits constant returns to scale and return to the effects of negative
cross-products in the numerical analysis below.
4.2.4 Wages
With respect to the modelling of the wages, we follow the standard matching literature.
We assume that workers bargain individually over their wage with the firm. However,
now the surplus of a match between the firm and an unemployed worker depends on the
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incumbent workforce. This implies that the wage of a worker depends on the moment
he/she entered the firm. More specific, in equilibrium we would have a non-trivial wage
distribution within the firm, complicated by the fact that workers leave and enter the
firm. Both the worker's and the firm's decision problem depend on this distribution. This
would greatly complicate our analysis and is beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore,
we follow the literature and assume that there are no long-term contracts, ie. wages are
continuously renegotiated (Pissarides (1990), Bertola and Caballero  (1994)). This means
that all worker's of the same type get paid the same wage, namely the wage of the last
hired employee. Note that this assumption is already implicit in equation (4.9), where
the wage bill equals E, w,Ni.  Also note that in equilibrium this wage is constant, as the
size and the composition of the workforce is constant.
The outcome of the bargain is assumed to be the Nash bargaining solution. Given
that the firm can freely open vacancies, this leads to the wage equation
Wi = (1 - il)bi + 13,  FN, + 8,71 - (r + 8,)si (4.12)
4.2.5 Equilibrium
A steady state equilibrium for the model described above is a tuple (l, ep, Of), in which t
denotes . In this section we will prove existence and uniqueness of this equilibrium.
In steady state unemployment on each labour market is constant, so inflow  into un-
employment equals outflow to employment:                                                                         
8(Li - Ui) = A,(0,)14,   i =p, f (4.13)
Therefore, steady state unemployment on each labour market is given by
8Li
14 = 8+ Ai(Gi)'
i=P,f (4.14)
Given equation (4.14), the number of people employed in steady state Ni = L, - 14 can
be expressed as                                                                                                   I
N. =     ACe,)    Li = g,(8,)Li,    i -p, f. (4.15)
8 + A,(8,)
The variables 0,  and wi  can be solved for using equations  (4.11)  and (4.12). Substitut-
ing  (4.12)  into  (4.11),  we  get a 2-equation system  in 2 unknowns  (note  that the marginal
products, depending on both Op and 81, link both equations):
r + 8 + BiA(Bi)
(1 - Bi)[FN. - bi - (r + 8)sil - n -0,   i =p, f. (4.16)
71(8,)
The constant returns to scale of the production function ensures that the marginal prod-
ucts FN, can be expressed in terms of one variable, n = . It now follows that for a
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given ratio n, equation (4.16) gives the equilibrium value of (Op,ef), which then uniquely
determines  u,  and wi. Moreover, because of equation  (4.15),   n  is a function of (ep,ef)
and L alone, so it follows that given l,  (Bp, Of) is determined.  We can prove the following
result.
Lemma 4.2. Let the production function F(Np, Nf) exhibit constant returns to scate
and diminishing returns to both inputs, then Vt > 0 there exists a unique steady state
equilibrium (ep, Of) 4 (0,0).
To see that (Gp, Bf) in turn determines l, note that by equation (4.6) this ratio is a
function of the value functions Uf and Up (given the distribution f(w)). By rewriting
equations (4.1) and (4.2), using (4.11) and (4.12), it follows that these value functions
only  depend  on  Bp  and  8/ :
0,0/iTUi = bit- (4.17)
1-Bi
Summarising, an equilibrium for the model described above is a fixed point problem
t = q(l), where the function q(.) is shorthand for the equations (4.16), (4.6) and (4.17)
generating the equilibrium (Op, Of)  and the implied participation levels.   We  have  the
following proposition.
Proposition 4.1.  Let the production function F(Np, Nf) ezhibit constant returns to scale
and diminishing returns to both inputs.  Then there exists a unique steady state eqtalibrium
(1. ,  0;,  e; ) 96 (0,0,0).
4.2.6  Benefits and recruitment cost
The way the model is currently specified, unemployment benefits are related to the price
level, not the wage rate. However, in practice the benefit level usually is related to the
wage level in the economy in one way or another. A straightforward specification is to
assume the benefits to be proportional to the wage level, as is the case in the Netherlands;
bi = piwi,   0 <Pi < 1. (4.18)
In order to keep the outcome of the wage bargaining process tractable, we assume that bi
is defined on the average wage level in the labour market for jobs of type i. This means
that individual employees take this level as given when bargaining with their employer.
However, in equilibrium all employees of a given type earn the same wage, so that the
average wage equals the individual wage.
Substituting equation  (4.18) into equation (4.12) gives the following expression for the
wage on market i:
di
Wi = (FN. + 8,71 - (r + 8)81). (4.19)
1-(1- B,)p,
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Substituting this result  into the equilibrium conditions  (4.11), the system of equilibrium
equations  (4.16) now equals
\     (r + 8)(1 - (1 - Bi)pi) + BiA,(ei)
(1 - pi)(1 - Bi)  FN, - (r + 8)si) - 7, = u,    i =p, f.
71(8,)
(4.20)
The argumentation in the proof of lemma 4.2 still holds, because (1 - Pi)(1 - A) > 0.
Therefore, the argument which hinges on the slope of both curves in (BI, Op)-space does
not  break down. However, the result in equation  (4.17)  does  not hold anymore, the value
functions now depend on the marginal products (and therefore on t). Thus, the fixed
point problem l = q(l) changes. In particular, the implied value of 1, q(l) can now be both
increasing and decreasing in t. Therefore we need an extra condition in proposition 4.1
to ensure convergence of the fixed point problem q = q(l). We now have
Proposition 4.2.  Let the production function F (Np, Nf) €Ihibit constant returns to scale
and  diminishing  returns  to  both  inputs.   If | €f|   5   1   then  there  exists  a  linique steady state
gp(ep)
equilibrium (1*, 8;, 89) 9,6 (0,0,0),  where Ef denotes the elasticity of with respect togflef)
t.
The condition on the elasticity ensures that an increase in t leads to an increase in
n = 0*1, ref. equation   (4.15). For reasonable values  of the model parameters  this
condition is easily met. A discussion of this condition is deferred to the appendix.
It should be noted that one could also argue for the hiring cost to be related to wages,
indicating that hiring is a labour intensive process (Pissarides (1990)). Again, making the
recruitment cost a function of both equilibrium wages greatly complicates the analysis.
However, taking the same approach as we did with the benefits makes a big difference with
respect to the equilibrium outcome: The equilibrium tightness on both labour markets no
longer depends on marginal products. Productivity changes are fully absorbed by wages
in this case, so that vacancies do not respond to them. This is not a desirable property
of our model, as we want to focus on demand side effects on equilibrium. Moreover, as
opposed to the unemployment benefits, it is considerably less clear-cut that the hiring
cost  should be proportional to wages (or productivity),  so  that  we  stay  with the original
specification.
4.3 Equilibrium analysis
In this section we analyse numerically how the equilibrium generated by the model is
affected by a change in one of the parameter values. In particular we will analyse the
equilibrium effects of changes in the production technology ie. changes in labour demand,
and compare these to the effects of exogenous changes in labour supply.
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4.3.1  Specification and calibration
We start by specifying the production technology. This technology is represented by a
CES production function, exhibiting constant returns to scale.
F(Np, Nf) = (AN,Ze + (1 - K)(INf)- )-1/e (4.21)
The production function is defined in efficiency units. The parameter x>1 reflects the
difference in working time per period between part-time and full-time workers. Therefore,
the parameter I allows us to decompose the difference in productivity between part-
time and full-time workers into differences caused by the difference in working time per
period (x) and true productivity differences. These latter differences are reflected in the
parameter K.
The parameter K can be interpreted as the productivity of a part-time worker compared
to a full-time worker. This is most clear when e = -1, ie. the perfect substitute case.
In this case, a part-time worker contributes K to production, while a full-time worker
contributes z(1 - x). As noted above, I captures the fact that a full-time employee
works longer hours than a part-time employee. Different stories can now be told whether
or not the part-time worker, correcting for the working hour difference, is more or less
productive, ie. whether K > 0.5 or K < 0.5. It might be that productivity is negatively
correlated with w, leading to K < 0.5. On the other hand, part-time workers might suffer
less fatigue or take less sick-leaves. We will not take a stance on this and take x = 0.5 in
the benchmark case.
The elasticity parameter e determines the elasticity of substitution,   T ·    Thus,   the
parameter e reflects the degree of interaction between both types of labour. In particular,
e determines the degree to which the marginal products FN, are diminishing with respect
to  N,  and are increasing with respect  to  Nj,   j  0 i. Therefore,  e  is the parameter  that
represents the organisational aspects of part-time  work.   If e  =  -1, a part-time worker  is
nothing but a full-time worker that works shorter hours. Increased values of e indicate
firms where part-time work has become more and more valuable, positively influencing
the productivity of the organisation.
Specifying the matching technology we follow the literature (Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999)) and take a Cobb-Douglas matching function;
i 1 -a, 0, (4.22)mi = Willi    Ui ·
Finally, we need to parameterise the dis-utility distribution f (w). From a parsimony
point of view, we want this to be a flexible distribution involving few parameters. Changes
in this distribution should reflect changes in the (opportunity) cost of participating. We
will argue below that most of these changes have an impact on the right tail of the dis-
utility distribution, barely affecting the left tail. In order to capture this, we will take the
dis-utility distribution to be a mixture of 2 Beta(a,B) distributions, with different support.
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This mix can be interpreted as there being 2 groups of people in society, one group on
average having low dis-utility values and one group having high values. Although this
specification comes at the cost of artificiality, it enables us to model changes in labour
supply in a more appropriate way. In particular, the impact of a change in one tail of the
distribution on the other tail can be better controlled.
The values of the parameters in the benchmark case, as reported in Table 4.2, are
chosen to reflect the Dutch labour market in the late 1990s. Although our model is in
continuous time, the parameter values should be interpreted with a quarterly time period
in mind.
Table 4.2: Model parameters, the benchmark case.
Discount rate              r                     0.025
Replacement rate          pp                       0.7
PY                                  0.7
Matching 11'P, ap 0.46, 0.5
11'f,al 0.8,0.5
Bargaining power          Bp                        0.5
Bf                       0.5
Destruction rate                                     0.033
Jf                      0.025
Flow cost vacancy          cp                        0.2
9                       0.2
Setup cost                   sp                          2
sf                    2
Production technology e,K,I -0.6, 0.5, 1.96
Dis-utility fi (w) B(1, 2) on [0, 59]
f2(w)    B(1,1) on [0.5,1.09]
mix 0.5
F                       O.7
The value of the discount rate implies a yearly rate of 10%. The replacement rate is
set to 70% of the previous wage, in accordance with the Dutch unemployment benefit sys-
tem. Both part-time and full-time workers are entitled to this percentage. The matching
elasticities  are  set  to 0.5 based on empirical evidence (Broersma  and  Van  Ours  (1999)),
and the workers share of the match surplus is equal to this elasticity in order to satisfy
the Hosios condition.3 The efficiency parameters of both matching functions are set to
match the composition of unemployment, and to generate meeting probabilities between
3The standard Hosios condition applies in spite of the new externality associated with endogenous
participation. This externality is internalised because due to the crs-property of the production function
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0 and 1. The job destruction rates are set to generate employment durations equal to 10
years for full-time workers and 7.5 years for part-time workers. These durations are equal
to the average job durations in the 1995-1996 wave of the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel.
The efficiency unit parameter x is set to 1.96. This figure is based on Statistics
Netherlands data on average hours worked in part-time and full-time jobs.  In 1996 the
ratio of average full-time and average part-time hours equalled  0 - 1.96 (CBS (1996))
For reasons described above, the productivity parameter K is set to 0.5. Using data on the
composition of employment, the parameter e is calibrated such that 34% of employment
consists of part-time jobs.
The shape parameters of both beta distributions are set such that the mix represents a
distribution that is skewed to the right. In this respect the distribution can be compared
to the log-normal distribution. Moreover, the supports of both distributions are set to be
of equal length.  Both the length and the lower bound of f2 (determining the employment
to population ratio and the participation rate) are calibrated.
The parameter B reflects the cost of participating part-time as a percentage of the
cost associated with participating full-time. We assume that part of these cost consist of
fixed cost, independent of the number of hours worked. This implies that B > 0.5. We
set B to 0.7.
We have made no distinction in the quasi-fixed cost of part-time and full-time labour.
The flow cost of a vacancy are taken to be equal given the fact that for instance cost of
advertising do not depend on the number of hours of the job advertised. Differences in
setup cost (for instance due to differences in training cost) will be analysed below. In
the benchmark the setup cost are equal to approximately 3 times the marginal produc-
tivity of a full-time worker. Together, the quasi-fixed cost generate expected (weighted)
unemployment durations of 2 quarters.
Table 4.3 summarises the benchmark equilibrium.
4.3.2   Changes in labour demand
In this section we will analyse the impact of changes in parameters that are related to
the demand side of the model. In particular, we will focus on the following 4 parameters:
The setup cost sp, the efficiency parameter x and the elasticity parameter e. Finally, the
effects of changes in the relative productivity parameter x Will be analyzed. Together, e
and K determine the production structure of the firm.
Setup cost sp
The setup cost of a job consist of quasi-fixed cost such as investment in training and
social security contributions by the firm, independent of the number of hours worked by
both types of workers enter the labour market in fixed proportions, leaving the marginal product of an
extra worker unchanged.
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Table 4.3: Equilibrium in the benchmark case.
Equilibrium





Participation rate 72.0% 72%°
Employment / Population 68.6% 68%a
part-time unemployment
(as % of total unemployment) 57.3 575
part-time employment
(as % of total employment) 33.7 30",c
unemployment rate 4.7% 5%°
" source: OECD Employment Outlook 1997.
b source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey 1997, percentage of unemployed seeking part-time job.
c The OECD defines part-time on the basis of a 30 usual hours threshold. The Eurostat Labour
Force Survey 1997 states a percentage of 38%, based on self-assessment. This percentage is close
to the percentage based on a cut-off level of 35 usual hours, previously used by the OECD.
the employee.  In our simulations, we will let  sp vary, keeping the level of sf constant.  If
sp = 0, this means that there are no setup cost related to part-time jobs. This might be
thought of as being the case in the early '8Os, when part-time jobs were mostly low-skilled
jobs not covered by social security. The results are shown in Figure  4.1.
We see that the rise in the cost of setting up a part-time job has the expected negative
effect on part-time relative to full-time employment. By increasing sp, part-time vacancies
become less profitable (The marginal cost of a vacancy go up). The firm reacts to this by
lowering the amount of part-time vacancies. This worsens the conditions in the part-time
labour market, decreasing part-time participation and increasing full-time and non par-
ticipation. This leads to second-order (organisational) effects. The decrease (increase) in
part-time (full-time) workers has a positive (negative) effect on the marginal productivity
of part-time (full-time) workers. By readjusting the number of both vacancies equilibrium
is restored. This mitigates the effect on the participation and employment levels, but over-
all the increase in the setup cost of part-time jobs leads to a sizeable decrease in part-time
participation, together with a modest decrease in part-time employment relative to total
employment.
In the Netherlands, the entitlement of part-time workers to benefits has increased
considerably.  Now, they are entitled to the same benefits as full-time workers, proportional
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Figure 4.1: Change in sp, labour force (top) and workforce (bottom) composition.
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to their working hours. As expected and as the results confirm, this change cannot explain
the increase in part-time employment.
Working time reduction and z
The parameter x measures the ratio of full-time working hours compared to part-time
working hours. Collective working time reduction is therefore equivalent to a decrease in
I. Data by Statistics Netherlands show that in the period 1980-1996 the parameter x
decreased from 2.26 to 1.96. Figure 4.2 shows the impact of this decrease.
Increasing z makes hiring full-time workers more profitable. This leads to extra full-
time vacancy creation and therefore extra full-time participation (and as a consequence
less part-time participation). This leads  to a increase  in the number of full-time workers
compared to part-time workers. Given the extra full-time workers, the productivity of
part-time workers goes up, so that extra part-time vacancies are created.
In the end a decrease in x leads to increased part-time participation and part-time
employment, relative to full-timers. This result is in line with Roger and Roux (1998),
who explicitly model the scheduling problem of the firm in an equilibrium search setting.
They also find that when hiring cost are important a reduction in full-time hours (rel-
ative to part-time hours) leads to increased part-time employment relative to full-time
employment.
As for total employment N, this is strongly affected by a change in x. Note that this
implies that there is no lump of labour. Reducing collective working time has a strong
negative impact on the level of employment.
The elasticity parameter e
The elasticity parameter e determines the dependence of the marginal productivity of
one type of workers on the presence of the other type of workers.  For e close to -1, this
dependence is almost 0. This value represents organisations in which part-time workers
have no value added apart from their own productivity. As e increases, the actual compo-
sition of the workforce gets a bigger impact on the productivity of the firm. This reflects
firms in which internal flexibility is important (ie. firms where having an extra part-time
worker can make a big difference compared to having an extra full-time worker). The
effects on the equilibrium outcome of the model are shown in Figure 4.3.
For e close to -1, hardly any part-time worker is employed.  Due to their small
contribution to productivity compared to full-time workers   (ie. low part-time wages),
labour market conditions are much more favourable in the full-time market. Increasing e
has a dramatic impact on the composition of the workforce. With employment more or
less constant, it becomes profitable to substitute part-time workers for part-time workers.
In order to change the composition of the workforce, only a small change in 8, is needed,
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Figure 4.2: Change in z, labour force (top) and workforce (bottom) composition.
I
L,










01.80 1.85 1.90 1.95 2.00 2.05 2.10 2.15 2.20 2.25 2.30
X ->
M
5-  _ r
Ne/N
5                                                         -
m-0
3-
6-                                        I
0





3-                                         i
a
0                                                      ..,
0
1.80 1.85 1.90 1.95 200 205 2.10 2.15 2.20 225 2.30
X ->
70                                                     CHAPTER 4. PART-TIME WORK
Figure 4.3: Change in e, labour force (top) and workforce (bottom) composition.
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given the impact this has on the participation levels in both labour markets (remember
that a decrease in Of both lowers Lf and increases Lp)
The productivity parameter x
As noted above, the parameter K can be interpreted as the productivity of a part-time
worker compared to the productivity of a full-time worker. Now suppose that the pro-
ductivity of part-time workers increases relative to full-time productivity.
Due to the parameter change, the marginal productivity of a part-time (full-time)
worker goes up (down), to which the firm reacts by opening more part-time vacancies and
less full-time vacancies. Due to the change in labour market tightness, part-time labour
supply increases and full-time labour supply decreases, ie. goes up. The induced
change in supply leads to second-order effects on 4, as the supply change affects the rate
at which new workers are hired. Despite this mitigating second-order effect, in the end
both the composition of the labour force and of the workforce change considerably. The
above is illustrated in Figure 4.4.
From the above, in particular Figures 4.3 (e) and 4.4 (x) it is clear that changes
on the demand side of the labour market have a big impact on the composition of the
workforce. Moreover, note that in all simulations above, assuming negative cross-products
FN,N1 would have increased the effect on the composition of employment. In particular,
it would reduce the mitigating effect of the second-order effects. Above, an increase in Nf
together with a decrease in Np leads to a decrease in the marginal product of a full-time
worker and an increase in the marginal product of a part-time worker, thus offsetting the
increase in Nf and the decrease in Np.  If the cross-products were negative, the second-
order effects on Np and Nf would be much smaller, because the cross-effect counteracts
the diminishing returns effect. Therefore, in the end Np would decrease more and Ni
would increase more, leading to a bigger change in N  4Np+Nt
4.3.3  Changes in labour supply
We model changes in labour supply by changing the dis-utility distribution f(w) Changes
in this distribution reflect changes in the way the individual cost of participating is dis-
tributed over the population. For instance, increased child-care subsidies would translate
into probability mass shifted from high values to lower values of w, as these directly affect
the cost of participating for individuals with children. Second, the increased educational
level of an individual would reduce the opportunity cost of participating.  Note that chang-
ing the parameter u is not relevant here, as this would only indicate a change in the fixed
component, not in the level of the cost.
4The  effect will still  go  in  the same direction  as  long  as  IFN,N, |  >  IFN, N, 1·   If this condition  were  not
satisfied, equilibrium in the negative cross-product case would break down.
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Figure 4.4: Change in K, labour force (top) and workforce (bottom) composition.
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It seems most likely that changes in the cost of participating mostly affect people with
high values of w.  As in the child-care example, better availability of child-care has probably
little effect on someone already working full-time, but it will affect a nonparticipant who
currently cannot afford or find it. Moreover, this person is more likely to change his/her
labour supply decision after he/she has finished a degree than someone who is already
working full-time. In terms of our dis-utility distribution, this means that changes have to
take place in the right tail of the distribution without (or only slightly) affecting the left
part of the distribution.  This is where our mixture specification comes into play, allowing
us to change f2 leaving fi unchanged. In particular, we will simulate two scenarios
that can both be thought of as capturing the changes described above. First, we will
consider a tilt in f2, distributing probability mass. Second, we will consider a shift in
the support of f2· To quantify the size of the shock associated with the change of the
dis-utility distribution, we use the following measure. Consider the equilibrium in the old
case. Given the thresholds determining participation in this case, we calculate the change
in participation, using the new distribution, holding the thresholds constant at the old
equilibrium levels. This can be interpreted as the number of extra people that decide to
enter the labour market at the current conditions.
Figure 4.5 shows the effects of a  tilt  in  f2  -  8(1,1). In particular, f2 changes  from
B(1,1) to B(2,1).  B(1,1) is the benchmark case, where dis-utility is evenly distributed
over group 2. B(2,1) describes a triangular distribution with most mass on the upper-
bound of the support. Therefore, in this case the mixture is U-shaped, individuals having
either very high or very low values of w. This might be considered to represent the Dutch
labour market in the early '8Os. Going from right to left in the figure then describes the
effects of decreasing the cost of participating. In particular, the size of the shock is equal
to a 62% increase in Lp, leaving Lf unchanged. This increase means that it becomes
easier for the firm to hire extra part-time workers. However, given the current produc-
tion structure, there is a limit to how many part-timers can be employed profitably. The
firm therefore reacts to this by lowering its hiring effort for part-time workers. This has
two effects: first, it reduces the number of part-time workers and second, it increases the
supply of full-time workers. These workers have become more profitable given the extra
supply of part-time workers.  As both part-time and full-time employment increase, the
labour supply shock has a big employment effect, but hardly affects the composition of
employment . To illustrate the effect of the change in hiring behaviour and the
associated change in the thresholds determining labour supply, we compute the change
in t taking the changed thresholds into account. The initial change of 62% in the end
leads to an increase in of just 11%, while increases 7%.
The effects of a shift in the support of f2 are described in Figure 4.6. The x-axis shows
the lower bound of the support of f2· Again, going from right to left represents a decrease
in the cost of participating. The impact of this shock is a 91% increase in the part-time
labour force, leaving the full-time labour force unchanged. The results are identical to
74                                                         CHAPTER 4. PART-TIME WORK
Figure 4.5: Tilted dis-utility, labour force (top) and workforce (bottom) composition.
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the effects of a tilt in the distribution. Again the firm adjusts its hiring behaviour given
the production structure, in order to optimally employ the extra supply. Again note that
as in the demand side case, imposing negative cross-products would have increased the
effect on the composition of employment.
Comparing the effects on the composition of employment, we can conclude that the
changes on the demand side (and in particular changes in the production structure) have
a much bigger impact than changes in labour supply. The former changes induce extra
supply, where the latter are limited by the unchanged organisation of the firm.
4.4 Empirical analysis
We will now investigate the empirical validity of the claim that labour demand is likely to
have played an important role in explaining the increase in part-time employment over the
past two decades in The Netherlands. It has been argued (Bosch (1998)) that uncoupling
of operating hours and working time will induce demand for part-time workers, as they
are a flexible scheduling device. In The Netherlands, this uncoupling occurred during the
second half of the '8Os, together with increasing fluctuations in the workload (Tijdens
(1998)).   Using the  1991  and 1993 waves  of a Dutch employer survey,  we will test whether
these changes indeed brought about increased part-time employment.  If the hypothesis is
true, then it must hold that firms with big differences between operating hours and (full-
time) working time have on average higher levels of part-time employment than firms for
which operating hours and working time practically coincide. The same holds for firms
with fluctuating demand. The next subsection describes the data we use.
4.4.1    The data
The data used in this analysis come from the 1991 and 1993 waves of the so called OSA
firm panel. This is a sample of circa 1600 Dutch firms, stratified by size and sector.
Part-time employment in this survey is determined on the basis of the assessment of
the employer. It covers employees who (according to the employer) work less than 35
hours per week.5  In the 1991 wave the number of part-time employees refers to December
1990, the 1993 wave refers to December 1992. We have only limited information on the
hours worked by part-time employees, the data only provide information on the most
usual number of hours, divided into 3 categories: 0 - 9, 10-19 and 20-34 hours. In both
1991 and 1993, 0-9 was most common in 7% of the cases, 10-19 in 35% and 20-34 in 58%
of the organisations in which employees work part-time.
The key variable of interest in our analysis will be the ratio of operating hours and the
standard working time of a full-time employee (OW-ratio). Weekly operating hours  of an
5The OSA notes that employers tend to overlook big part-time jobs, thus underestimating the true
number of part-time employees.
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organisation are defined as the total number of hours per week that at least some personnel
is working. Weekly working hours are net of working time reduction.  If the uncoupling
of operating and working hours indeed brought about an increase in the demand for
part-time workers through the need for a flexible scheduling device, then the variable
OW-ratio should have a positive effect on the percentage part-time employment in a firm.
Table 4.4 reports the mean proportion of part-timers and the mean OW-ratio in each
of the 9 sectors for both 1991 and 1993.  The data are weighted by sampling weights to
make the descriptives representative of the population of Dutch firms with 10 or more
employees. From Table 4.4 we conclude that there is considerable variation in both part-
time employment and the OW-ratio, both between and within sectors. The correlation
between the average OW-ratio and the average percentage of part-time employment is
0.58 in 1991 and 0.55 in 1993. However, this correlation is almost completely determined
by the sector Health Care. Without this sector, the correlation drops to 0.13 and -0.08
respectively.
To further investigate the relationship between operating hours and part-time employ-
ment, we have split up the variable OW-ratio into categories. These categories are chosen
such that each category contains ample observations, and such that categories clearly
differ from each other. The categories are (the numbers in parenthesis show the number
of observations  in  the  1991  and 1993 sample respectively):
1. OW-ratio 5 1 (429,395)
2.  OW-ratio E (1,1.25) (598,708)
3. OW-ratio 2 1.25 (400,525)
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show the (weighted) mean percentage of part-time employment for
each of these categories. The figures clearly indicate that both in 1991 and 1993 there
exists a positive relationship between the OW-ratio and the percentage part-time em-
ployment. We get approximately the same picture when we split the last category into
[1.25,1.5) and 2 1.5.
Finally, the 1991 wave contains information on the most important reason to hire
part-time workers. Four possible reasons are distinguished: 1) The need for (production)
capacity, 2) Preference of personnel, 3) Workers are (partly) disabled and 4) Other. The
first two reasons are by far the most important ones, as they account for 88% of the
(weighted) cases. Part-time employment in combination with reason 1 can be interpreted
as demand side induced part-time work, where reason 2 can be interpreted as supply
side induced. Table 4.5 relates reasons 1 and 2 to the OW-ratio categories. The column
percentages show that the higher OW-ratio categories have an above average percentage
of reason=1. This is confirmed by the Pearson Chi-square statistic. This statistic equals
15.1 and therefore the independence hypothesis is rejected at any reasonable significance
level. Moreover, Spearman's rank order correlation measure is significantly negative. This
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Table 4.4: Means and variation of OW-ratio and part-time employment per sector.
1991 1993
Sector OW-ratio %PE OW-ratio %PE
Industry and Agriculture M 1.30 6.47 1.41 7.50
a 0.75 10.25 0.79 12.23
N 304 332 321 309
Construction                                           p 1.05 3.58 1.18 3.28
a 0.09 6.01 0.61 6.86
N 191 221 208 193
'rrade and Repairs           B 1.31 12.81 1.33 13.65
0 0.72 17.27 0.60 20.68
N 363 221 368 356
Ttansportation                                     B 1.86 10.70 1.91 8.31
0 1.086 19.46 1.18 13.79
N       59 75 67    66
Business services                                B 1.16 14.92 1.29 16.08
0 0.51 16.10 .74 20.78
N 238 245 251 239
Health care                   B         2.58 54.58 2.67 59.14
a   1.62 23.74 1.64 26.23
N 102 104 104    97
Other services                B         1.69 38.70 1.63 45.86
a   1.22 28.95 1.05 31.54
N               50        57               57        52
Government                                       B 1.24 19.37 1.20 22.67
a 0.72 14.06 .57 15.55
N               29        30               33        32
Education       B   1.19 48.14 1.09 40.33
0 0.22 18.91 0.28 20.15
N        61    65 221 204
Total                              B 1.37 15.79 1.41 18.89
0   0.87 21.56 .87 24.43
N 1398 1518 1629 1547
Explanatory note: Data weighted by sampling weights.
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Figure 4.7: Weighted mean percentage of part-time employment vs. OW-ratio, 1991.
.,
Figure 4.8: Weighted mean percentage of part-time employment vs. OW-ratio, 1993.
,,
Table 4.5: Reason for part-time employment vs. OW-ratio.
OW-ratio
Reason     5 1 (1, 1.25) [1.25,1.5)    2 1.5
1      66 (38.2) 85 (34.3)   37 (51.4)   64 (52.5)  252 (41.0)
2     107 (61.8)  163 (65.7)  35 (48.6)  58 (47.5)  363 (59.0)
Total 173 248        72 122 615
Explanatory note: Data weighted by sampling weights. Column percentages in parentheses.
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Table 4.6: Reason for part-time employment vs. Fluc.
Fluc
Reason          0                 1
1     160 (37.0)  103 (50.2)  263 (41.3)
2     272 (63.0)  102 (49.8)  374 (58.7)
Total 432 205 637
Explanatory note: Data weighted by sampling weights. Column percentages in parentheses.
means that higher values of the OW-ratio are associated with reason 1.  We can conclude
that if part-time employment in an organisation is demand induced, then this organisation
is likely to have operating hours that are considerably larger than full-time working hours.
In other words, the variable OW-ratio captures demand side aspects of part-time work.
Second, the 1991 wave contains information on whether demand fluctuates over time.
In particular, seasonal, daily, weekly and irregular variations are distinguished. From
this information we construct the dummy variable Fluc, that equals 1 if the organisation
experiences demand fluctuations other than seasonal variation. This dummy variable di-
rectly relates to the need for scheduling. To see whether scheduling and the demand for
part-time workers are related, we tabulate reasons 1 and 2 against Fluc, see Table 4.6.
The Pearson Chi-square test statistic equals 10.0, so again the independence hypothesis
is rejected at a 5% significance level. Spearman's rank order correlation measure is sig-
nificantly negative, indicating that reason=1 is most likely combined with Fluc=1. We
conclude that scheduling and the demand for part-time workers are related.
4.4.2 Estimation results
In this subsection we will estimate the effects of several firm characteristics on the level
of part-time employment in a firm. Both in 1991 and 1993 approximately 20% of the
firms in our sample do not employ part-time workers. To account for this we estimate
(by Maximum Likelihood) models of the well-known Tobit (Tobin (1958)) type. Table 4.7
shows the variables we include in our regressions. Instead of the variable OW-ratio itself,
we use the categorised version OW-cat. This specification is more flexible with respect
to the effect of the OW-ratio, and less sensitive to measurement errors in the variable
OW-ratio.
We will first discuss the results for 1991. After excluding firms with missing observa-
tions on one of the variables, we have a cross-section of N = 1389 firms, of which 26% do
not employ any part-time workers. Column I of Table 4.8 shows the estimation results
for the standard Tobit model. The estimates for the OW-ratio dummies indicate that
there is some sort of threshold effect. High OW-ratio's (> 1.25) have a positive impact
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Table 4.7: Definitions of independent variables.
Variable
OW-ratio ratio operating hours and working time
OW-cat i l i f OW-ratio in category i=2, . . . ,4
Size number of employees (x1000)
Fluc° 1 if demand fluctuates (daily, weekly of irregularly)
'I'rainingc    l if average training > 1 year
Sector i set of sector dummies,  1 if in sector i=2, . . . ,9
HRMC 1 if there is a personnel department or officer
Ca# 1 if organisation follows collective agreement
°  only  available  in  1991.
b only available in 1993.
c only used in 1993 due 70% missing cases in 1991.
on the percentage part-time employment in a firm. Moreover, this effect increases as the
ratio of operating and working hours exceeds 1.5. The estimates of the sector dummies
reflect the results in Table 4.4. The transportation sector is comparable to the industry
and agriculture sector, where the construction sector has significantly less part-time work.
The health care and education sector are sectors with high percentages of part-time em-
ployment.  Size is significantly positive.  In one of the very few other empirical studies
on the demand for part-time labour, Montgomery (1988) argues and finds a significantly
negative effect on the basis of increased monitoring and administrative cost in large firms.
However, it can also be argued that it is easier in large firms to fit in part-time workers,
for instance because of the smaller impact on the organisation of a decrease in hours of 1
worker.
It is well known that Tobit estimates will be inconsistent if the error terms are het-
eroscedastic or non-normal (Greene (1997)). Therefore,   we also estimated the model,
explicitly incorporating heteroscedasticity:
J,  = exp {ao + ai Size + aj Sectorj} (4.23)
We include both the variable Size and the Sector dummies in equation (4.23). We include
Size because our dependent variable is a mean. Therefore, observations are more infor-
mative as firms are larger. The Sector dummies are included because Table 4.4 indicates
that the variation in part-time employment differs across sectors. The most important
thing to note is that the B estimates are hardly affected. So although we reject the ho-
moscedasticity assumption  (all ai except  ao=0), the conclusions  from the homoscedastic
model still hold. What is puzzling though is the significant positive effect of Size on 02.
Finally, the heteroscedasticity is combined with a parametric specification of a non-
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Table 4.8: Estimation results for 1991.
I                    II                   III
B
OW-cat2 0.015 (0.012) 0.010 (0.009) 0.007 (0.006)
OW-cat3 0.052* (0.019) 0.048* (0.017) 0.039* (0.011)
OW-cat4 0.054* (0.014) 0.035* (0.012) 0.010 (0.009)
Fluc 0.012 (0.010) 0.009 (0.008) 0.010* (0.005)
Size 0.043* (0.008) 0.052* (0.012) 0.047* (0.009)
Sector 2   -0.078*  (0.019)  -0.045*  (0.012)  -0.059*  (0.006)
Sector 3 0.085* (0.017) 0.068* (0.021) 0.036* (0.010)
Sector 4 -0.001 (0.025) -0.018 (0.035) -0.012 (0.018)
Sector 5 0.120* (0.015) 0.103* (0.016) 0.084* (0.010)
Sector 6 0.509* (0.018) 0.498* (0.026) 0.500* (0.034)
Sector 7 0.345* (0.025) 0.326* (0.040) 0.277* (0.035)
Sector 8 0.163* (0.018) 0.148* (0.017) 0.117* (0.011)
Sector 9 0.429* (0.022) 0.414* (0.023) 0.381* (0.026)
Constant -0.003 (0.012) 0.017* (0.009) 0.039* (0.006)
0                0.172   (0.004)
a
Size 0.204* (0.064) 0.599* (0.055)
Sector 2 -0.789* (0.167) -1.282* (0.273)
Sector 3 0.980* (0.136) 0.528* (0.179)
Sector 4 1.052* (0.174) 0.784* (0.191)
Sector 5 0.823* (0.096) 0.963* (0.181)
Sector 6 1.535* (0.147) 2.832* (0.189)
Sector 7 1.674* (0.308) 2.659* (0.358)
Sector 8 0.253* (0.088) 0.813* (0.184)
Sector 9 0.846* (0.170) 2.052* (0.236)
Constant -4.322* (0.052) -5.441* (0.078)71                 -0.207* (0.010)72                 0.016* (0.001)
LogL 162.25 269.88 474.75
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 5% level.
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normal distribution of the error terms (Ruud (1994) and Melenberg and Van Soest (1996)):
P [€i < t IIi, a] C expa'I, )  '=G( t  (4.24)
with
G(s) =W (70 +S t 7182 + 7283) . (4.25)
The distribution G generalises the normal distribution, so a test for normality is equivalent
to testing 70 = 71 = 72 - 0.6 Column III of Table 4.8 shows the results.  From the
estimates of 71 and 72 it is clear that normality is strongly rejected. The variable Fluc
is now significantly positive, while OW-cat4 no longer has a significant additional effect.
The other B estimates (Size and OW-cat3 in particular) are very similar to the results in
columns I and II.
We now turn to the results for 1993, shown in Table 4.9. For this year we have a
cross-section of N = 1486 firms, with 21% of the firms having no part-time employment.
The first column of Table 4.9 shows the results of the standard Tobit model for 1993.
The variable Size has a significant positive effect, similar to 1991. However, now the effect
of the OW-ratio is much weaker, but still significantly positive for high ratios.  The new
variable Training is significantly negative. Firms in which jobs on average require a lot of
training are less likely to employ part-time workers. This is in accordance with the quasi-
fixed cost of labour theory. The variable HRM has a significant positive effect. In firms
with a separate personnel department it might be easier for employees with a preference
for part-time work to accommodate their wishes. The CAO dummy is insignificant. The
pattern described by the sector dummies is equal to the pattern in 1991.
Columns II and III show the results of allowing for heteroscedasticity (II) and non-
normality (III). Similar  to  the 1991 results, homoscedasticity and normality are strongly
rejected. Moreover, the 1991 and 1993 estimates of a and 7correspond closely. Again,
Size  has a significant positive effect  on  02.
As for the B estimates, these seem to be quite robust to the specification.  In all
specifications, the effect of the OW-ratio is very weak, as opposed to 1991. This can be
traced back to the differences in figure 4.7 and 4.8. In 1991, the means (standard errors
in parenthesis) for the categories are 0.11 (0.17), 0.15 (0.21), 0.25 (0.24) and 0.29 (0.27).
The clear distinction between categories 1 and 2 on the one hand and categories 3 and
4 on the other is absent in 1993: 0.17 (0.22), 0.19 (0.24), 0.18 (0.26) and 0.24 (0.29).
Moreover, the variation within the categories is bigger in 1993. To see whether there still
is a threshold effect, we estimate model (4.24) with a dummy variable indicating whether
OW-ratio is larger than or equal to a certain threshold. Table 4.10 shows the results for
6In order to estimate this model if B contains a constant term, we need an identifying restriction on
G.   We  assume  that  70  =  0 (zero conditional mean). Moreover,  we  need  that  7  is  such  that the density
function is everywhere non-negative.  This is equivalent to 72  2  4.
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Table 4.9: Estimation results for 1993.
I                     II                    III
B
OW-cat2 -0.020 (0.014) -0.017 (0.011) -0.010** (0.007)
OW-cat3 0.020 (0.020) 0.009 (0.019) 0.013 (0.011)
OW-cat4 0.029** (0.016) 0.018** (0.014) -0.000 (0.009)
'Itaining -0.048* (0.019) -0.023** (0.015) -0.015** (0.010)
HRM 0.044* (0.013) 0.042* (0.011) 0.033* (0.007)
CAO 0.013 (0.014) -0.000 (0.013) -0.008 (0.009)
Size 0.037* (0.010) 0.031* (0.008) 0.028* (0.008)
Sector 2 -0.096* (0.023) -0.052* (0.016) -0.056* (0.008)
Sector 3 0.068* (0.019) 0.039** (0.025) 0.027* (0.012)
Sector 4 -0.012 (0.030) -0.016 (0.035) -0.012 (0.018)
Sector 5 0.115* (0.019) 0.095* (0.023) 0.067* (0.012)
Sector 6 0.556* (0.020) 0.547* (0.027) 0.560* (0.031)
Sector 7 0.405* (0.027) 0.385* (0.039) 0.357* (0.039)
Sector 8 0.192* (0.018) 0.172* (0.017) 0.130* (0.010)
Sector 9 0.393* (0.021) 0.373* (0.021) 0.340* (0.020)
Constant -0.022 (0.021) 0.007 (0.018) 0.037* (0.011)
0    0.197 (0.004)
a
Size -0.041* (0.055) 0.139* (0.082)
Sector 2 -0.983* (0.147) -1.491* (0.150)
Sector 3 1.028* (0.118) 0.562* (0.154)
Sector 4 0.373* (0.155) 0.255** (0.160)
Sector 5 0.779* (0.106) 0.703* (0.163)
Sector 6 1.083* (0.134) 2.425* (0.174)
Sector 7 1.437* (0.308) 2.591* (0.333)
Sector 8 -0.072 (0.089) 0.594* (0.153)
Sector 9 0.608* (0.141) 1.762* (0.193)
Constant -3.841* (0.058) -5.038* (0.088)
71                  -0.199* (0.009)72                  0.015* (0.001)
LogL 17.54 106.45 319.37
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 5% level.
** significant at 10% level.
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Table 4.10: Estimation results for 1993, threshold effects.
I                                II
B
OW threshold   0.009**   (0.006)   0.011**   (0.007)
'Itaining -0.015** (0.010) -0.015** (0.010)
HRM 0.032* (0.007) 0.032* (0.007)
CAO -0.010 (0.009) -0.010 (0.009)
Size 0.029* (0.008) 0.029* (0.008)
Sector 2 -0.056* (0.008) -0.055* (0.008)
Sector 3 0.027* (0.012) 0.027* (0.012)
Sector 4 -0.010 (0.018) -0.011 (0.018)
Sector 5 0.068* (0.012) 0.069* (0.012)
Sector 6 0.560* (0.031) 0.559* (0.031)
Sector 7 0.356* (0.039) 0.357* (0.039)
Sector 8 0.131* (0.010) 0.131* (0.010)
Sector 9 0.339* (0.019) 0.340* (0.020)
Constant 0.031 (0.011) 0.032* (0.011)
a
Size 0.134* (0.084) 0.132* (0.083)
Sector 2 -1.503* (0.135) -1.506* (0.137)
Sector 3 0.568* (0.159) 0.552* (0.157)
Sector 4 0.235** (0.158) 0.227** (0.158)
Sector 5 0.713* (0.165) 0.710* (0.167)
Sector 6 2.424* (0.174) 2.414* (0.173)
Sector 7 2.588* (0.337) 2.576* (0.337)
Sector 8 0.609* (0.152) 0.591* (0.153)
Sector 9 1.748* (0.193) 1.738* (0.193)
Constant -5.035* (0.089) -5.038* (0.088)
71     -0.198* (0.009) -0.199*   (0.009)
72      0.015* (0.001) 0.015* (0.001)
LogL 317.60 317.78
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 5% level.
** significant at 10% level.
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the threshold set to 1.1 (column I) and 1.25 (column II). In both cases we find a significant
positive effect, so high OW-ratios are still associated with more part-time work.
Finally, we have also estimated a 2-equation model, one (Probit) equation explaining
whether or not part-time work occurs, the other explaining the level of part-time em-
ployment conditional on this level being positive. The 2-equation specification has the
advantage that it is less restrictive than the Tobit specification. In particular, it allows for
the effect of a covariate to differ between the probability to have part-time employment
and the level of part-time employment. Second, in the 2-equation model the shape of the
distribution of non-limit observations is not linked to the probability of a positive obser-
vation. However, our estimation results (not reported here) are very similar (both with
respect to significance and sign) to the results obtained above. Moreover, the covariates
have the same sign in both equations, suggesting that the tobit specification is not too
restrictive in our case.
4.5 Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed the interaction between demand and supply factors affect-
ing part-time employment. The theoretical analysis has been carried out in a matching
framework, explicitly taking into account search frictions and labour supply decisions.
However, this framework does not allow for detailed modelling of the firms decision pro-
cess, because the matching model is sequential by nature (equating marginal costs to
marginal gains  of an extra worker). Therefore,  we have assumed  that the effects  of part-
time work on the work organisation (the so called fine tuning of working time) can be
captured by the way part-time and full-time workers contribute to the productivity of
the firm.  If a firm can increase its efiiciency by changing its work organisation, ie.  by
changing the composition of its workforce, this can be interpreted as a change in the
marginal productivities of part-time and full-time workers. Our reduced form approach
using a flexible CES production function should therefore be reasonable.
Our results show that a big increase in part-time employment, as experienced by
the Netherlands during the last 15 years, cannot be accounted for by an increase in the
supply of people wanting to work part-time.  In an equilibrium framework, the decrease in
recruitment cost (caused by the increased participation) does not necessarily lead to more
part-time employment, because the production structure does not change. Therefore,
although it becomes easier to hire extra part-time workers, these extra part-time workers
are less and less productive. The production structure therefore limits the positive effect
of the decrease in recruitment cost. Now compare the effect of a change in the production
structure, making part-time workers more profitable for the firm. This leads to an increase
in part-time job opportunities, which induces extra supply and reinforces the demand
shock. Because of the change in the production structure, more part-time workers can
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be hired before the positive effect of increased participation on part-time employment is
offset by the decreasing profitability of extra part-time workers.
The results therefore contradict the common believe that the dramatic increase in
female labour force participation was the main reason for the increase in part-time em-
ployment. Rather, our results show that this increased participation was induced by an
increase in the demand for part-time labour.
In our empirical analysis we have focussed on the effect of several firm characteristics on
the demand for part-time workers. The results support the claim that in The Netherlands
during the second half of the '8Os and early '9Os the extension of operating hours by
decoupling working time and operating hours together with increasing fluctuations in the
workload brought about labour demand changes that increased the level of part-time
employment.
Not the fact that there were so many women around wanting to work part-time, but
the firms' need for flexibility caused by collective working time reductions lead to the
increase in part-time employment.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
4.A Proofs
proof of lemma  4.1
" =*" EM2 rU f -TUp>             can berewritten as rUp (1(it·;ij  > iff.  Ast, C (0,1) it follows
P      1-B
9 >ruf. Given this result, we have U -.Up < rU,,-11:U, - TUf ·
" *"  This part is trivial. QED
proof of temma  # .2
We first derive the slopes of the curves described by system (4.2.5) by total differen-
tiation:
((1 - B,)-3# -         a         ) dep + ((1 - B,)-3©  def -0 (4.26)
BFN- Btir + 6 + BpX(ep) 7p 11(Op)-1 \ DFN )
OFN ) OFN D r+8+BfA(ef) 7f 11(ef)-1\
<(1 - B')-Be;'j de,+ ((1 -B,)--   def = 0  (4.27)Ber              801
Because of the properties of the matching technology, A'(8) > 0 and 4(8) < 0. There-
fore,
0(r +6+ 8'A(Bi))7, 71(8,)-1/88,
is positive.
Now consider the dependence of the marginal product FN, on #j. First, by equation
(4.15), Ni is an increasing function of 8, for given Li:
A;(0) >0 =* g;(8) >0= * Ni'(8) >0. (4.28)
Moreover, we know that the production function exhibits constant returns to scale with
diminishing returns to both inputs. Then the cross-partial derivatives 12) are positive.
This causes both curves to have a positive slope in  (Gi, 05)-space. Because both curves
have the same slope, this does not suffice to prove the existence of an equilibrium.
Now consider equation (4.16) for i = f.  If Of goes down to 0, the second term on
the LHS goes down to 0. The only way then for the first term to go to 0, is by lowering
Np, ie lowering Op.  Similarly, if Bf increases, the second term goes to Bf7fGf, which is
increasing in Of.   Now Op has to  increase as well,  so that  the marginal product FN, Can
increase (Note that due to the diminishing returns, a rise in Of lowers FNA Thus for 01
close to 0, Op is close to 0 and for increasing Gf, #p goes to infinity.
The crucial element, determining the pace at which Op adjusts to increasing 01 and
therefore determining the shape of the curves, is the cross-partial derivative of the marginal
products Because of the properties of the matching technology and the production
function, we have
82FN. (aN:\2 82 3,
-58 - = FN.N,N, \54 )  + FN.N,--58  =< 0
(4.29)
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82 FN
Now consider again equation (4.16) for i = f. We have that -.N  > O and --ae < 0.80p
Therefore, as #f increases, Bp has to increase more and more to make up for the decrease
in FN, caused by the increase in Of. Thus, the equation for i=f describes a convex
curve in (ef, ep)-space.  By the symmetry of the system, the equation for i =p leads to
a concave curve in (ef, ep)-space. This suffices to prove existence of an equilibrium. The
curves can possibly intersect twice.  We will now show that if the equilibrium in the lower
left corner exists, it equals (0,0), leaving the equilibrium in the upper right corner as the
unique equilibrium  96  (0,0).
If the production function satisfies limN,10 FN,  - 0, then Of 1 0 4 Op 1 0.  As the
reverse holds for the other curve, the intersection point in the lower left corner equals
(0,0).   If limNplo FN,  > 0, there exists a value Of,  such  that for values  ef  <  Of,  the
equation for i=f has no equilibrium. The equilibrium curve in this case originates
from  (Of, 0). This leaves the intersection point in the upper right corner as the unique
equilibrium. QED
Proof of proposition 4.1
-,
The first question then is how the equilibrium  8 * changes after a change in l.  To give an
answer  to this question, we linearise system  (4.16).   Let the first equation be denoted  by
tp - 0 and the second equation by 0f = 0. The linearised system can then be expressed
as
r 26  26lr 1 a.2 1
L gt  *11 12 1--1 +FL   'A                     (430)
eep Def at ]
The change in Op and #f caused by a change in L now equals
I"I=  1  ,  3  -3 11 1-5 1"                c'.'.)
I aeg
def    |          1 0 1   [   _ ffL           26              _ ff.[   1     '
where 1*1 equals
1 *    *  1 _ 00, 001      80, 80, (4.32)
1% *1- Dep Des -  Bef Dep
Thus
de .1    (     80 1 80p  + 8*p 80 A dl (4.33)  - 1*1    a8f  al     aef  Ot /
dBf =-' dl (4.34)1    ( 8$ 1 0*p  - 8*p 84, f 1*l  \ oOp al OOp at J
We start by showing that the determinant 1*1 is always positive. Writing equation
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(4.32) in terms of the original equations, we get
101    =      (1 - Bp) -Dez -                             aepBFN- B r 7- 6 -- BpA(#p) 'yp 9(Bp)-1 
aFN a<r + 8 + BrA(ef))1'f'1(81)-1  .((1- Bf)-Ber - aer
OFN 8FN,
(4.35)-(1 - Bp) (1 - Bf)-
801         80p
The assumptions made on the production function give, by Euler's Theorem,
DFN, BFN,  = < OFNA: (4.36)8Np DN, - \ 8Ns )
Using equation (4.36), it is easy to show that
BFN BFNf BFN. BFN,(1 - B.)p(1 - *)- = (1 -B-)=(1 -14)-· (4.37)
"  80p         80f            80f         00p
8 rt8ttl,Me,) 7, 9(0,)-1Moreover, we have >  0.   Denote  this term  by G. Substituting these881
results into equation  (4.35),  we  get
BFN, BFN.1*1 = -Cp(1 - 13/)- - Cf(1 - 0-)- +  CpC f · (4.38)
Def              Dep
Because of the diminishing returns assumption, the determinant is always positive.
Now, writing equation (4.33) in terms of the original equations, we get (omitting the
positive determinant)
BFN, a r +8+ Bix(81) ·yf '1(81)-1 \ OFNp  '
dep =
{((1 -Bf)-35- - 88, '1 (-1)(1- B.)-Dr-,1 'it
BFN BFNA
(4.39)+  (1 - Bp)p . (1 - Bf)--Br  dl.
80f
BPN 8FN-Because of the diminishing returns, we have -33,  < o and -31   < 0. Therefore, the first
term on the RHS is negative. The second term on the RHS is positive. To see this, note
that  because of the positive cross-partial derivatives  (and  the  fact  that by equation  (4.15)
Ni depends positively on 8,), we have
BFN,  -BFNPON f  > 0. (4.40)
801    8Nf Def
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Moreover,
BFN,  BFN,Bf.
-Dj   = aS  al' =(>0) ' (>0)- (>0) (4.41)
Nf
We will now show that in absolute value the first term is bigger than the second term,
implying that Bp is a decreasing function of t. First note that
1 *  119'1  -  1 a f ,1 1 :t 1  1 2'1  1  11  -  l e'    l e  I  .              ( 4 4 2 )1 Nfl NI||
Using this we get
 (1 - Bf) B  f_ a r +8+ BIA(Of) 71 11(ef)-1\                     BFN-Bef                              82yl . (-1)(1 - Bp)-
aFN,     a r +8+ Bt. (Of) 71 11(8/)-1 1 OFNP 1
(1 - Bf)-3 )»-     a#,     .1(1 - B,)-3£-1 »
aFN, \ BFN.
1(1 - BI)-3©  |(1 - B,)-31
BFN BFN,
I(1 -Bp)-33-&. (1 - #f)-Br       (4.43)
In a similar fashion, we can derive that Gf is an increasing function of l.
Now consider an equilibrium (Op,ef), generated by a given value lo. Given these values
we can compute the value functions rU, and therefore the implied value q(to) = l'. Now
recall that a necessary condition for part-time participation to occur is given by equation
(4.5):
TU.
TUY < -E. (4.44)
B
If this condition is not met the implied value t' = 0. However, the properties of the
production function ensure that there exists a t>0: q(t) >0.I n particular, we have that
1 10 => FN, T oo =* Bp T oo· For any Of this suffices to ensure part-time participation.
Therefore, by lowering lo,  we will eventually enter the interval  (0, l),  with t such that
q(l) =0<1. Now by lowering l further, by equation (4.17) rUp goes up and rUf goes
down. This leads  to an increase  in the implied value  q(t).   By  continuity  of all functions
involved (innocuously assuming that the dis-utility distribution has no mass points), the
implied value q(t) can be increased by an arbitrary small value by decreasing t. Therefore
1 - q(l) converges to a unique equilibrium value l- > 0. QED
Proof  of  proposition  4.2
The first part of the proof copies the proof of proposition 4.1, where (1 - pi)(1 - Bi)
replaces  (1  -  B,).   The only other difference  is  the  term  C, in equation (4.38), which  now
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denotes
a (r + 6)(1- (1
-
Bi)A) + Bix(GE) 'Yi '1(81)-1
00,
(4.45)
However, it still holds that C, > 0. Therefore, it follows that Op is an decreasing function
of l, while Of is increasing in l.
The proof of proposition 4.1 breaks down because now the result in equation (4.17)
does no longer hold. In case of proportional benefits, the value functions not only depend
on 8, but also on the value of the marginal product and therefore on t. Consider an
increase in l. This leads to a decrease in Gp and an increase in Of. However, the increase
in L also has an effect on n=2= Mill. This effect is ambiguous, because gi is an
increasing function  of Bi Beforehand  it can therefore  not be ruled  out  that an increase
in t  leads to an decrease in n, increasing FNp and decreasing Fiv/. This effect counteracts
the negative (positive) effect of the decrease (increase) in Op (#f) on rUp (TUr).
If   1 411    5   1, the relative decrease in is smaller than the relative increase in l.
Thus, an increase in l leads to an increase in n, and therefore together with the decreased
8p and increased Bf, to a decrease in the implied value q(l).  The end of the proof of
proposition 4.1 then applies. QED
Discussion of the elasticity condition
We can rewrite the elasticity Ef as follows:
G g,(ep) -9,(8,) -  op(op) Op -gllef)cef
(4.46)fi -61 -i - 4p    4  - 91    7





0,       -  8+ AM) Ce.      ,
ie. the product of the unemployment rate at labour market i and the elasticity of the
matching function with respect to vacancies. Empirical evidence shows that this latter
g. (8:)
elasticity equals 0.5. Thus, €e 5 0.5. Moreover, with local unemployment rates at
reasonable levels (ie. close enough to the equilibrium generated by the reasonable pa-
rameter values) the elasticity will be « 0.5. Unfortunately, we cannot derive bounds for
E '.    However,  if both 4,(4) equal  0.2 (ie. local unemployment rates  of 40%),  then  the
condition on fi equals
Ifil 5 14*Ifip - 4,1 5 5. (4.48)
Therefore, the condition on ff does not seem to be very restrictive.
Chapter 5
Counter Intuitive Results in a
Simple Model of Wage Negotiations
5.1 Introduction
The strategic wage bargaining model in Fernandez and Glazer (1991), Haller (1991) and
Haller and Holden (1990) is extended to allow for multiple wage contract renegotiations
and productivity growth, by making the following more realistic assumptions. First, the
parties can only agree upon short-term contracts. Second, contracts are incomplete in two
different ways, namely a contract specifies a nominal wage that remains constant until it
expires (i.e. wages cannot be contingent upon productivity growth) and future behaviour
after the expiration date cannot be included in the contract. Third, the last expired
contract remains in place until it is replaced by a new one. The latter is in accordance
with the common practice in many Western countries, where it is forbidden by law that
a firm unilaterally lowers wages after the expiration of a central agreement without the
workers' consent, e.g. Holden (1997).
In Fernandez and Glazer (1991), Haller (1991) and Haller and Holden (1990) it is shown
that wage increases only occur in case the union's threat of going on strike is credible.
Furthermore, in Fernandez and Glazer (1991) a brief remark is made with respect to short-
term contracts: The union's minimum and maximum equilibriumi utility is not affected
by assuming short-term contracts. The strategies that support this maximum equilibrium
utility mimic everlasting contracts by having immediate agreement upon a wage increase
equal to the wage increase under everlasting contracts in the first short-term contract
and, after the expiration of this first contract, all future negotiations are immediately
concluded with a short-term contract that features no wage increase. Our interpretation
of these 'just one wage increase ever' strategies is as follows: The union is very militant
in the first contract's negotiations by exploiting the threat of strike, while it behaves very
1 By  equilibrium  we mean subgame perfect equilibrium.
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peacefully in all future contracts' negotiations by refraining from this threat.
Since some unions are notorious for their aggressive behaviour it is more interesting
to adapt the maximum equilibrium wage strategies such that the union uses the threat
of strike whenever this threat is credible and only refrains from this threat in case it
is not credible. The aim of our analysis is to investigate this particular 'militant union'
equilibrium (MUE).2 By doing so, the credibility issue is put into a dynamic context. Since
both parties take into consideration how the current contract will affect future contracts'
negotiations more interesting wage dynamics result than in Fernandez and Glazer (1991).
Our model is formulated in terms of wage shares with the understanding that a new
wage is negotiated. The union's MUE utility does not depend upon the length of the
short-term contract, meaning that it is without loss of generality to assume everlasting
contracts or, equivalently, 'just one wage increase ever' strategies, in deriving this utility.
The 'just one wage increase ever' equilibrium and the MUE impose different paths of
wage shares over time. Rational parties are indifferent between these two paths of wages.
Psychologically, however, the MUE path may be enjoyed because wages keep up with
profits, which might be considered 'fair'.
The union's threat of strike is only credible if the wage share is smaller than a certain
threshold and the union's MUE utility depends upon whether or not strike is credible.
The MUE dynamics for the wage share are derived from the union's MUE utility. For a
large class of parameter values there is monotonic convergence towards to a unique steady
state wage share. Otherwise, there is no steady state and cyclical behaviour is inevitable.
There is a subclass of parameter values for which a voluntary decrease in the wage
share (and also the wage) occurs.  Such a decrease never occurs if strike fails as a credible
weapon in the current and next contract's negotiations, but can occur either if strike
is currently credible and the wage share is sufficiently high, or if strike is not currently
credible but will be credible at the next contract's negotiations. Since credibility of strike
is associated with a wage increase this result is counter intuitive. Wage decreases can
only last for a short number of wage contracts and after that wages are forever increasing.
Thus, a decrease in the wage share redistributes wages (and profits) over time in such a
way that the long-run MUE wages must overtake the long-run wages corresponding to a
path consisting of holdout until MUE wage increases can be negotiated.
Finally, following Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky  (1986),  we  let  the time between
proposals vanish. In this limit strike is always credible for the union independent of the
wage share and there is monotonic convergence to a unique steady state wage share. The
union is unable to grasp the entire surplus. In this limit, the counter intuitive result of a
decrease in the wage share survives.
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.3 we derive the union's MUE utility.
The MUE wage dynamics and conditions for a wage decrease are derived in Section 5.4.
2As in Fernandez and Glazer (1991) and Haller and Holden (1990) it is possible to derive inefficient
equilibria which feature strike. Since doing so is by now a routine exercise, it is omitted.
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In Section 5.5 the long run evolution of wage shares is analyzed. The limit behaviour of
the MUE as the time between bargaining rounds vanishes is investigated in Section 5.6.
Section 5.7 concludes the chapter, while the next section introduces the model.
5.2 The model
Our wage bargaining model is basically the wage bargaining model in Fernandez and
Glazer (1991), Haller (1991) and Haller and Holden (1990) in which the assumption of
an everlasting contract is dropped and exogenous productivity growth is included. Time
is discrete and time t E IN. In order to establish notation we define T, T € IN\ {O}, as
the contract length and 71- - 1, 7r > 1, as the growth rate of productivity corresponding to
a learning-by-doing technology. The initial revenue generated by the firm is normalised
to  1,  meaning  7rt  is the revenue  at  time  t. A holdouta is assumed  to be Pareto efficient'1,
with per period payoff wt for the union at time t (wt is the wage specified by the last
contract's wage which is either still valid or expired at time t) and the firm's profit
at time t is equal to 7rt - wt. Each party's payoff at time t corresponding to strike
is normalised to 0. The union is only allowed to strike at time t if at time t the last
agreed upon contract has expired.  If one of the parties receives the infinite sequence of
payoffs <It,  o, where xt is the payoff at time t, then the normalised payoff to this party
is simply (1 - 6) EL 8tze, 8 6 (0,1), where 6 denotes the common discount factor, or,
alternatively, the probability for a next period. We assume that 7r < 8-1 in order to
ensure that the surplus (1 - 6) Ent 8'-,71'T = .11-68x . 71-t is Well defined.
The bargaining process is identical to Fernandez and Glazer (1991). At bargaining
round t, t even, the union demands a wage and at round t, t odd, the firm offers a wage.  In
case a proposed wage is rejected, the union can either strike for one round or holdout. An
agreed upon (wage) contract w lasts T rounds, after which bargaining starts over again.
There are no negotiations or strikes during the validation time of a contract.  Note that w
influences future negotiations by specifying the disagreement payoff in these negotiations.
It is necessary to specify which party restarts the negotiations after the expiration of each
contract. In order to make the calculations less tedious we impose that T is even, which
means that if a party proposes a wage that is accepted in round t, then this party is the
proposing party at the restart of the negotiations at t + T.
The following reinterpretation of our model shows the resemblances and differences
with the model of Fernandez and Glazer   (1991). The settlement  wage  wt at round   t
determines the wage share w:/72 at this period and vice versa. Thus, it can be said that
at round t the parties negotiate for the wage share, denoted as vt, with the understanding
that they negotiate the wage. If the parties agree upon the wage share y at round t, then
3A holdout means that workers engage in production under the terms of the last expired contract.
4A discussion of inefficient holdouts is postponed to the concluding remarks.
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the wage will be equal to v · 7rt  for the next T rounds starting at t and meanwhile the wage
share 1,4+r = 7r-Ty,  T -0, . . . ,T- 1, declines over time due to productivity growth.  So,
our model introduces declining wage shares over time into the framework of Fernandez
and Glazer (1991) combined with short-term contracts. Alternatively, nominal wages and
inflation  lead  to a declining  real  wage  over  time, e.g. Holden  (1997). In order to facilitate
a comparison with the results in the literature, our analysis will be in terms of the wage
share.
Note that wt E  (0, ** · 7rt] translates into Vt E (0,115*], where it* > 1.  Thus, it
is implicitly assumed that the firm has access to a perfect capital market in case Yt > 1.
This assumption is without loss of generality, because the main results in this chapter can
also be derived  if Vt  E  (0,11.
This reinterpretation also implies that the firm is more patient than the union. During
the terms of an agreement the entire productivity growth accrues to the firm, because
the wage to be paid remains fixed. So, effectively the firm has 871- > 8 as its discount
factor. For the union the wage share during an agreement declines at the rate of 7r-1 per
round, partially offsetting the discount factor Ox. So, the union still values the future
with discount factor equal to 5 and is therefore less patient than the firm. Fortunately,
the critique in Bolt (1995) does not apply.
Finally, the declining wage share is associated with 7r > 1. For 71- = 1 the wage share
does not decline.  So, the fundamentals of the model under x > l change at the border
case Mr = 1, i.e. there is a discontinuity at 7r = 1 in the dynamics of the model.  The
results for 7r = 1 are briefly discussed in the relevant sections.
5.3 The militant union equilibrium utilities
In this section we derive the union's MUE utility    As in Fernandez and Glazer  (1991),
Haller (1991) and Haller and Holden (1990) the union's minimum equilibrium utility is
lit · 7rt = Wt, because the union can secure this payoff simply by holding out forever
and never proposing nor agreeing   upon wage shares that prescribe a share below   Vt·
Furthermore, similar as in the references above, the union's maximum equilibrium utility
is attained if the union adopts the threat of a stutter strike, i.e. strike if the firm declines
a proposal and hold out if the union declines an offer. However, there is a threshold
8, 0 > 0,5 and the MUE strategies prescribe stutter strike iff Yt 5 8 Otherwise, i.e.
M > 8, the union resorts to holdout. The level of 8 we are interested in is the maximum
level at which stutter strike is credible. So, the militant union threatens to go on stutter
strike whenever it is credible and it resorts to holdout otherwise.  If the union does
not carry out the threat of a stutter strike in case Vt 5 8, then an immediate switch
to the strategies corresponding to the union's minimum equilibrium utility occurs (no
5Actually, 8 is the level for all t that are even, while the level for t odd is simply li-8.
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punishment is necessary  for  vt  >  8). The latter  is only needed  in the derivation  of 8  and
will be neglected in the rest of the analysis.
First,  let the function  Ki  (14, t),  i, j  = 1,2, denote party i's equilibrium continuation
payoff at the start of round t and from this round onward when party j is the proposing
party as function  of vt. The militant union strategies feature immediate agreement  at  the
expiration date of an old contract and, therefore, this equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Since
19 (Vt, t) is the normalised discounted value of an infinite stream of wages and 1/'  (Vt, t)
is the firm's value for the stream of revenues minus the discounted stream of wages (with
the same discount factor) wehave that Vd(Vt,t) + 1/&(1/t,t) = 113*7rt, j -U, F. Thus,
the firm's value functions 1/  (Vt, t) =  112*lrt - 1/6 (vt, t) can be ignored.
Second, if the wage share at t, t even, exceeds the threshold 8, then stutter strike is not
credible. However, due to the productivity growth, going on strike will become credible
at t + r (th), where /* (vt) is the smallest even integer that solves
T (yt) = arg min t, s.t. vt · lr-2 5 0.
e/2eIN
Note that e- (1/t) - 0 in case vt 5 0 at t even. For t is odd, strike becomes credible at
t + e (yt · 71'-1) + l.
The following proposition characterises the union's MUE utility and the threshold 0.
All proofs are deferred to the appendix.
Proposition 5.1. The value function V# (yt, t), t even, is given by
f  [ v, + 111-&] 0, Vt S 1-627,2
62.2(1-82)
VUU (Vt, t) = <
1 [1+6-61.(vt) (1-6)(Oir)1'(V,) 1 62.2(1-62)
C [ 1+8 th
+ 1-62/2   f,  1/t >   1-827,'2
Moreover, Vuu (Vt, t) 2 ye · 7rt for all yt E [O, i *]
827r2(1-82)
The threshold 0 = 1-82„2 1  E  (8218*, 15*) is increasing in x,  71'  E  (1,5-1).  Thus,
productivity growth relaxes the credibility constraint. Furthermore, the value function
is independent of the contract length and, therefore, also holds for everlasting contracts,
i.e. T = oo. Thus, the value function also represents the union's utility associated with
the maximum wage equilibrium strategies in Fernandez and Glazer (1991) if productivity
growth would be incorporated. Consequently, the latter strategies and the MUE strategies
only differ with respect to the intertemporal distribution of per-round utilities.
The value function is discontinuous and non-monotonic at yt = 71'2ke, k C IN, because
t. ( 8)  = 2k <  2k +2  - r (14) for 1,4  E  (71'2k#, T2(k+1)8  .   The coefficient 12*f of
(1-8)(8*)2k .the linear term jumps upwards if k increases, while the constant term   1-624   Jumps
downward if k increases.  Thus, slightly increasing Vt at 10"0 means that the value function
jumps downward and that the slope of this linear function becomes steeper. Furthermore,
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as 71- decreases the number of points where the value function is discontinuous increases,
because each interval (71-2/,8,  2(k+1)8] contracts.
The results for the case T = 1 can be derived similarly as in the proof of propositions
5.1 after substitution of T = 1 and a minor modification due to f' (Vt) = 00 for M > 0.
Then the same expressions as in Fernandez and Glazer (1991) result, i.e.
viy (vt, t) = <  173Vt + Tb,   Vt 5 J2,
l
v:, M> 32,
which is only discontinuous at Vt -8- 82.  Furthermore, if 7r -1, then the union's utility
is stuck at vt if Vt > 8, whereas 71- > 1 implies that the union's utility increases even if
th > 0.  So, the discontinuity in the dynamics of the model is reflected in a discontinuity
in the results for 7r = 1 and 7r > 1.
5.4 The militant union equilibrium proposals
In this section the dynamics of the wage share under MUE strategies are derived. Since T
is even the MUE strategies induce an infinite sequence of consecutive contracts that are
all proposed by the union and, therefore, we restrict attention to the wage share proposed
by the union. Basically, the wage share V proposed by the union is the solution of
(1 - 81') 9 · 7,t + 87'Vbt (y . lr-T, t + T) = 1/# (yt, t) , (5.1)
where y · ,r-T is the wage share at the expiration date of the contract. The value function
of proposition 5.1 is not monotonic and, therefore, not invertible. This means that (5.1)
can admit more than one solution y in case the solution for y is larger than 71·TO. However,
this is not automatically true for all y > 71'TO. Furthermore, the discontinuities in the value
function would carry over to the MUE proposal. In order to avoid these complications,
we approximate £* (Vt) with (ln ,r)-1 ln 9 if 1/t > 8.  Thus, for vt > 0,
[1 to- 6(Inx)-,In9. (1 - 8)(87r)(ln,)-11'191 tVuu (Vt, t)    =
L
1+8 Mt 1- 82'r,  J 'r
1 + j'·51
where the latter expression follows after making  use  of  at  =  elina   =   (9)'no/in „.    The
approximated value function is continuous in yt and coincides with the true value function
if Vt = 7r21-8, k €IN. The countable number of points on the interval (8, 11--6I] for which
the two functions coincide goes to infinity as 7r goes to 1, which is the case in Section 5.6.
So, the continuous value function approximates the true value function for 7r close enough
to  1. The approximation overestimates  the true value function, because implicitly  it  is  as
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if the union proposes at real time t+ (ln 71·)-1 ln 'S t t r (vt), t even.  This bias has two
opposite effects: If the approximation is used in the right hand side of (5.1), i.e. Vt > 8,
then y adjusts upwards. Whereas, if the approximation is used in the left hand side, i.e.
V ) AT0' then y adjusts downwards.
The next proposition only states the wage share proposed by the union in case this
party did not deviate in the past, because otherwise the union's minimum equilibrium
utility strategies prescribe  y (Vt)  -  Yt·
Proposition 5.2. At round t, t even, the union proposes V (Vt) given by
R
6        (1-ST„T (1-62)173-3Tvt + (1+6-67')(1-62„2) i if 1,4 5 min {el,e},
Y '                                                                                                                        ify:  E  (0*, 81  ,
< 8 ify:  E  (0, Rl)
T*57vt + 12t-Sr  (1 - 8) (9)1+N - 87-5 : 8)  ,   if y E [R , R21 n (8, 112*] ,
14,                                                                                                                                                                          if vt   E    ( 122,  li-6,]   ·
where y' > 7rTO > Vt is the targest of the two real roots Of
y + (1 - 0 (1)
1+8 :-
- -Vt - = 0, (5.2)
O    l-8
1+6 1-95
F > 7TTO > Vt is the largest of the two real roots of
1+
lin: 1/t ) 1+ IN,Y+(1-8) (f)        -0- (1 - 5) ( f        - 0, (5.3)
the threshold 8- = 8-37T-2 [(1 + 8- 87') 8271-T+2 _ (1- 87'7rtr)] . 8 and Ri 5 7TTO S R 2 are
the two positive, reat roots Of
/I\1+12: 1-6
x + (1 -8) (3)
- XT (OT + 827TY (1 +8- OT)) = 0.1 - 827TY
A discussion of these results is postponed. First, two mutually exclusive cases are
distinguished, namely 8- < 8 and 8* 2 8, for which sharper results can be obtained. The
case 8* 2 8 reduces to the following condition
82,r2 5 5-1  7TT+2 (82 + 63) + (STXT (1 - 82 2) - 1) . (5.4)
Figure  5.1 illustrates condition   (5.4). This condition is satisfied  for  all  points  on  or
above the lower curve and below the upper curve * - 8-1. As T increases the lower
curve shifts downwards, thereby enlarging this area. Therefore, there is a nonempty area
of positive measure in the (6, w, T) -space for which condition (5.4) holds.   The area of
condition (5.4) is separated from the line 7r = 1. Similar considerations hold for the
subclass excluded by condition (5.4).
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Figure 5.1: Condition (5.4) in (8,7r) -space, T = 10.
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5.4.1  The case condition (5.4) holds
The first proposition discards two of the five cases of proposition 5.2.
Proposition 5.3. If condition (5.4) is satisfied, then min {8-,8} = 8, (8*,81 = 0,
(e, Ri)   =  0  and  [Rl, R21  n  (0,11   =   (0, 71'TO]   in  proposition 5.2. Moreover,   Vt  5   0  im-
plies y (vt). Mr-T 5 8.
The first case,  Vt  E  (7TTO, 1%&], corresponds to f (th)  >  T.   That is, the union fails
strike as a credible weapon for more than T rounds. Disagreement means holdout will
prevail in these rounds and, therefore, the firm can postpone an increase in the wage share
at no cost, which it does, i.e., v (vt)  = 14.  This confirms the intuition in the literature.
Strike becomes credible within L (th) < T rounds in the second case, Vt E (0, lrTe]. Then
strike is currently not credible,   but  it is credible  at the expiration   date  of  y (yt).    Thus,
the militant union has one more contract to go before strike becomes credible. The union
faces a dilemma, disagree and hold out until t + e (1/t) at which strike becomes available, or
negotiate a new contract now. Impatience makes the union willing to accept a wage share
today in order to avoid waiting until  t+e (Vt)· The third  case,  Vt  E  [O, 8], corresponds
to strike is both credible in the current and next contract's negotiations. Note that once
strike is credible it remains credible in all future contracts' negotiations, i.e. 9 (Yt)·lr-T 58
for th 5 8
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Figure 5.2: Proposition 5.4 in (8, lr) -space, T = 10.
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The next proposition implies that the union does not always negotiate a larger wage
share.
1-6TlrTProposition 5.4. Suppose condition (5.4) holds. If F#N-6'1.j < 1, then
C   1 - 2 7TT
V (vt)  < 0 4, th E   8'27r2(1 - LT) 0, xTe   96 0
Remark 5.1. The condition is necessary and sullicient for a decrease in the wage share
i.irth E   5·4; ;-S,)8, 8 .  Furthermore, in case 62 ;iCS·) 2 1 then there exists some A>1
such that a decrease  in  the wage share occurs if Vt  E  (AB, 7TTO]   even.6
The condition 82 301.)<lis satisfied for all points above the middle of the three
curves in Figure 5.2. Moreover, according to Figure 5.2 the area of this condition is
contained in the area corresponding to condition (5.4) bounded by the lowest curve. We
conjecture  that this holds  for any triple  (8,7r, T).7 Finally,  the  area  in  the (6,71-, T)-space
for which the condition 6430Tr) < 1 holds has positive measure, because substitution of
71' = 8-1 implies 0<1 for all T.
6The bound AG corresponds to one of two roots of the polynomial in the proof of proposition 5.4.
7For 10.000 random triples (8, ir, T) we numerically verified whether condition (5.4) holds if the con-
dition of proposition 5.4 holds.  For all cases this was found true.
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The result in proposition 5.4 differs from the results in the literature where an increase
in the wage (share) is identified with strike being credible. Clearly, it is counter intuitive
that a decrease in the wage share (and the wage itself) occurs in or near the region where
strike is credible, but not where strike is not credible. This implies that for the union
the initial wage decrease is compensated with an acceleration of the increase of the wage
share in the future.
5.4.2  The case condition (5.4) does not hold
The next proposition states that all five cases of proposition 5.2 occur if condition (5.4)
does not hold.
Proposition 5.5. If condition (5.4) does  not  hold,   then  min {8-, 8}   =  8*,   (0-, 8]   0   0,
(0, Ri) 0 0 and [Rl, R21 n (0,11 - [Rl, R21 4 0 in proposition 5.2.
The first case,  Vt  E  [O, 8'], corresponds to strike is both credible in the current and
next contract's negotiations. The union always negotiates a larger wage share.8 The
second case, 14 E (0*, el, is the transition from strike is credible in the current contract's
negotiations to strike is not credible at the next contract's negotiations. So, the militant
union has one more contract to go before strike ceases to be credible. The negotiated wage
share is larger than the current wage share, because y (Vt)  = y-  > TTO  >  Vt. The third
case,  Vt E  (0, Ri), with Rl  < 71'TO, corresponds to strike is not credible before t+0 (vt),
where f (th) < T, at the current contract's negotiations and it will neither be credible at
the expiration date of y (y ) = 9. Despite the fact that strike is not credible the union
negotiates a substantially larger wage shareg> *TO > 8. The reason is that both parties
anticipate the large increase of the wage share a t t t f (vt) of the second case if they would
not agree for the next f·(Vt) < T rounds and impatience makes the union willing to accept
a lower increase in the wage share today in order to avoid the waiting. The fourth case,
Vt   E   [Ri, 161, corresponds  to the situation in which strike  is not credible   at   time  t   but
strike is credible at the expiration date of y (Vt)·  Thus, the militant union has one more
contract to go before strike becomes credible. Conditions for a decrease in the negotiated
wage share are not derived.  The last case, 1/t E  (R2,  ], with R2 2 7TTG, corresponds to
2(yt) > T, i.e. the union lacks strike as a credible weapon now and at the end of the new
contract. In that case there is no increase in the wage share, because the future threat of
strike lies too far away in the future.
5.5  The wage share in the long run
Similar as in the previous section we distinguish two exclusive cases.
8This follows directly from the proof of proposition 5.6 below, where monotonic convergence to z- is
shown, and x* > 8 if condition (5.4) does not hold.
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5.5.1  The case condition (5.4) holds
The dynamics on [0, 8] admit a steady state wage share and, moreover, there is monotonic
convergence to this steady state. The wage share I* E [0,1] is a steady state wage share
if Vt  = z* implies that y (th) · lr-T = z:   So,  at time t + T,  i.e. the expiration date of
Y (Yt), the wage share will be equal to the wage share at t.
Proposition 5.6. If condition (5.4) is satisjied, then there is monotonic convergence in
wage shares to
(1 - O.7'*T)I.= 0<0
8271'2(71'T (l t o- 67')-8)   -
for att vt E  [0, **] Moreover, if  ·4321.)< 1, then z' < 643K.Irk·) O<  8.
Note that the wage share (and, consequently, also the wage) is forever monotonically
increasing if the initial wage share lies below x'. However, if initially the wage share
lies  above  z-,   then  even a militant union which has strike  as a credible option   at  its
disposal cannot prevent that the wage share will decrease over time. A decrease in the
wage share cannot be ruled out according to proposition 5.4. The number of consecutive
contracts featuring a wage decrease is bounded from above, because the long-run wage
share approximates x* and an increase to 7rTI- is needed in order to sustain the steady
state wage share. So, after a finite number of contracts, wages exceed the initial level.
5.5.2  The case condition (5.4) does not hold
If condition (5.4) does not hold, then the steady state z- of proposition 5.6 exceeds 0 and
lies  outside the interval  10, vl Still  the wage share monotonically increases  over  time  on
the domain [O, 0-] and, eventually, after a finite number of contracts, the wage share will
be larger than 8'.9 It follows that we have cyclical behaviour of wage shares.
This  can  be  seen as follows. After  Vt  has  left the interval  [0,8], 1/t enters either  the
interval [Rl,R*l or (8, Rl) U (·F£2, **).  In the former case, the wage share at the end of
the  contract  is  in the interval  [O, 01,  in the latter  case it could either  stay  in this interval
or  enter the interval  [Rl, R21.   The  most  one can obtain are limit cycles  (i f these exist  at
all).   This is illustrated  in  the next numerical example.
Take 6 = 0.8, 7r = 1.02, T = 4. Then 0- = 0.6, 8 = 0.717, Rl = 0.777 and R, = 0.799.
It turns out that in this case, independent of the starting value yo, the evolution of the
wage share converges to the cycle described in Table 5.1. Note that in this case a wage
decrease occurs  for  Vt  E  [Rl, 122]·
9This follows directly from the proof of proposition 5.6 if IO, 0-iA] is taken as the domain of the
dynamics and observing that monotonic convergence to t on ICI, **1 holds even if x- > 0.
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Table 5.1: Evolution of the wage share.
Current wage share Interval Proposal
0.778 [Rl, R21 0.776
0.717 (8.,8) 0.897
0.829 (R2,1 *)      0.829
0.766 (8, Rl) 0.812
0.750 (0, Rl) 0.834
0.770 (0, Rl) 0.807
0.745 (0, Rl) 0.842
0.778 [Rl, R2] 0.776
Finally, the line 7r = 1 is one of the boundaries of the area where condition (5.4) does
not hold.  For x = 1 we obtain  (0,121) - 0 and  [Ri, R21 - 0 in proposition 5.2.10  Thus,
1    ,vt +  1 75,·,     if y.  E   [0, 62  -  192]  ,
V Cy')  =  1     i by,  + Th, if "  E  (82 -  191,82]  ,
C Vt,
if  yt  E   (62,11  ,
for sufficiently large 8 < 1. We mention that i) only a finite number of wage increases can
take place and iiI the last contract featuring a wage increase specifies a wage in between
P and  1-8(1-8) < 1. Hence, 7r =  1  and MUE strategies impose a wage ceiling and
once strike ceases to be credible it remains not credible forever. So, for 7r = 1 there is a
wage ceiling above 0 - 82 while cyclic behaviour results for 71- > 1. So, the discontinuity
in the model at 7r = 1 translates to a discontinuity in results.
5.6 Limit results
In this section we follow the literature on strategic bargaining by letting the time between
bargaining rounds vanish (e.g. Binmore et al.  (1986)) and, meanwhile, maintaining a
constant level of the contract length measured in real time.
In order to make the analysis precise we define 8, A > 0, as the time between two
bargaining rounds,   5   = e-ra, where r denotes the interest  rate,   and  7r   = epa, where
p denotes the growth rate of productivity. The assumption 1 < 7r < 8-1 implies that
0<p<r. The contract length L E R++ is measured in real time. Since L=T A and L
10The following statements can be derived similarly as in the proof of proposition 5.2 after substitution
of Mr  =  1  and a minor modification  due  to  f (yt)  =  00  in  case  Vt  > 62. Furthermore,  [Rl, R2] is empty,
because once Vt > 0 strike remains not credible forever.
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is kept constant T has to adjust if A goes to 0, i.e. T = L/&.11 For simplicity we neglect
that T = L/A should be an even integer. The following theorem states the limit results.
4   r 1Theorem 5.1. In the limit, as A goes to 0, strike is credible for every vt  e  [u, 7.p],
'h, union proposes the wage share 2=br  vt + (1 - e-(r-p),[,  ,   and its MUE utility is
i    [vt   +   7% l
epi. Moreover, there is monotonic  convergence in wage shares  to
(1-e-(--p)L)r ((1-e-(--P)L)r     1< -L and the wage share decreases ifvt E  (1-e-'L)(r-p)'753] 40(ept,(2-2-•L)-1)(r-p) r-p
The threshold 8 (and **) converges to ;5; as the time between bargaining rounds
vanishes. The reason is that the equilibrium condition for strike to be credible is given by
1/t · ept 5(1- e-ra)·Ot e-ral/if (y:·e-*,t +1), t even.   Since  lif  (ye  · e-*,t +  1)   >
1/t · ept for all A>O this condition requires e sufficiently close  to 1, which holds  for-TA
sufficiently small A > O. This equilibrium condition easily generalises to a large class of
extended models, provided Vt · ept is replaced by the union's minimum equilibrium utility
in such model. Furthermore, the union is unable to grasp the entire surplus ept.    A
decrease in the wage share will occur for sufficiently large wage shares.
Finally, the union's limit MUE utility corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution
with everlasting contracts and disagreement point  (Vt  · ept, 0),  because
In  (w-v t. ep ) (_r    . ept-w  = *w-l <yt +--r    ept\T - P 2 C      r-p)
This means that the limit results can be obtained by a simple two-step procedure. First,
compute the union's limit MUE utility by applying this Nash bargaining solution and,
second, derive the dynamics of the wage share from this utility.
5.7 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we have extended the wage bargaining model by Fernandez and Glazer
(1991), Haller (1991) and Haller and Holden (1990), by allowing for finite contract length
and productivity growth. By doing so, credibility over time of the strike threat enters
the analysis. However, the credibility issue vanishes as time between bargaining rounds
goes to zero and matters simplify in the limit. The results then hint that a large class of
extended models can be analyzed using the Nash bargaining solution with the appropriate
disagreement points. For instance one could think of inefficient holdouts, e.g. Holden
(1997) and Moene   (1988), or introducing competition among strategic options  for  the
union, such as holdout, work-to-rule and strike, e.g. Houba and Bolt (2000). Inefficient
11Note that keeping T fixed would mean that L = TA = O as A = 0. Then, in the limit, parties would
constantly negotiate new contracts which expire instantaneously at the moment of conclusion. Clearly,
this is unrealistic.
106 CHAPTER 5.  AGE BARGAINING
holdouts only require a minor modification of the union's minimum equilibrium utility
in our analysis. Competition among strategic options would not alter the conclusions of
theorem 5.1, because in the limit all actions will be credible and strike is the union's most
effective action among the credible actions.
Our analysis complements the study in Holden (1997), where  the Nash bargaining
solution determines the nominal wage in a small macroeconomic model with inflation,
endogenous employment, decentralised wage bargaining and one-year contracts. Further-
more, the credibility issue is not addressed by assuming that the disagreement point
corresponds to inefficient holdout. Our results hint that the credibility issue vaporises in
the limit and that, alternatively, the disagreement point corresponding to stutter strike
could have been taken. In Holden (1997) workers also have an outside option and condi-
tions for a binding outside option are derived. So, wage decreases are implicitly present
in  Holden (1997). Theorem  5.1 also hints  that this result can still be expected in Holden
(1997) if a militant union would be assumed.
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Appendix to Chapter 5
5.A Proofs
proof of proposition 5.1
Suppose there is a threshold B such that at t is even strike is credible iff Vt 5 0. If 89 > 0,
then strike becomes credible  at  t+E "even", where L denotes  e (vt) There  are two cases
to be considered.
Case l y: >8.  Then t+f i s the first round strike will be credible again and, hence,
1/3, (Yt+1, t +1) corresponds to the function at which strike is credible. Until t+f strike
is not credible and Vt · 71-t is the union's disagreement payoff. The firm's problem at T + 1,
T -t t f- 2, t +E-4, . . . ,t (T even),is given by
1-6
-Trtl - VUF  ty'Ttl, Ttl)1 - 671'
1-8= max-7rT+1 - (1 - OT) 1/F · ir'+1 - 67,1/J (VF . 7r-T, 7- +T+1) ,VF   1 - 67r
S.t.
(1 - 87') YF . lr,-+1 + 87,1/tf (VF. 7r-T, T +T t l)
=   (1 - 8) 7,+1 · lr,+1 + OV# (14+1· A-1, 7 + 2).
Substitution of the constraint into the objective function and rewriting yields
Vup (11·'Ttl, T + 1) =(1- 8) VT+1· 71'T+1 + 6Vuu (yrtl ' 7T-1, T + 2) (5.5)
Similarly, the union's problem at ·r given by




-71'' -(1 - OT) yu· 1,1 - 87,1/u (Vu· 71'-T, 7 + T)
1 - 67r
1-8 _=   -A' -(1 - #B. 71'1 - 81/J (VT· 71--1, T + 1)1 - 671-
yields
V# (yr, 7-) = (1 - 8) B · 71'1 + 61 tf (Vr · 71'-1,7- + 1) . (5.6)
Furthermore, if the parties would not agree at T then at T + 1  we have that Y.+1  - yr · 7r-1
Making use of this relation and substitution of (5.5) into (5.6) yields the recursive relation
V/(VT, 1-)- (1 - 82) VT · 7rT + 821/1  (yr· 71.-2, 1- +2) ,  T =t t f-2,t t £ -4, . . . ,t.
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Solving the recursion yields
V# (Vt, t) = (1 - 81) Vt . 7rt + 8tv# (Vt · lr-t, t + f), for yt > 0 (5.7)
and V# (vt · x-6, t + 4 refers to case 2, i.e.  Vt · 71'-t f 0
Case 2 Vt S O at t even. Then going on strike is credible. The union's problem (5.6) at
t, t is even, is different and is now given by




- OTV# (wu, 7TTF:)  = 8  [1-67rt+1  - 1/J (Vt . 7[.-1 't + 1)   ,
- ir' - (1 - OT) 11)U1 - 67T l 1   6,
1/# (yu. lr-T, t+T) = (1 - 81) wu + 8tvuu (vu · 71'-T-E, t+T+e) .
where E denotes E (yu  · 7r-T). The second constraint comes from case  1 and is necessary in
order to take into account yu's such that yu · 7r-T > 8 at t + T.  Note that f (yu · 71--T)  = 0
for yu · ir-T 5 8 and then this constraint is superfluous. As before, substitution of the
first constraint into the objective function yields
1/# (yt, t) = (1 - 871·) -l--67rt + 81/if (Yt . lr-1, t + 1) . (5.8)1 - 671-
The firm's problem at t + 1, t is even, does not change and, hence, equation (5.5) is also
valid in this case for ·r +1=t+1.I f the parties would not agree at t, t i s even, then at
t  +  1  (odd)  we  have  that  1/*+1  =  1/t  · 7r-1. Making  use  of this relation and substitution  of
(5.5) (for 1- +1=t+1) into (5.8) yields
1,/ (Vt, t) = (1 - 8) 71't + 8 (1 - 8) Vt · 71.t + 821/El, (Vt · 71 -2, t + 2) , for Vt 5 8,         (5.9)
It is easy to verify that
r 8 1-81V# (vt,t) =  1 -vt + ;rt. for m 5 8,li + 6 1 - 6202]
is  a solution  of  (5.9).   Then the expression  in (5.7) becomes
V# (Vt, t) - Vt + 7rt.  for vt  > 8. (5.10)[1+8-8t (1 - 8) %7111
L 1+6 1 - 62'r2  ]    ,
It  is  easy to verify  that  1/3'  (th, t)  2  1/t  .  7rt  for  all  yt
Finally, strike at t, t even, is credible iff vt · irt 5(1-8) ·0+ 81/if (Vt · lr-1, t+ 1).Attis
odd, we have
8                    (1  -  8)  6,rVJ (14, t)=(1 - 8) + yt · 7rt + 81/#(Vt · 7r-1, t + l)= -Vt +l+8 1 - 827r2 '
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2 1-82for ye 5 7re. Solving for 0 in e = 61/f (e· lr-1, ttl) yields e = 627r as the threshold1-8.
postulated at the beginning of the proof. QED
Proof   of  proposition   5.2
The two expressions for Vuu on both sides of (5.1) imply four different cases.
First, if Vt 5 8 and y · lr-T 5 8, then y solves (5.1) iff
(1-OT) 1/+ ST/_.6-y.K-T+   1-8  \  T 8 1-8\l+6 1  - 8271-2 )  1r    =i-731/t +  1  - 6271 2 '
which yields the solution
8               (1 - FlrT) (1 - 82)
U-1+8- OTYt + (1+ 6- OT)(1- 6271'2)
The condition y · 7r-T 5 8 can be rewritten as
1-82
vt 5 8-1 (OT7rT (1 - 6271'2) + lrT+2 (82 + 83) - 1) E 8*.1 - 827r2
Combining  the two conditions  vt  5  0  and  y  · 7,-T  5 8 yields  th  S  min {8*, 8}.
Second, if th > e andy · r-T 5 8, then y solves (5.1) iff
(1 - 67') V+OT (-1-y. lr-T +    1-8   j 7rT =y e+ (1-8)  ye  1+IE.$ .
(1 + 6 1 - 5271'2 /
Solving for y yields
l+6 1+8 / /V,\ 1+8       (STXT (1 - 8)  
V-1+8- 8Tvt   1+8-8 7, <(1 -8) (8)        -    1- 8271 2   j
The condition y · 1r-T 5 8 can be rewritten as
/Vt \ 1+ M 1-6
Vt + (1 -8)  l-3-,1             -                    lrT (87' + 8271.2 (1 +8- OT))
SO. (5.11)1 - 8271-2
The polynomial is 1Sleasing for vt small and
increasing for vt large, because 1 + e <
0 implies limw_„0 x in. =  too  and  limz-oo x1+1   =  0,  i.e. the graph is U-shaped.
Furthermore, Vt  = 7rTO is one real root, because  (71-T) 1+IM = OT 7TT . Therefore, there exist
two positive, real roots, i.e. Rl 5 7rTO 5 R · Combining 1/2 > 0 and y · 71--T 5 0 yields
vt  E  [Rl, R21 n  (e, i St] .
Third, if Vt > 0 and y · 71'-T > 8, then y solves (5.1) iff
     -T* 1+ 51 „       1+  ::
(1 - OT), + OT ('. A-T + (1 - 6) (21.     j       j .T -8 + (1 - 6) (9)        ,
which can be rewritten as stated in  (5.3)  by making use of (71--T) 1+mw = 6-Tr-T By the
same arguments as applied to (5.11) in the second case, (5.3) is U-shaped in v and there
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exists two positive, real roots S1 < S2, because y = Vt is one of them.
Next, we prove that Si < 71-7,8 < S2, i.e. S2.7r-T > 8, for all Vt E (8, Rl) U (R2,18*], where
the latter set results from 1/t  > 0 and discarding [Rl, R2]of the second case. The arguments
are as follows. Consider  (5.3)  at  y  =  KTO as a function of vt  E  (8, Rl) U (R2,11--a,].
Substitution of y = 7TTe into (5.3) yields
lrTO + (8'r)T (1 - 8) - 14 - (1 - 8) < 
.j,+1'.
which can be rewritten as
lrT  (1 -8)   (8271-2 (1 +8- 87') + 81')  -v t- (1 -8) (78£11+15,              (5.12)1 - 627TY
because
lr,re + 87'7rT (1 - 8)   =   T'  1- /(1 - 62) 6271'2 + (1 - 8271'2) (1 - 8) ST)
C         1-  95 1 - 627['2        )
= 7rT (1 - 8) ((1 + 6) 627r2 + OT (1 - 827['2))1 - 8271 2
=  71'r (1 -8)  (5271'2 (1 + 6- 87') + 87') .1 - 82712
But (5.12) is equal to minus expression (5.11). Since (5.11) is positive for yt € (8, Ri) U
(R2, 11--Or], as shown in the second case, we have that (5.12) is negative for such Vt· Hence,
Sl < 71-Te < S2 and only 92 satisfies v · 7r-T > 8 for all Vt E (8, Rl) U (R2, i8*]·  Finally,
V  =   14   is  one  root  of  (5.3).     If  0   <   Vt   <   Rl   5   7TTO,   then  necessarily   Si   -   1/t   <   71'Te.
Otherwise, S2 = 1/t > 71'Te for Vt > 7rTe.
Fourth,y<B and y · 1r-T>8.In that case y solves (5.1) iff
, + r., (1 - ,) («)..1:1  - ity· +  1 152 2 1
which yields (5.2). Similarly as in the third case, (5.2) is U-shaped in y, and has two
positive, real roots. The smallest root is not feasible, i.e. v < 71-Te, iff the LHS of (5.2) is
negative at y = 7TTO (because in that case 71-7,8 lies in between the two roots). Substitution
of y = TTe yields
8    1-8
X1'8 + (871')T (1 - 8)- T73 Vt   - 1 - 8271'2
The latter expression is equal  to  0  in  Vt  =  0* (see third  case) and decreases  in  Vt·   Thus,
this  expression is negative  iff  Vt   >  8-. The latter  is  true  iff  Yt   >  8*.    Thus, the unique
feasible solution is the largest root of (5.2) for all Vt E (8.,0) QED
Proof of proposition 5.3
First,  min {0*, 0}  = 8 iff condition (5.4) holds.   Next, (5.11) holds for 0  - 0, because
(1  -  7rT) 8271'2*%  +  (1  - 8,r)  (1  - 87'7rT)    So is equivalent to condition (5.4). Hence,
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Ri  5 8 and R2 = 7rTG in the proof of proposition 5.2.  Thus,  (0, 11--58I] n [Rl, Rel  =  (8,7TTO]
Finally, y (Vt) S Y (0) 5 71-TO iff condition (5.4) holds. QED
Proof of proposition 5.4
Propositions 5.2 and 5.3 imply that a wage decrease cannot occur for y: E (1TTe, illt] ·
Thus, only yt 5 8 and Vt € (0, 7TTe) have to be investigated. First, ye 5 8. Then y < Vt
iff y, »  8 it;  -,i)) 0. The interval  ( 8 ,I  ,)) 0, 0 |  is non-er»pty iff ,(1:2;N.)) < 1. Second,
Vt E  (8, 7TTe) Then y < Vt iff
, 4      'l t lili
(57'+2„2  + (1 - 52"2        4# - 8'.'  < 0·
Similar to the proof of proposition 5.2 it follows that vt = 7rTe is one of the two positive,
real roots. This condition holds in Vt = 8, i.e. the smallest root is smaller than 0, ifi
1-grlrT
827r2(1-81')
< 1. In that case 7TTO is necessarily the largest root and the polynomial is
negative for all yt f (0,71'Tel QED
Proof   of  proposition   5.5
First,  min {r, 8}  =  8'  <  0 iff condition  (5.4)  does not hold.   Next,  from the proof of
proposition 5.3 it follows that (5.11) in the proof of proposition 5.2 does not hold for
1/: = 0 if the condition (5.4) does not hold. Since, rrTO is one of the two real, positive
roots it necessarily follows that both Rl and R2 are larger than 0. QED
Proof of proposition 5.6
Propositions 5.2 and 5.3 imply that Vt > 8 can not be a steady state, because the wage
share monotonically decreases for Vt > 8. Denote the wage share xk as the k-th con-
tract agreed  upon at round kT evaluated at round  (k + 1) T.   Then  for all Zk, Ik-1  €
 0,01:   xk  =  lr-T [axk-1 tb], where  a  =   i*Fr   <   1  and  b  =   62 Ii:_ r) 8.    Then
(1-OT"T)
Z' = 6212(Al'(1+8-61)-6) 0 solves 71'Tz' = axi + b and I- 5 8 is equivalent to condition
(5.4). Next, monotonic convergence to I- on [0, 01 means that zk 5 Ik-1 for all sk-1 > I.
and Zk 2 Zk-1 for all Ik-1 < x- for all k. Suppose :rk-1 > T'. Then :rk 5 Ik-1 follows
from
-TA r-Tb   1
.._k   = lr-Ta + -- 5 7r-Ta +--- (7r-TaI* + 7r-Tb) = - =1
Ik-1 Ik-1 I-    I*                    I*
Similar arguments apply for xk-1 < I: So, there is monotonic convergence to I- on
[0, a]. Finally, it is easy to verify that x- < 821,30;&·) e. QED
Proof of theorem  5.1
First, in the limit, condition (5.4) always holds, because
lim 827  s lim 8-1 (lrT+2 (82 + 63) + OT,rT (1 - 8272) - 1) ** 1 5 (2epL - 1)8-0 A--,0
and the latter inequality holds iff PL 2 0, which is assumed. Next, application of
l'H6pital's rule yields lima-012   -  TE7 and lima-0 0  =  FLp. So, strike is credible  for
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all *, « IO, 1. Then the limit expressions stated in the theorem
follow trivially from
propositions 5.1,  5.2,  5.6 and 5.4. Furthermore, lima-0 x. = ept.(2-6-•L)-1 ' 753 < 753 iff
1-e-(r-p)L
1-e-(r-p)LpL > 0. The latter is assumed. Similarly, lima-0 x. <     1-c-.L    . 75;  iff PL > 0. Finally,
(1-e-(--P,L .  L-  -L-1 0 0 iff PL > 0. QED
< 1-e--6 T-p' T-P 1
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Dit proefschrift gaat over arbeidseconomie. Deze economische discipline richt zich op de
bestudering van de arbeidsmarkt. Hierbij wordt gebruik gemaakt van inzichten uit zowel
de macro- als de micro-economie. Bovendien is arbeidseconomie een van de weinige deelge-
bieden van de economische wetenschap waar theorie en empirie hand in hand gaan. Deze
combinatie van empirie en theorie en van micro- en macro-economie wordt geYllustreerd
in dit proefschrift, dat bestaat uit min of meer op zichzelf staande hoofdstukken.
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt de dynamiek in de werkloosheid geanalyseerd. Daarbij mo-
delleren we de relatie tussen enerzijds instroom in en uitstroom uit de werkloosheid en
anderzijds de veranderende macro-economische omstandigheden. Ook onderzoeken we
of de individuele uitstroomkans afhangt van de werkloosheidsduur, de zogenaamde in-
dividuele of echte duurafhankelijkheid. Deze duurafhankelijkheid ontstaat wanneer de
werkloosheidsduur van een sollicitant een signaal is voor werkgevers over de kwaliteit van
de sollicitant. Duurafhankelijkheid kan echter ook door dynamische selectie ontstaan. Als
we een heterogeen cohort werklozen volgen in de tijd, dan zullen de mensen met de meest
gunstige karakteristieken de werkloosheid als eerste verlaten. Hierdoor neemt de kwaliteit
van het cohort af, waardoor de waargenomen gemiddelde uitstroomkans daalt, ook als er
geen duurafhankelijkheid op individueel niveau is.
In onze analyse maken we gebruik van geaggregeerde Franse data. Deze data bevat-
ten informatie over het aantal mensen dat in een gegeven kwartaal werkloos raakt, en
het aantal mensen dat in een gegeven kwartaal de werkloosheid verlaat. Deze gegevens
stellen ons in staat om enerzijds het effect van de veranderende macro-economische om-
standigheden en anderzijds de individuele duren te analyseren. Uiteindelijk ontleden we
de uitstroomkans uit werkloosheid in drie factoren, namelijk echte duurafhankelijkheid,
een conjunctuur effect en een niet-waargenomen heterogeniteit effect. De aandacht van
het hoofdstuk richt zich op de vraag hoe de uitstroomkansen verschillen tussen leeftijds-
groepen (namelijk jongeren, volwassenen, ouderen) met betrekking tot bovengenoemde
drie factoren. Daarnaast worden de instroomkansen van de verschillende leeftijdsgroepen
vergeleken.
De resultaten laten zien dat er geen lange termijn trend zit in de in- en uitstroomkan-
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sen van jongeren. De instroomkans van volwassenen daarentegen vertoont een stijgende
trend, terwijl de uitstroomkans een dalende trend laat zien. Echter, de gunstige cijfers
voor jongeren kunnen deels worden verklaard door de aanwezigheid van speciale trainings-
programma's voor jeugdige werklozen (waardoor zij in feite uit de statistieken gedefinieerd
worden). De vraag  is  of deze programma's  ook een blijvend positief effect hebben  op  de
arbeidsmarktsituatie van jongeren.
We vinden dat in het algemeen geldt dat de instroomkans anti-cyclisch is, terwijl de
uitstroomkans de conjunctuur volgt. Wel zijn er duidelijke verschillen tussen mannen en
vrouwen en tussen de drie leeftijdsgroepen.  Zo is de instroomkans voor vrouwen nauwelijks
gevoelig voor de conjunctuur. Dit zou verklaard kunnen worden door de administratieve
aard van onze data, omdat vrouwen in het algemeen minder reden hebben zich te laten
registreren als werkzoekende. De instroomkans van mannen is echter sterk conjunctuur
gevoelig, waarschijnlijk doordat mannelijke werknemers sterk vertegenwoordigd zijn in
conjunctuur gevoelige sectoren. Het blijkt ook dat enerzijds de instroomkans van de
jeugd gevoeliger is voor de conjunctuur dan die van volwassenen, maar dat anderzijds
de uitstroomkans van volwassenen gevoeliger is voor veranderende macro-economische
omstandigheden. Dit betekent dat de volatiliteit van het jeugdwerkloosheidspercentage
toegeschreven kan worden aan de volatiliteit van de instroom. Deze verschillen kunnen in
belangrijke mate verklaard worden door de eerdergenoemde trainingsprogramma's en de
gangbaarheid van tijdelijke contracten.
Naast conjunctuur effecten vinden we ook bewijs voor sterke seizoenseffecten. Deze
beinvloeden vooral de instroomkansen. Met name schoolverlaters zorgen voor een sterk
positief effect van het derde en vierde kwartaal op de instroomkans. Bovendien blijken
trainingsprogramma's veel van de nieuwkomers op de arbeidsmarkt op te nemen.
Tenslotte volgen er uit de gevonden resultaten met betrekking tot duurafhankelijkheid
en conjuncturele effecten ook enkele beleidsimplicaties. Jeugdwerkloosheid vertoont ne-
gatieve duurafhankelijkheid op individueel niveau. Daarnaast lopen jongeren tijdens een
recessie het grootste risico om langdurig werkloos te raken, omdat dan hun instroomkans
hoog is en hun uitstroomkans laag. Daarom zou beleid om langdurige werkloosheid onder
jongeren te voorkomen gericht moeten zijn op deze langdurig werklozen.  Merk op dat
als het met name de niet-waargenomen heterogeniteit zou zijn die zorgt voor dalende
uitstroomkansen over de duur van de werkloosheid, beleid gericht zou moeten zijn op het
screenen van nieuwe werklozen en verbetering van hun ongunstige karakteristieken.
In de analyse van hoofdstuk 2 wordt bij de berekening van de uitstroomkans uit
werkloosheid geen onderscheid gemaakt naar de arbeidsmarktsituatie die volgt op de
werkloosheid. Vanwege beperkingen in de beschikbare gegevens kunnen transities van
werkloosheid naar werk niet onderscheiden worden van transities naar niet-participatie.
Er bestaan echter vermoedens dat individuele duurafhankelijkheid en niet-waargenomen
heterogeniteit beide uitstroomkansen verschillend beYnvloeden. Gebruikmakend van een
unieke dataset onderzoeken we in hoofdstuk 3 deze verschillen voor Frankrijk. Hiertoe
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schatten we een zogenaamd competing risks model. Daarnaast leiden we de condities af
waaronder dit model geYdentificeerd is.
De resultaten tonen aan dat het inderdaad zinvol is in de analyse van uitstroomkansen
onderscheid te maken naar de arbeidsmarktsituatie volgend op de werkloosheid.  We
vinden dat zowel het patroon van individuele duurafhankelijkheid als het effect van de
niet-waargenomen heterogeniteit verschilt. We vinden echter geen bewijs voor correlatie
tussen beide uitstroomkansen. Bij deze resultaten zij wel opgemerkt dat nauwelijks is
voldaan aan de afgeleide conditie voor identificatie.
Hoofdstuk 4 gaat over deeltijdarbeid. OECD statistieken tonen aan dat gedurende
de afgelopen decennia deeltijdarbeid een belangrijk fenomeen op de arbeidsmarkt is ge-
worden. Hoewel landen verschillen in de hoogte van het percentage deeltijdarbeid ten
opzichte van de totale werkgelegenheid, geldt in alle landen dat werkgelegenheidsgroei in
belangrijke mate veroorzaakt wordt door groei in deeltijdbanen. Meestal wordt aangeno-
men dat toegenomen participatie van vrouwen de oorzaak is van de groei in deeltijdarbeid.
Echter, ook veranderingen in arbeidsvraag zouden deze groei kunnen verklaren. Het doel
van dit hoofdstuk is nu om na te gaan wat de meest waarschijnlijke verklaring is voor de
groei in deeltijdarbeid in Nederland, veranderingen in arbeidsvraag of veranderingen in
het arbeidsaanbod.
Om deze vraag te beantwoorden construeren we een evenwichtsmodel van de arbeids-
markt, een zogenaamd matching model. Deze modellen passen in de zoek-theorie litera-
tuur. Een belangrijk element in deze literatuur is het bestaan van fricties op de arbeids-
markt. Met andere woorden, het kost tijd voor een werkzoekende om een baan te vinden.
In matching modellen wordt de arbeidsmarkt gemodelleerd als een verzameling vacatures
en een verzameling werkzoekenden. Gegeven de zoek- en recruteringsactiviteiten is er
dan een bepaalde kans dat een individu in de groep van werkzoekenden en een van de
vacatures elkaar ontmoeten. Arbeidsvraag is in de context van het model equivalent met
de keuze van een bedrijf een vacature toe te voegen aan de verzameling van vacatures,
terwijl arbeidsaanbod gemodelleerd wordt als de beslissing van een individu om toe te
treden tot de groep van werkzoekenden.
Vervolgens kiezen we de parameters van het model zodanig dat het gegenereerde even-
wicht de situatie op de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt weerspiegelt. De comparatieve statica
van het model tonen vervolgens aan dat veranderingen in arbeidsvraag de meest waar-
schijnlijke oorzaak zijn van de groei in deeltijdarbeid, zoals die plaatsvond in Nederland
gedurende de afgelopen twee decennia. De intuitie hierachter is dat veranderingen in de
vraag leiden tot veranderingen in het aanbod, terwijl het effect van veranderingen in het
aanbod beperkt wordt door de productie-structuur. Hoewel het door het extra aanbod
eenvoudiger wordt om part-time vacatures te vervullen, is bij een gegeven productie-
structuur maar een beperkt aantal extra vacatures winstgevend.
Dat veranderingen in de vraag naar arbeid inderdaad de oorzaak zijn van de groei in
deeltijdarbeid in Nederland, zou verband kunnen houden met het begin jaren '80 inge-
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zette proces van arbeidsduurverkorting. Gedurende de recessie van begin jaren '80 leidde
arbeidsduurverkorting tot verkorting van de bedrijfstijd, om zo het overschot aan capa-
citeit op te lossen. Echter, in de tweede helft van de jaren '80 trok de economie weer
aan.  Om bij de ingezette arbeidsduurverkorting extra capaciteit te creeren werden be-
drijfstijd en arbeidstijd ontkoppeld. In combinatie met de toegenomen volatiliteit van de
bedrijfsdrukte, ontstond zo toenemende behoefte aan fiexibele werktijd arrangementen
om efficient personeel in te kunnen roosteren. Deeltijdarbeid voorzag in die behoefte.
In de tweede helft van hoofdstuk 4 wordt empirisch bewijs aangedragen voor dit ver-
moeden. Gebruikmakend van gegevens uit een panel van Nederlandse bedrijven, vinden
we dat hoe meer bedrijfstijd en arbeidstijd verschillen, hoe meer deeltijdarbeid er ingezet
wordt. Verder wordt ook het positieve verband tussen de volatiliteit van de bedrijfsdrukte
en de hoeveelheid deeltijdarbeid binnen een organisatie bevestigd.
In het model dat ten grondslag ligt aan hoofdstuk 4 worden lonen bepaald door on-
derhandelingen tussen werkgever en werknemer. Op loononderhandelingen wordt nader
ingegaan in hoofdstuk 5. Met behulp van een zogenaamd atternating ofter model wordt
de situatie beschreven waarin een bedrijf en een vakbond onderhandelen over het loon
van de werknemers. Beurtelings doen beide partijen een voorstel, waarbij de vakbond
de mogelijkheid heeft te staken als er geen overeenstemming over het op tafel liggende
voorstel wordt bereikt. Ook kan de vakbond ervoor kiezen om in geval van onenigheid
te blijven werken voor het huidige loon, de zogenaamde holdout optic. De belangrijkste
bijdrage van de analyse in dit hoofdstuk aan de literatuur is de introductie van eindige
contractduren en productiviteitsgroei in het alternating oT€r model. Dit betekent dat
het nu overeengekomen loon van invloed is op de uitkomst van de onderhandelingen na
afloop van het contract, en dat de te verdelen koek in de toekomst groter is dan de koek
nu. Met andere woorden, de geloofwaardigheid van de dreiging te gaan staken en de
effecten van een holdout worden hierdoor in een dynamische context geplaatst. Dit leidt
uiteindelijk tot interessante verschillen in loondynamiek ten opzichte van de dynamiek in
het standaard model met oneindig durende contracten en een koek van vaste omvang.
Het blijkt dat het maximale nut dat de vakbond kan bereiken niet afhangt van de lengte
van het contract. Echter, de manier waarop dit nut bereikt wordt is wel afhankelijk van
de contractduur. De twee essentiale parameters in het model zijn de disconteringsvoet
van de spelers (ie. hun ongeduld) en de groeivoet van de winst. Op basis van deze twee
parameters kunnen twee klassen onderscheiden worden, ieder met hun eigen loondyna-
miek. In het eerste geval is er monotone convergentie naar een stabiele toestand, waar
het loon een vast percentage van de winst is. In het tweede geval bestaat er geen stabiele
toestand en vertoont het loon cyclisch gedrag. Ook zijn er situaties waarin het voor de
vakbond optimaal is om in te stemmen met een verlaging van het loon terwijl op dat
moment staken een geloofwaardige dreiging is.
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